The one hundred twenty five years of Europe’s past that stretched from the French Revolution to the outbreak of World War I (1789-1914) is commonly treated by historians as the era known as the “Long nineteenth century.” This fact alone stands in extraordinary contrast to how the landscape of Europe—both figuratively and in all too many cases literally—was so dramatically and irrevocably altered in the slightly more than four decades that followed. The task of telling that story in a single volume—a chronicle of people and events at once complex and colossal in scope—falls to renowned British historian Ian Kershaw in To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949 [2015], an installment in The Penguin History of Europe series, a big, ambitious, well-written survey of outsize consequences plotted along a concentrated timeline, and in this he mostly succeeds.
It is no small challenge. In the style of an old fashioned narrative history, Kershaw—a scholar regarded in some quarters as one of the foremost experts of Hitler and Nazi Germany—guides the reader through the catastrophe of World War I and the repercussions in its aftermath; the social, economic, and political instabilities of the interwar period that was marked by both great prosperity and financial collapse, as well as by the twin incongruities of a strengthening of democratic institutions and the birth of fascism; the unimaginably even greater calamity that was World War II; and, finally, the dawn of the Cold War. That’s a tall order, and I have to wonder if Kershaw, despite his credentials, at first hesitated at the assignment of fitting all that into one book rather than several.
Given the scope of the material and the confines of just one volume, the author must make a series of determinations as to where to focus: what warrants passing mention and what merits a deeper dive. There’s simply too much to detail it all in a bit more than five hundred pages. From the start, it is evident that Kershaw made sound decisions. He correctly recognizes that while the aftershocks of the First World War were indeed momentous, reporting the course of the war itself other than in broad outline is unnecessary for this kind of survey. The second war gets far more attention, and rightly so. Here the reader is rewarded by Kershaw’s expertise with Nazi Germany as all the many moving parts of Hitler’s ambitions at home and abroad are skillfully assembled into what was to become the ruthless killing machine that by 1945 left the continent littered with an astonishing seventy five million dead—nearly twice as many casualties as in the first war.
But my own interests were most piqued by the author’s brilliant treatment of the interwar period that puts a lie to many popular myths, especially with regard to the Weimer Republic and its later hijack by Adolf Hitler. It turns out that reparations caused far less economic than psychological trauma. And hyper-inflation, at least in its first wave, was more helpful than harmful to Germany, as war debts were rapidly repaid, and the industrial manufacturing base rebuilt and refortified. Most surprising, perhaps, is Kershaw’s emphasis on the strength of German democratic institutions, which he pronounces among the most solid in Europe at the time. The latter serves as a tragic underscore to what might have been, absent the rise of Hitler. Fascism was born in Italy, of course, and Mussolini’s role in sponsoring and spreading its dangerous contagion internationally receives careful attention. Meanwhile, Stalin was curating his increasingly brutal brand of Soviet totalitarianism. The Spanish Civil War—which for a time acted as a kind of proxy dueling ground between Germany and the USSR—also gets the coverage it deserves. And there’s much more.
The toughest task for any so-called “European history” is to provide adequate if not exactly equitable coverage to all its member nations. That is not easy. There’s a lot of countries in Europe—many more after the First World War fragmented multiple empires into artificially constructed borders with adjacencies to sometimes hostile ethnicities. Of course, all the attention typically goes to the big guys: the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, and sometimes Spain—but those six only represent about eight percent of the seventy-three sovereign states that existed in 1939!
Kershaw tries to do better, but frankly it is an impossible trial, especially in a single book. Still, he widens the lens enough to reveal most of these nations struggling against similar internal and outside urgencies and meeting these with either traditional remedies that were likely to fail or, rarely, sometimes novel approaches that might have bred success in the longer term had not the cataclysmic Second World War swallowed up all other exigencies. These forces included economic depression, the impact of American isolationism, the almost paranoid fear of the spread of Soviet communism, as well as the instability inherent in the sudden creation of multiple new nations, and the truncation of several existing empires that also saw their respective monarchies replaced by new kinds of governing mechanisms.
There was also the disenchantment of millions who walked away from the ruins of the First World War unwilling to simply return to the “business as usual” of a once familiar civilization that had been shattered beneath their feet. The latter existential crisis was more characteristic of the West, however. In the East, as Kershaw makes clear, there was far more celebration, at least at first, with nation-building that saw the tossing off of centuries-old yokes of oppressor states. The course of both wars was also quite different east and west, as were the outcomes. There were few trenches in the east in the first war, and the results of victories and defeats forged new sovereignties. But these lands were ravaged like never before in the second war, and the years that followed saw them fall victim to a new brand of tyranny under Soviet domination.
Academics may gripe that To Hell and Back lacks endnotes, but that was ordained by Penguin editors, not Kershaw. Notes here are likely superfluous anyway, for the most part, because this is a synthesis of existing scholarship, rather than groundbreaking new theses. The back matter does include an extensive bibliography, as well as a series of fine maps, something often frustratingly conspicuous in their absence in all too many books of history. Still, I suspect some readers will find something to complain about, if only because the curious mind will want Kershaw to spend more time on a topic of interest that only saw fleeting attention in the narrative. But I resist that. Instead, I have nothing but admiration for an author who was able to competently include so much between two covers while maintaining the reader’s interest throughout, and at once dodged the dreaded tedium of a textbook or Wikipedia entry. That is quite the achievement in itself.
But there’s more. Mark Twain allegedly quipped that “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.” Hitler’s Austrian Anschluss, adventurism in the Sudetenland, and invasion of Poland echo eerily in Vladimir Putin’s brand of neofascist revanchism, manifested in the annexation of Crimea, the sponsoring of puppet statelets in the Donbas, and finally the full scale assault on Ukraine. That is indeed a kind of unsettling rhyme. I came to this book because while reading The Gates of Europe, Serhii Plokhy’s masterful history of Ukraine, I was struck by a series of uncomfortable gaps in my own knowledge base. It occurred to me that I could speak with greater facility of the Peloponnesian War or Appomattox than I could the Treaty of Versailles. Surveys are not intended to be comprehensive, but the very best ones—To Hell and Back certainly earns that accolade—tickle the brain to incite further pursuits. And for that I offer my sincere gratitude to Ian Kershaw.

A review of the Plokhy book, referenced above … Review of: The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine, by Serhii Plokhy

Review of: To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949, by Ian Kershaw – Regarp Book Blog https://regarp.com/2024/05/06/review-of-to-hell-and-back-europe-1914-1949-by-ian... ( )

Described as a history of Europe from 1914 to 1949, this is actually a political and economic history of the two world wars in Europe; other aspects of European history are not discussed independently. Military details of the wars are not present. The various human actors are mentioned only as necessary, so Hitler's (of whom the author is a famous biographer) adult political activities are mentioned, but his various colleagues are mostly ignored. There is excellent and enlightening description of Lord Halifax, Neville Chamberlain and Hitler regarding meetings about the Sudetenland, but Churchill, for example, is not discussed in any detail. Consequently, the work is anecdote poor. The first eight chapters of the book are sequential. The book reads like it was well-outlined and is an excellent reference with interesting statistics. I liked the discussion of the economics of the 1920s by country; some myths are dispelled. The book was recommended to me by the author Lewis Weinstein after his initial exposure to Kershaw's analysis of the Spanish civil war. I have to admit that I find the Spanish civil war so confusing that I'm not sure I was enlightened much. The later chapters include interesting discussions of the relationship between the major Christian religions and the Nazis, country by country, the relationship between various famous intellectuals and the Nazis (including, for example, Arthur Koestler, Ezra Pound and Martin Heidegger), interesting statistics about the approximate number of deaths among all of the displaced people after the war, country by country, and interesting statistics about how each country dealt with collaborators and Nazi functionaries after the war. There are many other useful things here. I look forward to the second volume and I will let pass the author's absurd comment that Proust's epic novel was extraordinary "not least for its length". ( )

Mi s-a părut simultan prea superficială și pe repede înainte (să tratezi peste 30 de ani, în toate țările europene, în toate domeniile, de la economie la religie, politică, armată și istorie, în 600 pag, e clar nerealist), dar și prea încărcată (prea multă informație per pag) și, sincer, plictisitoare ca un manual.
Pe deasupra, Kershaw nu înțelege prea bine Estul și URSS-ul și manifestă, din perspectiva mea, o înțelegere prea mare față de caracterul criminal și imperialist al acestui stat.
Cât despre România, aproape toate referințele sunt greșite istoric sau chiar anti-românești... ( )

Megírni az egész huszadik századot - ez, gondolom, épp olyan álma egy korszakkal foglalkozó történésznek, mint egy gyógyszervegyésznek kikeverni a rák ellenszerét vagy a Covid-vakcinát. A nehézségek viszont számosak. Mindenekelőtt a téma szerteágazó volta, aminek köszönhetően egy effajta összefoglalás alsó hangon is tízezersok oldalasnak ígérkezik - amennyiben pedig a szerző ezt szeretné egy jóval emberségesebb 1200 oldalnyira redukálni (ami azonban még mindig sok, azzal együtt, hogy bűnösen kevés), vagy meg kell barátkoznia a zanzásodás gondolatával, vagy ki kell választania egy speciális (lehetőleg eredeti) nézőpontot, és arra kell korlátoznia az írói figyelmet.

Kershaw előbbi mellett dönt, ami mindenképpen jogos, ha valaki összefoglalásban gondolkodik. Ebből következik, hogy ez a kötet inkább széles, mint mély. Nem igazán lehet kiemelni egyetlen revelatív, új gondolatot, ami köré szervezné a struktúrát - következésképp laikusoknak tökéletes, de aligha fognak parázs történelmi viták kialakulni a kötet kapcsán.

Mondjuk egy központi gondolat azért akad - bár forradalminak éppen nem nevezném. Kershaw a Nagy Kérdésre (vö.: "Hogyan jutott el oda a világ legprosperálóbb, talán legcivilizáltabb kontinense, hogy mintegy brahiból szétrobbantsa saját magát?") azt a választ adja, hogy az események ősoka a globalizálódó, alapvetően demokratikus kapitalizmus kifáradása volt, amely párhuzamosan zajlott az új ordas eszmék kialakulásával. Ráadásul nem is egy ordas eszméről beszélünk - egyfelől ugye ott vannak a bezárkózást hirdető nacionalizmusok, amelyek közvetlen kiváltó okai voltak az első világháborúnak, a két világháború között pedig némi forradalmi tónussal gazdagodva fasizmusként születtek újjá. Másfelől pedig a világháborús szenvedés felerősítette és radikalizálta a marxizmust, vagyis megjelent a politikai palettán a szélsőbal is, leánykori nevén kommunizmus. A huszadik század első fele tulajdonképpen leírható úgy, mint ennek a három ideológiának a véres birkózása. Nagyjából 1941-ig úgy tűnt, a demokrácia passzivitásának köszönhetően vereséget szenved - Hitler ekkorra uralma alá hajtotta Európa nagy részét, a Molotov-Ribbentropp-paktum pedig arra utalt, hogy a két szélsőség szövetséget kötött a közép felszámolására.

Ugyanakkor van itt egy bújtatott tanulság is - hogy végeredményben a szélsőségek hasonlítanak a Hegylakókhoz, jelesül közülük is csak egy maradhat. Így biztos távolságból már megállapítható, hogy a nácizmus (vagyis minden nacionalizmus legvirulensebb megnyilvánulási formája) törvényszerűen kellett megtámadja a bolsevizmust (ami meg a kommunizmus sajátosan orosz - mondhatni: ázsiai - változata volt). Hisz mindketten totalisták voltak, a lélek egészére tartottak igényt, és hát két totalista nem fér meg egy csárdában, de még egy kontinensen se. A demokrácia nagyobb rugalmassága ebben a közegben hasznos fegyvernek bizonyult - képes volt antikommunista meggyőződését zárójelbe tenni egy időre, és az egyik rosszal szövetkezve megsemmisíteni a másik rosszat.

Kershaw összefoglalásának első kötete itt ér véget: a két szélsőség közül az egyiknek a véglegesnek tűnő vereségével*. A porondon két szereplő maradt. Egyfelől a demokrácia, ami aztán tényleg úgy festett, hogy lesüllyedt a medence aljára - de hát onnan lehet elrugaszkodni felfelé. Másfelől a Szovjetunió, aki meglehetős renoméval emelkedett ki a világégésből, mint az ország, aki a legtöbbet áldozta a nácizmus legyőzéséért**. Hogy ők mire mennek egymással, nos, az a második kötetből kiderül.

(Megjegyz.: én ezt a második kötetet várom igazán. Az első kötet erényei nyilvánvalóak ugyan, hisz kvázi tökéletes és minden aspektusra kiterjedő összefoglalás, de nekem néhol - most dicsekedni fogok - inkább tűnt átismétlésnek, mint új információnak.)

* Most talán elspoilerezem a második kötetet - pedig meg se jelent -, de a Szovjetunió felbomlása tulajdonképpen megismételte azt a mintát, amit 1945-ben már láthattunk. Csak épp akkor a szélsőbal szenvedett olyan vereséget, amiből - úgy tűnik - nincs visszaút. Igaz, az ő abszolút hitelvesztése nem egy mindent felperzselő háború, hanem egy jóval lassabb gazdasági-politikai folyamat végeredménye, de attól még nem kevésbé totális. Sajnálatos, hogy úgy fest, az emberiségnek egy szélsőségre mindig szüksége van ahhoz, hogy komfortosan érezze magát a bőrében, mert a kommunizmus bukásával párhuzamosan az agresszív nacionalizmusok elkezdtek visszatérni az üresen maradt ideológiai térbe.
** A mítosz, miszerint az oroszok a nácik egyetlen hiteles ellenfelei, a mai napig az ország önképének integráns eleme. Aminek köszönhetően a putyini propaganda szerint Oroszhon bárki ellen visel háborút, valójában a nácik ellen visel háborút. ( )

The book caught my attention for the sheer audacity of the subject matter: Europe covering the period that encompassed two world wars, the early Cold War and a rather eventful inter-war period. I am familiar with single-volume histories of each war, but to do justice to both - and everything in-between seemed an impossible task. It would not simply because of the writing and the need to condense key facts, but the immense volume of material that exists covering the period.

The outcome is impressive. [a:Ian Kershaw|30702|Ian Kershaw|https://images.gr-assets.com/authors/1612305000p2/30702.jpg] paints the narrative chapter by chapter advancing a few years at a time, sketching our the political developments, the views of the elite, of the ordinary people, economic and cultural developments. Inevitably the major powers get the most attention: Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Russia (or the Soviet Union), Italy and (while it lasted) Austria Hungary. But he also did a circuit of the other countries, picking out common themes and contrasts. The coverage was truly impressive.

Of course, something has to give. This was very broad-brush. There are no detailed accounts like you might find in his biographies of Hitler (e.g. [b:Hitler|22534749|Hitler|Ian Kershaw|https://i.gr-assets.com/images/S/compressed.photo.goodreads.com/books/1410145141l/22534749._SY75_.jpg|3785163] ). Any detail of the military campaigns was largely eliminated as battles affecting hundreds of thousands of troops were covered in a half-sentence (such as the battles for Norway and France) or vanish entirely (such as the defence of Greece or the Allied operations after Normandy). This must be the only history of the period that does not mention Eisenhower, Montgomery or Rommel! Kershaw has chosen to put more emphasis on the privations of the civilian population: bombing, totalitarian control, famine, displacement and of course, deliberate mass murder - the genocide.

Controversies and mysteries are quickly dispensed with. There is no debate about the causes of the First World War - an answer is provided and he moves. This also proves a contrast to [b:Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World, 1940-1941|143614|Fateful Choices Ten Decisions That Changed the World, 1940-1941|Ian Kershaw|https://i.gr-assets.com/images/S/compressed.photo.goodreads.com/books/1266481778l/143614._SY75_.jpg|2420378] where he deals with a series of key decisions in detail.

Gaps such as these are unavoidable given the scope of the task. The result, however, is a coherent narrative that does feel like a genuine European perspective that gives fair coverage across the board. ( )