This is a battle history in which the history of the battle takes up considerably less than half the book (chapters 13 through 17, pages 192-286). The rest of the book tells the story of “the men who fought it,” with particular emphasis on the fact that the primary identification of those men was not with their regiment, but with their community, usually recruited by company. Nevertheless, the description of the fighting is good. The maps are also good; although they don’t show differences in elevation, and are in black-and-white, they do show where the various units were at various times during the battle. ( )

The battle of Wilson's Creek was one of the first US civil war battles I heard about and it remains one of my favourites with its flavour of generals and soldiers of variable capability and high-minded battle plans that end in a free-for-all. So I was exited to learn about this battle study. Unfortunately, the authors base their narrative on an extensive reading of newspaper accounts and show a peculiar need to inform us repeatedly about trivial non-events such as that the homefolk were glad to see their returning warriors. A more accomplished and juicy use of their large source material could not, however, compensate for their lack of military knowledge and reasoning. It starts with small mistakes such as "the full battery opened, possibly with canister, as the closest enemy was no more than five hundred yards away" (p.230). Highly unlikely, as canister fire beyond 200 yards is ineffective and beyond 400 yards futile.

More gravely is the authors' lack of understanding of Lyons' strategy, position and logistics: His army of ninty-days recruits was on the verge of melting away. Just like McDowell in Virginia, he had to force the issue or relinquish Missouri to the more numerous local Southerners and a pro-South governor. Lyons' drive and charisma and a nucleus of professional soldiers allowed him to knock the Southerners (nearly) out of Missouri - at a high cost in casualties and his own personal life. While the Confederates repeatedly reentered Missouri, they never achieved command over any population centers. This resolves the authors' puzzle why the North considered the tactically lost battle a victory. The battle kept Missouri in the Union.

The authors do not appreciate how Lyons was sandwiched between the war's worst political generals: Above him, "pathfinder" John C. Frémont, below/beside him, "I fights mit" Franz Sigel - both of which were to hand further victories to the South in their careers. Sigel's incompetent idea and leadership of the flank attack cost the Federals the chance of victory - although this is hardly discussed in the book. The book's maps lack elevation and forest markings and the unit positions are not to scale.

Overall, the authors are to be commended for their effort in tracking the source material. The ultimate battle study of Wilson's Creek remains to be written. ( )