David G. Herrmann

Herrmann has set out to confront the extraordinarily complex question of the origins of World War One. He has chosen to approach the problem from an international geopolitical perspective, in which he compares the developments and perceptions of the major European powers from 1904-14. Herrmann devotes much of his work to discussions of the various international diplomatic crises that plagued Europe in the decade leading up to World War One. Herrmann bases a significant portion of his analysis on the perceptions of the European powers of their rivals and allies. This theme of perception is a critical one for Herrmann. Using the successive diplomatic crises as a framework, he examines the evolutions of the various military policies / developments and how they were perceived by their neighbors. Thus, for Herrmann, World War One appears to be the outcome of a variety of factors, none of which were necessarily inevitable: the outcomes of the diplomatic crises and overall strategic and diplomatic environment; the role of various military developments and the general arms race, which had a destabilizing effect; and the perceptions surrounding both.

Herrmann shows the myriad of ways in which military strategy and foreign policy were inextricably linked in the decade leading up to World War One. The balance of military power -- Herrmann is careful to distinguish this from a broader balance of power -- did not cause the First World War, but it clearly had a major influence on the course of events leading up to the war and at least some impact on the decisions of the belligerents to go to war. For Herrmann, it was only after the Second Moroccan Crisis of 1911 (and not after either the First Moroccan Crisis of 1905-06 or the Bosnian Crisis of 1908-09) that the various European powers were locked into an "interdependent" set of actions and reactions involving increases in military spending and true expectations of future military conflict. This competitive arms race of 1912-13 is a major focus of Herrmann's analysis. Herrmann presents a large body of convincing evidence that the military build-ups, ostensibly for defensive purposes, were misperceived as being indicative of aggressive / offensive intentions, causing the other side to react with greater hostility and coloring their perceptions, ultimately creating a destabilized international political environment. Military force became the central concern of European international politics. Thus, Herrmann claims that the national armament acquisitions were the product of international tensions rather than internal domestic considerations and were the primary precipitant of World War One.

Aside from the major themes of the arms race and the perceived balance of military power, Herrmann also includes a number of secondary themes in his geopolitical opus. Herrmann highlights the centrality of the reserve forces and mobilization of "citizen soldiers" during wartime, as peacetime armies were largely professional cadres and frameworks on which to expand during wartime. He also discusses the coming of the age of machine warfare and the difficulties the various European powers had in integrating the new military technologies into their force structures and operational concepts. Very often, technological developments and early adoption by one or more states set off military competitions -- e.g., airships, aeroplanes, quick-firing artillery, etc. -- which contributed to heightened tensions and antagonism.

Methodologically, Herrmann is very successful at treating the pre-WWI European states as being inextricably linked, politically, diplomatically, and militarily. Herrmann's unit of analysis is the nation-state as a whole. He focuses on the actions of the nation, only rarely discussing the actions of individuals or divergent schools of thought within nations. He also does not focus on any one state's development to the exclusion of others, nor does he examine any in isolation. This "inter-connectedness" is crucial to Herrmann's argument and analysis, and he always comes back to discussions of the changing balance of military power (or at least perceptions of these changes). He largely builds the chapters of the book around the series of political and military crises that shook Europe from 1904-14. Within each chapter, Herrmann examines one of the crises in detail, discussing why the crisis happened, how it was eventually resolved, and what the impact of the crisis and its resolution was on each of the European powers. He also provides a description of the relevant military-technical developments during the examined period, describing how the different countries' military developments were inter-related and, in some cases, led to increased competition and perception of aggressive intent. Herrmann also provides thorough and compact summaries of the crises, developments, and implications at the start and end of each chapter.

Herrmann is careful to restrict his discussion to the military-technical and, to a lesser extent, cultural realms. For Herrmann, it is these areas that played the critical role in the outbreak of war. He does not discuss economic relationships and issues; domestic political cultures and pressures; or even the naval race between Britain and Germany (which he quickly dismisses). Herrmann presents his evidence fairly, but for him, the military build-ups and associated perceptions of intent are the key causes of the First World War. This may be a minor concern or a major problem, depending on the reader's perception of the extent to which non-military-technical factors had on the road to war. I personally would like to have seen a more significant treatment of domestic politics and parliamentary maneuverings, as we see only the barest hints of these in The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War. For the most part, Herrmann treats nations as unitary entities, not examining the various interest groups within nations and the roles these might have potentially played in fomenting war.

If there is a weakness in Herrmann's study of any of the major powers, it would be in his study of Russia. He fails to adequately explain Russia's interest in the Triple Entente and why it became such an enthusiastic ally of France. Herrmann is forced to confess that Russia's decision to declare war against Austria-Hungary was "mostly reactive and based upon political considerations," which weakens his overall argument that the balance of military power considerations was closely tied with the decision to eventually go to war. Herrmann also goes on to concede that "[t]he French decision to back Russia was more or less automatic, but had some basis in calculations of relative military power" and that the British apparently made their decision based on "immediate political and long-term strategic concerns rather than on fine calculations of the military balance." This has a cumulative effect in weakening the part of Herrmann's argument concerning the criticality of military power calculations.

Herrmann also does not spend a great deal of time discussing the extent to which the European powers had successfully integrated their new military forces (both in terms of new manpower and new military technology) by 1914. Since Herrmann points out that the bulk of the military acquisitions were begun after the Second Moroccan Crisis in 1912-13, it would seem to have been difficult to fully integrate all the new forces by the actual onset of war. This would appear to be an argument against the arms race being a major cause of outbreak of war in 1914, but this minor criticism simply warrants a fuller exploration and does not, by any means, seriously damage Herrmann's argument.

Because the concept of perception, particularly of the balance of military power, is so critical to Herrmann's analysis, I also would have liked to see him devote more discussion to misperception (and the pursuit of policy contrary to national self-interest based on incorrect assumptions and beliefs). Clearly, almost all the major European powers failed to correctly judge their allies and antagonists in the period leading up to the outbreak of war. As Herrmann states, by 1914, from Germany and Austria-Hungary's perspective, the balance of forces was likely to get worse in the future; Italy, France, and Russia would all likely get stronger within a few years. Therefore, 1914-15 represented a reasonable military opportunity -- the situation had been better before, but it looked like it would get worse in the future. So where did Germany and Austria-Hungary go wrong in their strategic calculus? Were they simply considering raw numbers of mobilizable forces and failed to factor in the new modes of warfare that would quickly take hold once battle was joined? Did they believe that the other Entente powers would not risk war to aid their Russian ally? Why did Germany behave in such a bellicose manner, which ultimately had the effect of driving the Entente powers into closer cooperation? Herrmann offers no direct answers in his narrative.

All of these are relatively minor criticisms. Herrmann is truly to be commended for creating such a readable, scholarly narrative. He appears to have consulted at least fourteen European archives and cites works in at least four languages. While the omission of Russian, Serbian, and Ottoman sources is unfortunate, it is hard to expect more from a single scholar in any one work. Many of the works consulted are diplomatic papers, general staff reports, and intelligence assessments, some of which allow Herrmann to expose the various cultural biases and perceptions on the part of military attachés and other officials. These biased perceptions were a significant factor in diplomatic actions and military developments throughout the period and are welcome additions to the body of English language literature on the topic. Herrmann's thesis that balance of military power considerations was crucial to the decision to go to war and that the land armaments race destabilized European international relations and precipitated the war is well presented, convincing, and worthy of further discussion. All in all, Herrmann's The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War is a fascinating account of the geopolitics, crises, and interactions precipitating World War One.

Review copyright 2008 J. Andrew Byers… (mehr)