This issue focuses on the Aukus deal and the assessment is not positive.

Questions raised included:
- why does Australia need nuclear powered subs given the very much greater cost than conventionally powered subs?
- whether the promised subs will ever be delivered?
- how can we commit to a 50 year commitment and as importantly how can the US and the UK
- can we manage simultaneously 3 very different sub classes (renovated Collins class subs; second hand Virginia class subs that are to be sold to us and the new (yet to be designed) Virginia class replacements), when Australia seems incapable of handing its current sub fleet?

Over 5 articles, very different perspectives are provide, but mostly negative.

Big Ship

8 April 2024… (mehr)

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bigship | Apr 7, 2024 |

The march of autocracy : Australia's fateful… von Jonathan Pearlman

A lot has happened since this edition of Australian Foreign Affairs landed in my post box last year, but still, the first essay, 'Enter the Dragon, Decoding the new Chinese empire' offers interesting insights. Written well before the Pelosi stunt and the backlash from China, it made me suspect something that I haven't read anywhere in the mainstream media or even at John Menadue's Pearls and Irritations. What if all that firepower wasn't intended to 'punish' or 'threaten' but was a signal to China's domestic audience? What if it was meant to show them what China could do, if it chose? The Chinese people have endured two centuries of humiliation — what if the agenda was really to assert that China is confidently en route to world pre-eminence (and that a militarily overstretched and fiscally overburdened America can't do much about that?)

John Keane, professor of politics at the University of Sydney is the author of The Life and Death of Democracy. It's 992 pages long; I'm never going to read it. But I can read his essay instead, and it makes compelling reading. 'Enter the Dragon, Decoding the new Chinese empire' isn't an apology for a China we don't much like. It's about facing up to a reality rather than indulging in wishful thinking. It's about addressing misconceptions that are dangerous:

Like bellows to a fire, fallacies about China are inflaming controversies and stoking divisions. These misconceptions are dangerous because they spread confusion, attract simpletons, poison public life and blur political judgements. (p.8)

The first fallacy that Keane addresses is that China is commonly said to have a totalitarian political system. Strictly speaking, he writes:

... totalitarianism refers to a one-party political order ruled by violence, a single "glorious myth" ideology, all-purpose terror and compulsory mass rallies. The bulk of Chinese people would say that daily life in their country just isn't like that. The Mao days are over. (p.8)

China is ruled, says Keane, by a 'phantom democracy' put in place by leaders who seek to win the loyalty of the population. They know that mere power does not enable enduring rule. They know that the symbols of economic progress aren't enough either. They reject power-sharing, but they mimic electoral democracies. President Xi practises the common touch with well-crafted "surprise" appearances with the people. There are village elections and the spread of "consultative democracy" into city administration and business. They use digital media to shape public opinion via a giant information-gathering apparatus...

...which uses data-harvesting algorithms to send summaries of internet chatter to officials in real time, often with advice about terms to use and avoid during public brouhahas. (p.11)

China's leaders know that government stability rests on public opinion.

Ignored by those who view China as a country run by totalitarian bullies and authoritarian autocrats, this principle is of utmost importance in grasping that the new Chinese despotism is equipped with shock absorbers, and therefore more resilient and durable than many suppose. (p.12)

...the rulers of China acknowledge that power doesn't ultimately flow from the barrels of guns, or from Xingjiang-style interrogations, arrests and internments. They admit that little sustains the political order beyond the population's loyalty — their willingness to believe that the system addresses their complaints, and that democracy with Chinese characteristics is therefore better than its ailing 'liberal' alternative. (p.12)

The second set of misconceptions addresses China's burgeoning global role. Like America, China abhors the term 'empire', but (like America), that's what it is. Already.

[Empire] is the word that's needed to describe accurately China's rising global role in such fields as finance capital, technology innovation, logistics, and diplomatic, military and cultural power. (p.14)

To read the rest of my review please visit https://anzlitlovers.com/2022/08/14/enter-the-dragon-by-john-keane-in-australian...… (mehr)

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anzlitlovers | Aug 14, 2022 |

Friends, Allies and Enemies: Australian Foreign… von Jonathan Pearlman

The Australian Foreign Affairs journal only publishes three issues each year so there's no excuse for neglecting it, but as usual, I am really behind with my reading of the journals I subscribe to. But—six months after its publication—this issue is still very relevant because it raises the viability of our current foreign policy strategy, i.e. to counter the rise of China with new strategic partnerships instead of relying on the US. If Australia's foreign aid cuts in our region have taught our neighbourhood to look to their own interests and dispense with their loyalties accordingly, where does that leave us?

In the Introduction, Editor Jonathan Pearlman makes the point that countries in the region hold differing views of China and vary widely in readiness to confront Beijing.

In July 2019, for instance, Australia joined twenty-one countries in issuing a condemnation of China's mass detention of Uyghurs; the only other signatory in the Indo-Pacific was New Zealand. Among the more than fifty countries that, days later, issued a statement defending China, at least five were regional neighbours: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Nepal and the Philippines. Australia does not, like South Korea or Japan, stare at China across a sea; nor is it one of the many claimants to disputed territory in the South China Sea. Each country in the region has unique interests and qualities, which are likely to stretch the limits of the term "like-minded". (p.5)

Hugh White in 'Great Expectations' argues that building new alliances in Asia is destined to fail. The language of our Defence White Papers have changed over time, from a policy of self-reliance when Indonesia seemed the most likely threat, to overt support for Any American Adventures (whether they were in our strategic interest or not). But things have moved on. The most recent White Paper acknowledges that Australian confidence in America has been shaken, and not just by Trump's isolationism, his erratic diplomacy and his focus on China as an economic rather than strategic rival. China is now the most powerful adversary America has ever faced. It is also determined to take America's place as the leading power in East Asia. Washington still has no coherent plan to counter this, and not just because of Trump.

The reasons [...] go to the fundamental question of whether America needs to preserve its leadership role in Asia enough to justify the costs and risks of containing a rival as powerful as China in China's own backyard. China's strength and resolve means those costs and risks will be high. (p.11)

The idea of an 'Asian NATO' has been around for about 20 years: a regional coalition of US-led Indo-Pacific alliances to contain China. But it assumes that harnessing regional anxiety about China will lend itself to cooperation in our region.

Broad gestures of diplomatic support don't thaw much ice in a Cold War. China is determined to restore its position as the primary power in East Asia, and will bitterly resent and savagely punish those who oppose it. It has the capacity to impose high costs on its weaker neighbours at relatively low cost to itself. Asian countries will pay dearly if they dare to support US efforts to contain China. So while they might like to see China contained, it is unlikely they will be willing to contribute towards this containment. (p.14)

(We in Australia already know about 'economic punishment.' 40% of Australian exports to China have been affected by their trade bans.)

To read the rest of my review please visit https://anzlitlovers.com/2021/05/25/great-expectations-by-hugh-white-in-australi...… (mehr)

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anzlitlovers | May 25, 2021 |

Are We Asian Yet?: Australian Foreign Affairs 5 von Jonathan Pearlman

For people who are concerned about Australia's place in our region, the current issue of the Australian Foreign Affairs journal could be an interesting one, but I confess to a little weariness about the topic, Are We Asian Yet? History vs Geography. Individually and collectively, the writers of the four essays have thoughtful ideas to contribute but I have heard most of it before. (Not because I'm any kind of expert, but because this issue of Australia's place in Asia is a perennial).

There are four essays:

Significant Other: Anxieties about Australia's Asian future, by David Walker

Red detachment, Is Chinese culture beyond reach? by Linda Jaivin

Can Australia be one of us? The view from Asia by Sarah Teo

The Rookie PMs: How Canberra's leadership circus is damaging ties with Asia, by George Megalogenis

Yes, there is Australian anxiety about the future. But competitors for and resisters to US domination in the region were always going to arise. And it seems to me that one reason That Man keeps tearing up US agreements about everything is that the writing is already on the wall and he'd rather opt out than face the humiliation of losing its superpower influence in our region. #ChangeHappens...

Yes, Chinese culture is complicated, filtered to us through government propaganda on the one hand and dissidents on the other. Yes, there has been racism and othering of Chinese people and their culture. But there's no significance IMO to the fact that Australians don't know the names of Chinese Nobel Prize for Literature winners Gao Xingjian and Mo Yan. Most Australians don't know the names of any Nobel winners, perhaps not even our own Patrick White. And when it comes to not knowing much about Chinese arts in general, well, of course, it would be better if Australians knew more about any aspect of their neighbours' culture, but consider the burden: even with the best will in the world, Australians cannot be familiar with all the cultures of its own multicultural population. And even if we prioritised Asian cultures, it's still an impossible task, given the number of countries and the diversity of cultures within them. #DiversityIsComplicated.

The chapter which bothered me most was the one by George Megalogenis. His assumption seems to be that 'being Asian' is somehow related to the percentage of Asian-born migrants who make Australia their home.

"Are we Asian yet? The answer is yes in the booming inner city and outer suburbs of Melbourne, Sydney and even parts of Brisbane. Already the Asian-born outnumber the Australian-born in Melbourne's inner city, and in Auburn, in Sydney's west. They match the Australian-born in Melbourne's Dandenong, Sydney's Parramatta and Brisbane's Sunnybank. But the rest of the country is either still in transition or caught in a time warp, with an ageing Anglo-European population that is not being replenished with new immigrants." (p. 75)

So we are 'Asian' if our population morphs into an Asian-dominated demography? Let me clear, I don't object to any such change. What I'm querying is the assumption that such Asians remain 'Asian' in identity. As far as I'm concerned they have the potential to be, like all our other migrants, (including me) Australians of one sort or another, comfortable with a malleable identity and a dual heritage. And what if, as in Britain, the face of Australians becomes increasingly brown, with more migration from Africa and the Indian sub-continent? Would that make us more, or less, 'Asian'? IMO whatever 'being Asian' means, it doesn't mean defining ourselves by colour or ethnicity, and especially not if that's used as some sort of code for making ourselves acceptable to our neighbours.

To read the rest of my review please visit https://anzlitlovers.com/2019/04/29/australian-foreign-affairs-5-are-we-asian-ye...… (mehr)

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anzlitlovers | Apr 29, 2019 |

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