Dennis Ross

The work is divided into three rather unwieldy parts resulting in a mixed bag of tangible results. Dennis Ross argues that the Bush administration’s problems stem from its inability to use the tools of statecraft—diplomatic, economic, and military—to advance our interests. What he does not do is to distinguish how his statecraft differs significantly from what Bush employed as diplomacy. As a result, the work concludes little more than Ross disagrees with Bush. This is what is to be expected as a former Clintonian foreign policy expert though he did work in the administration of George H.W. Bush as well.

Similar to so many, Ross seems caught in a time warp of his own making. As Iraq has evolved into a more manageable situation, guarded optimism seems fair to state, Ross still maintains that Iraq is a failure. He should at least acknowledge the military success of the surge, which, when coupled with advances on the political and cultural front, as in his notion of statecraft, that Iraq is a winnable situation. He does not. He seems mired in the Iraq Study Group's overly pessimistic evaluation.

But the substance of the book is the three parts that concern him. One part is replete with historical examples, not wholly convincing applications of his notion of statecraft. He ties German unification, and the fragmentation of Bosnia, unsuccessfully; moreover, he omits any reference to the atrocities in Bosnia, as if Clinton masterfully handled the region as an example of statecraft. He likes Persian Gulf I since that was statecraft in his estimation but the Iraq War is a disaster. Then, a second piece has an exhortatory guidance section, while a third part is his analysis of particular situations. The bitter tone against the second Bush mars his argument throughout however. Towards the end he has a polemic against faith-based initiatives though little in his book addresses the idea.

Ross is almost frighteningly naive when it comes to the issue of Iran. He states: "No U.S. president is going to ignore public perceptions of Iran or the possible political fallout from negotiating directly with the Iranian leadership (pp. 178-179)." He certainly does not rule out direct negotiations without preconditions.

Ross' book is a remarkably frank expose on the disaster in the making of American foreign policy with the onset of the new administration.… (mehr)