Ronald H. Spector

One volume history of WW2 in the Pacific draws on declassified intelligence files; British, American, and Japanese archival material; and military memoirs. Reassesses US and Japanese strategy and shows that the dual advance across the Pacific by MacArthur and Nimitz was more a pragmatic solution to bureaucratic, doctrinal, and public relations problems facing the Army and Navy than a strategic calculation. He also argues that Japan made its fatal error not in the Midway campaign but in abandoning its offensive strategy after that defeat and allowing itself to be drawn into a war of attrition.
Spector skillfully takes us from top-secret strategy meetings in Washington, London, and Tokyo to distant beaches and remote Asian jungles with battle-weary GIs. He reveals that the US had secret plans to wage unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan months before Pearl Harbor and shows that MacArthur and his commanders ignored important intercepts of Japanese messages that would have saved thousands of lives in Papua and Leyte. Throughout, Spector contends that American decisions in the Pacific War were shaped more often by the struggles between the British and the Americans, and between the Army and the Navy, than by strategic considerations. https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Eagle-Against-the-Sun/Ronald-H-Spector/97...

Spector vividly recreates the major battles, little-known campaigns, and unfamiliar events leading up to the deadliest air raid ever, adding a new dimension to our understanding of the American war in the Pacific and the people and forces that determined its outcome.
A historian at the Army Center for Military History, Spector concentrates on the problem of command in the Southern Pacific theaters, the rivalries between the various U.S. armed services and the problem of allocating resources. PW praised his ability to ""show how even the most efficiently run campaigns unfold against a background of violent dispute.'' https://www.publishersweekly.com/9780394741017… (mehr)

This is an excellent history of China and Southeast Asia from after World War II ends until the mid-1950’s. There is so much information in here – the author presents a pretty balanced account of the civil wars and colonialism post WWII – excesses and failures on both sides. If you believe you have a “good” understanding of the history there but have never read any detailed accounts like this book, I urge you to read this book. Be prepared though, the book is lengthy and is likely to take a lot of reading time to digest everything.

I came away with such an enhanced understanding that changed some of my views on American and other foreign involvements in Korea (before and during the Korean War) and Vietnam (pre-US 1960’s involvement – the US Vietnam war is not covered, although the precursor years are covered.) Worst of all, the details of the deaths and casualties on every side will sadden you as it did me. The tales of vengeance and revenge that occurred before and after changes in control of areas will shock you. Perhaps not enough attention has been given to the human loss involved in what seemed like constant civil wars, fomented by foreign powers (this includes the US and France, but also China and the Soviet Union), partly because the focus in other countries (US and Europe) was on the end of WWII and recovery from the traumas of the early 1930s through 1945.… (mehr)

Er í dálitlum vandræðum með að meta þessa bók.
Annars vegar er hún ágætlega rannsökuð og fjallar vel um ólguna í kjölfar síðari heimsstyrjaldarinnar í rústum japanska heimsveldisins í Asíu.
Hins vegar segir Spector einungis hluta sögunnar og greinir ekki frá því hvers vegna hann fjallar eingungis um sum ríki en sleppir öðrum né finnst mér hann taka saman niðurstöður sínar með fullnægjandi hætti.
Spector greinir frá aðstæðum og ólgu í Kína, Kóreu, Indókína, Malyasíu og Indónesíu við uppgjöf Japana. Hvernig Bandamenn brugðust við uppgjöfinni með því að senda hersveitir til þessara svæða fyrst og fremst til að bjarga stríðsföngum og afvopna Japani.
Í ljós kemur síðan að þeir verða oft að fá japönsku hersveitirnar til að berja niður þjóðernissveitir heimamanna með valdi allt til 1947 en japönsku hermennirnir gengu líka stundum í lið með þessum sveitum. Þá lentu gömlu nýlenduþjóðirnar í miklum vandræðum með að ná aftur tökum á nýlendum sínum á svæðinu.
Helstu niðurstöður höfundar eru þær að bandamenn fóru algerlega þekkingarlausir til landanna, t.d. var enginn í herliðinu sem fyrst fór til Kóreu sem kunni tungumálið og þeir höfðu einungis nokkrar blaðsíður úr ferðabók frá 1905 til að styðjast við sér til upplýsingar. Spector bendir á hve aðstæður líkjast hernámi Íraks síðar meir.
Að lokum var ég sáróánægður með hvers vegna höfundur tiltók ekki hvers vegna hann fjallaði ekki um aðstæður í Filippseyjum, Japan, Suður-Kyrrahafi og Tævan í kjölfar stríðsins. Umfang slíkrar bókar hefði vissulega verið gríðarlegt en samanburður eða skýringar ættu vel heima.… (mehr)