War in the West (Tennessee not New Mexico)

Steven Woodworth returns to the Western Theatre in DECISION IN THE HEARTLAND (bum touchstones again) a scholarly investigation of the war without Lee. Woodworth briefly touches on all the important battles of the West from Henry/Donelson thru Shiloh, Stones River, the Atlanta campaign to the post Bentonville surrender as he expounds on his thesis: the war was won in the West not at Gettysburg. Happily he attaches a very solid bibliographic essay for those who which to read further. While not an all encompassing study is certainly is a great beginning point for those who which to know more about this part of the war. Well written, well researched; the one negative is the poor quality maps (Yuck). Recommended.

I was able to attend a Smithsonian Institution seminar on Confederate Military Strategy conducted by Stephen D. Engle who wrote War for the Heartland (silly touchstone gives me a completely different book if I try and write "Struggle for the Heartland" - go figure that one out). Anyway, I was so impressed by Engle's discussion of the war and the military challenges facing the Confederacy (and how they muffed it), that I told him he had sold a book - but I haven't had a chance to read it yet.

I will be writing up something about the seminar based upon my notes and posting it on LT.

Robert A. Mosher

Any further recommendations (especially operational/tactical) for the Forts Donelson/Henry campaign?

Re. Fort Donelson/Henry
I thought Where the South lost the War : an analysis of the Fort Henry-Fort Donelson campaign, February 1862 was worth looking at.
Probably could have dropped the headline grabbing title though

ALong with STRUGGLE and SOUTH LOST, you can also add Jack Hurst's MEN of FIRE that examines the campaign from the outlook of US Grant & Nathan Bedford Forrest. (a 3 star book).

Thanks, I ordered Men of Fire and South Lost (at very favorable prices).

I love civil war history where every engagement is a decisive turning point and high water mark. If only someone had informed the Southerners of their hopeless cause in time, a lot of blood and misfortune could have been spared ...

"It was a battle of the Bulge without overcoats." So starts Men of Fire. Oh, no! First, as anyone exposed to Band of Brothers knows, the US forces were also ill-supplied to the logistical overstretch during the battle of the Bulge. Secondly, and more importantly, the battle of the Bulge is a singularly bad comparison. It is wrong both in terms of the time frame and the role of the attacker. Two valid civil war comparisons to the battle of the Bulge spring to mind: Either Hood's Nashville campaign or Early's Washington raid (both ill-fated counterattacks depriving the South of her last reserves).

Ammianus, I admire your stomach for bad prose. The writing is atrocious on a monumental scale - strange for a professional journalist (supported by his English teacher sister!): "a fiery yet frozen hell" - either is possible bot not the combination; "The battles of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson split Dixie breast to bowel." - what shape of the South makes this remotely possible? About one howler per paragraph. The sentence structure is worse: "Although many more-venerated killing grounds were later to be consecrated, each would mark just one more valiant attempt by the Confederacy to recoup its staggering losses of Forts Henry and Donelson, the supply depots of Nashville, and the vastness bounded by southern Kentucky, northern Alabama, the Cumberland Mountains, and the Mississippi River" (p.2). He tends to overload his message ("the South could not compensate the territories lost") with an "all you can eat" buffet of misused adjectives and mixed ideas (casualties vs. land).

Will I finish the book? It is a bit like tracking the last season's Miami Dolphins, a mix of horror and perverse amusement. Fortunately, I only paid 3 USD (plus 6 USD S&H) for the book.

Where the South lost the War arrived - and what a difference: Bearss endorsement, check. Good maps, check. Detailed orders of battle (incl. numbers at the regimental level), check. Agreeable to read.

The author uses the Ft Leavenworth campaign analysis model, which according to my little googling is sort of a framework to anchor military principles. I'd be grateful for a pointer to read more about this.

JCBrunner -

Actually, if you go to the Fort Leavenworth website and look for library's digital page and the Combat Studies Institute page you should be able to access lots of their material as PDF files. It's a pretty good collection.

Robert A. Mosher

Thanks, the collection is great (and Ft Leavenworth reminds me always of Marshall). It has lots of interesting ACW stuff, among them also Gott's 1983 thesis paper on Fts Henry and Donelson ... a source I hope to use in summer when the enhanced Asus eee pc (larger screen) will be available as a PDF reader.

Despite searching the site, I have not yet found a good primer on the model. My search has turned up a lot of bad powerpoint slides (yellow on violet? really?), though. I keep digging.

I just finished Shiloh and the Western Campaign of 1862. It opens with about 100 pages on Forts Henry and Donelson. It is a very good book and goes through the seizure of Corinth by Halleck. I recommend it because it is so well written and researched.

Struggle for the Heartland is a struggle - to read. Seriously bad, bad writing. Similar to a six-year-old's gusto for the f-word, he peppers his text with medical, statistical and economic terms he doesn't quite understand (hint: significant does not mean important). Typical sentence: "The conflict threatened to sever the bonds of profitable intercourse as Southern states began to question their loyalties during the secession winter." A rewrite: The discussion of secession threatened established trade links at the end of 1860 (As few agricultural products mature in winter, transportation needs were probably limited anyway.). Bad writing leads to bad thinking.

I wonder where the blurbers and reviewers found the incorporation "of economic, political and social studies into military history". One might expect it in chapter 1, but a glance at his sources show just the same old, same old. A true analysis might have shown that the state borders make no economic and geographic sense and the "heartland" is anything but a moniker to a collection of different regions - which is precisely why both the Federal and Confederate commanders struggled to devise common campaign plans. This is not a new approach but classic military history with a weak intro bolted on.

The book has terrible maps (On the second map, one railroad is missing which is very prominent on the first map. On the Fort Donelson maps, units are but unlabeled blobs.). The bibliographical essay is a suck-up to a citation cartel and fails to mention a number of contributors (such as Bruce Catton. Cozzens only gets a weak nod to his Pope biography but not for his book on Corinth).

I generally like the Great Campaigns of the Civil War series. This is a major disappointment.