Choose to believe?

I am puzzled by this question, which I asked elsewhere, and was wondering if anyone here could help me understand the concept of "choosing to believe".

I don't see how someone can choose to believe; they either believe or they don't. Moving from one state to the other is something that happens after reflecting on the evidence, they either are persuaded by the evidence or testimony or they are not. How can one choose to be persuaded? How can one choose to believe?

I think that I asked a similar question in the Pro & Con group a while back, though I'm not quite sure which thread it was in. My cousin had asked me a similar question and I put it to the group.

I'd also asked the question in another fora and was somewhat interested in some of the replies there. One of the more interesting ones was from someone who lacked faith, yet found that by not believing, she was excluded from too much of her family's narrative structure. The day-to-day grounding and conversation, events that went by her... Things like that, she was not connected to. So in her case, she made a basic decision to practice faith.

I think a story that you might enjoy, rrp, would be the title story from Ted Chiang's collection Hell is the Absence of God. It's set in a world where the bare bones of belief are unquestionable, yet no more scrutable nonetheless. Angelic visitations are common occurences, witnessed by all.

The question of whether to have "faith" in God, though, is one that is entirely separate in this conception from the question of whether to believe in him.

And as for the basic concept of "choosing to believe" something, I think that you underestimate the basic self-deceptive drive of the human race (and I'm not necessarily pointing fingers at Christians here).

There are lots of little interesting sociological studies that show the various ways that people deceive themselves and others. Things like the famous Milgram's experiment, to the Kitty Margolis attack, etc.

One of my favorites was related in a memoir that I read a few years back. The basic experiment is that you take a large enough group of people, send one person out and then make the rest of the people your confederates. You then come up with a simple test, say comparing the length of two lines and deciding which is smaller. The crux of this is that while the person being tested is out of the room, you tell all of the confederates to make the wrong choice when answering the question (which is done by a show of hands).

Most people, when faced with such a situation, will cave and start giving the incorrect answers.

Thanks Jesse, I'll get the Ted Chiang book.

I am not sure that your psych examples show people choosing to believe. Aren't they just influenced by the group to make decisions on how they should react, not what to believe? They could be acting against their internal belief; we all recognize that peer pressure can be a strong motivator. Even if the subjects actually believed that the longer line was shorter, aren't they just persuaded by the evidence, of which part, in this case, is the reaction of the group (the wisdom of the crowd being a recognized, useful and mostly rational rule-of-thumb). Your example illustrates the power of persuasion not the ability to choose what you believe.

As to believing something because of the testimony of a trusted authority, I think that is a very common occurrence that is part of the normal process of accepting evidence. I can't see the difference between in saying "I believe person A" to "I choose to believe person A".

Now the stubborn issue is more interesting. If I refuse to consider some evidence for proposition A, am I thereby choosing not to believe proposition A? It is probably true that, at that time, I don't believe A. I may think, quite reasonably, that I have seen enough evidence to persuade me. I don't think you would fault me for refusing to consider someone's evidence showing 2+2=5. That I don't believe 2+2=5 in not a matter of choice because I refuse to view the evidence. I am just choosing not to waste my time.

If there is obviously plenty of evidence that 2+2=5 and I still don't believe it for some other reason, then obviously I think my reason, my evidence, does indeed trump the other evidence. Again, I am not choosing to believe, my evidence causes me to believe.

Anyway, it seems to me that stubbornness captures one sort of moral climate that is meant when the words "choose to believe" are used. When I say "you choose not to believe", I might be saying nothing about "choice" but mean "I disapprove of the fact that you do not believe me". But isn't choose to believe also used in a more positive moral sense, with approval not disapproval?

I think that some of what you're getting at is captured in the question of how "conscious" of the choices we make we are. By saying that we "choose" to believe something, we take to the level of a conscious decision.

Your argument, rrp, is that anyone that's honest with themselves, will have no choice but to choose to believe what they believe to be true. It's almost tautological in that sense. We choose to believe it, because we couldn't choose otherwise.

But I don't necessarily think that that's true... Though I'm not sure that I'd be able to offer anything more than anecdotal evidence to the contrary.

I'm reminded of the short story, "Sonny's Blues, by James Baldwin where the narrator says -

I couldn't believe it: but what I mean by that is that I couldn't find any room for it anywhere
inside me. I had kept it outside me for a long time. I hadn't wanted to know. I had had
suspicions, but I didn't name them, I kept putting them away. I told myself that Sonny was
wild, but he wasn't crazy. And he'd always been a good boy, he hadn't ever turned hard or
evil or disrespectful, the way kids can, so quick, so quick, especially in Harlem. I didn't want
to believe that I'd ever see my brother going down, coming to nothing, all that light in his
face gone out, in the condition I'd already seen so many others. Yet it had happened and
here I was, talking about algebra to a lot of boys who might, every one of them for all I knew,
be popping off needles every time they went to the head. Maybe it did more for them than
algebra could.

And I think that a lot of people determine their beliefs and strongly consider what they want to believe when making those determinations. It's why we end up with things such as confirmation bias and cognitive dissonance.

From a purely anecdotal standpoint, a lot of this was driven home to me when my father died. I probably couldn't even begin to ennumerate the number of people that said things to me along the lines of "You can't expect your friends to want to think about things like this" or "I don't want to have to think about going through something like this with my family".

At one point, I'd mentioned to an acquaintance I'd known for three or four years (or rather someone that I'd considered a friend up to that point), that they couldn't tell me my dead brother's name. The response that I received was that they "tried not to see that part of me, because it wasn't too much fun."

I guess that you could argue that this is more about something other than "belief", but I'd argue that it constitutes a sort of willful dictation of belief. And it's an all too human attribute.

As to believing something because of the testimony of a trusted authority, I think that is a very common occurrence that is part of the normal process of accepting evidence.

Oddly enough, argument by authority is logically invalid, yet inescapable.

If we were to (though I'm not sure we should) accept the conclusion that "chosen belief" is a different category than the type of belief demonstrated in our normal beliefs about the empirical world, (e.g., we don't "really believe" the things we choose to believe), does anything particularly interesting follow?

I think it would normally be stated that there's a difference between making our beliefs conform to our evidence/knowledge of the world and choosing to believe that the world adheres to our "chosen" beliefs even if our beliefs are otherwise unsupported.

Here's a question for you, rrp... Do you believe that it's possible for one to lie to oneself?

Do you believe that it's possible for one to lie to oneself?

Just now, I tried to convince myself of the truth of the statement "I am lying" and almost succeeded. Of course, once I realized I was lying then I must have been telling the truth ... that I was indeed lying ... oh no ... paradox vortex...

No, I don't think it's possible to lie to oneself.

>8 Alixtii:

So when you say to me "you choose not to believe X" you mean "I disapprove that you don't" and when I say "I choose to believe X" I meant "I don't really believe X" or "I don't have any reason to believe X". That would make sense. Of course "choosing" wouldn't then come into it at all.

>7 Jesse_wiedinmyer:

I don't think cognitive dissonance is an example of choosing to believe, more an example of how it's not possible to choose to believe. If I am aware of my own cognitive dissonance, and am able to choose to believe, surely I could choose to believe just one of the competing beliefs, and so resolve my cognitive dissonance.

Confirmation bias is an interesting trait. That I seek only confirming evidence for belief X, you suggest, means that I am choosing to hold belief X. But doesn't confirmation bias only work because I am unaware of any competing beliefs? It's almost defined that way. If so, then I don't have a choice, I have only one option, believe X. Don't I need a choice of alternative beliefs, say X and Y, to be able to choose to believe X?

11>

I'm not arguing that, at least not yet. I do think that "I choose to believe X" implies that "My reasons for believing X are nonstandard" where the standard reasons for belief are constitutive of some standard epistemological approach (say, correspondence theory). Whether something which is believed on pragmatic, coherentist, or otherwise non-standard epistemological grounds is "really" believed is not something I'm prepared to speak to, although it seems to me to say it isn't is to illegitimately presuppose the correctness of the standard epistemology, which is begging the question.

I'd probably disagree entirely with your statement that it's not possible to deceive oneself, though I'm pretty sure that at this point we're arguing axiomatic beliefs more than anything else.

And yes, I understand you're basic concept that if one lies to make a statement then you're fundamentally undercutting the truth-value of the statement. (Bringing to mind a girl I once dated briefly that spent six months leading me on. When queried about why she'd spent so long lying to me, she stated that she hadn't wanted to seem like a bitch. Which led me to wonder why one would have to lie to say they weren't a bitch.)

Regardless, though, I think that you're entirely incorrect in your assumption that most people are that self-aware. Nor do they choose to be. As to whether that truly counts as deception or not, I doubt we'll agree upon.

With regard to the concept of lying to others versus lying to oneself, I'm reminded of the quote from Hobbe's Leviathan -

And those that deceive upon hope of not being observed, do commonly deceive themselves (the darknesse in which they believe they lye hidden, being nothing else but their own blindnesse;) and are no wiser than Children, than think that all hid, by hiding their own eyes.

But again, I think that you and I have fundamentally different beliefs about the level of self-awareness that most people choose to display.

And it probably ties to what would be the distinction between wanting and having the ability. Going back to the discussions I had after my father died, I'd reiterate that most people stated that they had no desire to think of such things.

Have you considered, rrp, that if you follow your arguments to their logical conclusion, that you're pretty much arguing free will vs. determinism. Seeing that you're in the Christianity thread, I doubt that you'll get many takers for your point of view. I think determinism is pretty much anathema to most Christians, no?

Then again, even if you're right and our beliefs are in no way something that we control, those who believe that you're wrong couldn't help but do otherwise.

I am not looking for takers for my point of view. I have a genuine interest in the question. I honestly don't understand the concept of "choose to believe" and would like to know what people mean by it. If it were possible to "choose to believe", perhaps someone might be able to tell us how to do that; there are times when I sincerely wish I could.

I was hoping someone here could contribute some thoughts, or like you, point to a book that might help (BTW I'm picking up the Ted Chiang book tomorrow).

Cross-posted from Pro and Con (Religion):

As a churchgoer who is currently going through what might be termed an extreme agnostic episode, I am quite conscious of the meaning of "choosing to believe" from at least my current perspective, and it is related to the relationship between belief and practice. I could choose not to believe: I could abandon any attempt to find an intellectually and emotionally workable expression of my Self in religious terms, and (as the slogan on the London bus puts it) stop worrying and enjoy life. But having a religious temperament and many church associations, I am not sure I could "enjoy life" if I was convinced that life was all basically meaningless. So at present, I am actually in the situation of choosing to believe. Finding myself in an essentially agnostic frame of mind, I must decide whether meaning in life is something that I can potentially find from outside myself, or something that I can only impose upon it from my subjective perceptions. I prefer to hope that there is external meaning, so I am committed at least to continuing to explore whether I can find it. If I choose not to practise any form of spiritual life, then I am sure that pretty soon I will not have one. I choose to give faith the benefit of the doubt, and practise to the extent which my conscience allows. (This makes prayer essentially an exercise in either contemplation or zazen, since I am not sure that it makes sense to presume that "God" is "listening".) Believers who cannot accept the level of doubt which my beliefs or unbeliefs entail will carry on regarding me as beyond salvation. Atheists who cannot accept the positive side of agnosticism will presumably consider me feeble-minded.

I was hoping someone here could contribute some thoughts, or like you, point to a book that might help (BTW I'm picking up the Ted Chiang book tomorrow).

I'd realised while walking home today that I'd actually mislinked the book. The proper title of the book is Story of Your Life, and "Hell is the Absence of God" is not the title piece. Though after talking a bit more with you, I'd recommend it even more strongly than before. I'm not even sure that the book will necessarily illuminate the discussion further. It's definitely a story that stuck with me for the world he paints. I'd definitely be interested in hearing your thoughts on the story.

As for converting or not... I dunno what to say. I can definitely understand where you're coming from. "Choosing to believe" is something, for me on a personal level at least, indicates either a fundamental dishonesty or a lack of intellectual rigor. I do, however, believe that it's possible to be dishonest with oneself. In fact, I'd argue that it's probably easier to do that than otherwise. And even being honestly mistaken is much easier than not.

And I think that various deaths in my family are probably the prod to a lack of ability to "choose to believe" in my case (and I'll note that I'm not directing that at any specific belief whatsoever). But those events are the events that are somewhat immutable for me. If that makes sense. They don't change with time, so far as I can see. No amount of wishing makes the facts otherwise. And for all I know, there is an afterlife and this temporal passing too shall pass. Regardless, it's as close to an immutable fact as I might find. My beliefs on the matter don't change it one whit.

As to whether or not it's even possible to lie to oneself, that I probably don't have the time to get into at the moment. I still think that if you eliminate the ability to "choose belief" on any level, then you're left with determinism. The brain is essentially black-boxed, hard-wared by genes, programmed (and modified) by environment and we'd just spew out the outputs that correspond to our particular data set. Then again, that may be the way it actully is with our belief in our choice of our beliefs being merely a programming glitch.

Jesse

Thanks again. The book I have ordered is Feeling very strange : the Slipstream anthology . It contains the story.

It's actually a pretty good anthology. Another book (fiction) that deals with the subject in an oblique fashion is Franny and Zooey.

Nada?

So I read Hell is the Absence of God. It's not a bad story, but it didn't particularly move me. The central dilemma is not can one choose to believe in God, everyone believes in God in the story, it's can one choose to love God. As God, through Angels, his agents in the story, does some bad things, he is difficult to love. I suppose there are are parallels between choosing to believe (here) and choosing to love (in the story). In both cases there are reasons for and reasons against, the result (believing or loving) matters and in both cases the result seems beyond the will; you can't just choose to do it.

Religion provides people lots of comforts to people: god exists, he loves you, you can know his will, he will give you life after you die, and so on. What religion can not give you, however, is one logical reason or shred evidence to believe in it. So, in order to get the comforts of religion, people must "choose to believe," or "make the leap of faith," or "accept god into their hearts." These are all euphemisms for self delusion: I am choosing to belief something, not because it is true or can be shown to be correct, but because I want it to be true. The easiest thing is the world for a human being to do is to choose to believe something someone is telling them. We do it every day, even when deep down inside we know we are being told a lie.

#23- Lots of logical reasons for Christianity exist and plenty of evidence is out there for the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. Iron-clad evidence that is beyond doubt? Nope. But neither is there iron clad evidence for materialism. Like everything else, you take the evidence at hand and make a choice with it. Christianity has proven itself very satisfactory for me and the amount of proof that I see has become greater since I made my choice.

The existence of God is quite comforting in some ways, but also terrifying in others. Depends on how seriously you take Him.

#24- Good point, Mark. There are "many infallible proofs" (Acts 1:3) for the death and resurrection of Jesus, the essence of Christianity. For the discerning reader, the book of Daniel, written hundreds of year before Christ, predicts His death down to the year. God wants faith, but he wants an intelligent faith, not a blind one.

Give us an infallible proof for the death and resurrection of Jesus that is NOT in the Bible or the Church Fathers.

>26 geneg:

Putting the period after "Jesus" would be hard enough on its own, no?

I don't know what counts as "infallible proof," but I suspect the truth of Jesus' resurrection is transmitted to modern-day Christians much more forcefully in their personal experience than in anything the Church Fathers could have written.

>26 geneg:
How is this any more reasonable than saying "Give us an infallible proof for gravity that is not in Newton or any other scientific work"?

>26 geneg: I don't know if you would consider it infallible, but the growth and survival of the early church based on the simple testimony that Jesus has been raised from the dead when all it would take to destroy it is the production of the body, the proof of a conspiracy, or the admission of guilt from a tortured witness is quite remarkable.

Os, bend your knees, raise yourself up on the balls of your feet, now, uncoil as fast as you can, pushing as hard as possible with your legs and feet. What happens? Are you to the moon yet? No, I feel 100% certain that after momentarily rising in the air a few inches you fell back to earth. Gravity. Don't need no Newton. Don't need no Einstein. Just gravity.

Where is the proof of Jesus' resurrection?

Mark, a movement that grows and flourishes amongst the superstitious is hardly proof that Jesus rose from the dead.

>30 geneg:
Sorry, try again. Among other things, the result of your suggested test depends upon where I am standing when I try it (don't try this while standing outside the space shuttle). You've demonstrated something that happens, but this is not a proof of gravity. What's the something? Gravity? perhaps. Magnetism? perhaps. Something else? perhaps. You can't answer without Newton or some other scientific work. There's nothing wrong with this - that's why science is so useful. After the apple incident (or whatever gave him the insight), Newton had to work to prove that what was happening was gravity - you know, the force of attraction between two bodies is proportional to their mass and inversely proportional to their distance of separation. Then Einstein comes along and shows that gravity isn't at all what Newton thought it was (you know, mass bends space).

My point is not that one can or cannot prove that Jesus was resurrected; simply that you pose the question in an unfair way, since you know that the only basis for faith in the resurrection is divine inspiration via the Bible and other testimony. Perhaps to be more clear, I should have suggested that you prove that Julius Ceasar (or Josephus, or Charlemagne, or Napolean) lived and died without the testimony of contemporary witnesses or the works of later historians.

If you do base your belief in Julius Ceasar on such witnesses, why refuse the testimony of witnesses regarding Jesus' life.

Os.

>30 geneg: Then you missed the point. Superstition will not flourish on this magnitude if there is simple proof that it is superstition. Os makes the point perfectly. There is plenty of extra-biblical documentation for the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. Is it proof beyond the shadow of a doubt? I don't think that is what God was going for. But it does give a great Rorschach for intellectual and spiritual honesty or biased dismissal from both sides.

My point is that outside of Christianity itself there is no proof that Jesus died and was resurrected. There are mentions of the Christian cult outside of Christian literature but none of these offer any proof.

Persecution, which the Christian Church experienced for the first 300 or so years of its existence is the best way known to man to grow a movement.

None of this proves Jesus died and was raised from the dead.

>33 geneg:
My point is that outside of Christianity itself there is no proof that Jesus died and was resurrected

Well, of course not. Anything that purports to offer evidence of Jesus' resurrection is, de facto, within Christianity.

Anything that purports to offer evidence of gravity is, de facto, science. So, outside of science itself, there is no proof that gravity exists. Or, if you still think jumping up and down is proof, I'll use my other example: Outside of the testimony contemporary witnesses or the works of later historians, there is no proof that Julius Ceasar existed.

Os.

Superstition will not flourish on this magnitude if there is simple proof that it is superstition.

Astrology?

Islam?

Buddhism?

Evolution?

Creationism?

I've seriously lost track of the dialectic. Why do we need proof again?

>40 Alixtii:
because #26 asked?

I guess that the point that I'm trying to make is that superstitions will flourish at very large magnitude. This flourishing doesn't necessarily mean that there's any inherent truth to the underlying idea.

>41 Osbaldistone:

But why did #26 ask? Was it a meaningful response to any of the 25 comments which preceded it? If so, how?

>42 Jesse_wiedinmyer:: This flourishing doesn't necessarily mean that there's any inherent truth to the underlying idea.

Depending on the account of truth one is using, this is either trivially true or trivially false.

>44 oakes:

Settles it how? All the great theologians of the Church struggled with that question no less than Pilate did. When I read Aquinas or Augustine I don't come away with the feeling they though the matter was simple or obvious.

And the notion that Christian should just avoid doing epistemology completely is, frankly, just ludicrous.

The Epistemology of Saint Augustine of Hippo

The Epistemology of Saint Thomas Aquinas

The Epistemology of Saint Anselm

And that's just the A's.

(Also, you're veering perilously close to ad hominem.)

ETA: And how could I forget:

The Epistemology of Pope John Paul II

There is plenty of extra-biblical documentation for the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus.

We've had the "Jesus-didn't-exist" fight before. From the perspective of how ancient history is done, it's an absurd opinion. Jesus lived and was executed by the Romans as surely as Socrates was executed by the Athenians. But you'd be hard-pressed to find extra-Biblical evidence that Jesus was resurrected.

Of course, I think he was, but you can't get there without relying on the NT, and on people who'd read it and were part of the church that believed it. This is not at all surprising given what the NT says about the event and after--he didn't run about seeing large crowds, stopping in to visit the Josephus' parents, etc.

Outside of the testimony contemporary witnesses or the works of later historians, there is no proof that Julius Ceasar existed.

Well, no. We have extensive evidence in coins, inscriptions and papyri, not to mention non-historical evidence in the manuscript tradition--poets, astrologers, etc. Heck, you could probably reason him up from rings and potsherds.

By contrast Jesus's existence *is* dependent on the manuscript tradition, but so are many other people and events which no historian would question. There is always the possibility aliens invaded in Late Antiquity, dropped out libraries of clever documents and brainwashed everyone. Absent that, you have what you have.

Alixtii, read post >25 ms529212:. My question was in direct response to:

"There are "many infallible proofs" (Acts 1:3) for the death and resurrection of Jesus, the essence of Christianity."

Here's maybe a different way of looking at the question at the top of this thread. If you believe something you "accept it as true or real," you "credit it with veracity", you "have firm faith, confidence and trust" in it.

Does this affect the way you behave? Absolutely, if you truly believe. If you don't believe you can fly to Detroit, would you get on the plane? If you don't believe Suzy would ever go out with you in a million years, would you humiliate yourself by asking her? If you believe you'll cut your skin, would you stick your face in the fan? I don't think so.

But if a person says she believes in Jesus and then goes out and breaks all 10 commandments, cavorts with all 7 deadly sins, and builds her whole day around not missing Dancing with the Stars, then no matter what she might "say" she believes, she has "chosen" not to believe.

By acting in a way consistent with a certain Samaritan, people have "chosen" to believe.

Yeah, I would agree, the Bible says "Faith without works is dead." Therefore, if you believe, you should prove it in your actions. Just saying you believe is pretty much pointless because anybody will say they believe. You must prove it.

Today, people are quite "blazzay" about faith in God, and because of that, they don't imitate Jesus' actions (showing empathy towards people, doing the works, even just showing an unselfish and unhypocritical attitude to many parts of normal day life).

So I say it more important in displaying and applying upon a faith in God rather than saying a mere belief in it.

>54 oakes:

Nice. I forgot that Corinthians had that. It doesn't change the point, of course. The source there is Corinthians. My point was that there's no evidence outside of the NT, or based on it, for the resurrection. As usual you seem unable to take statements of fact as attacks on your faith. The NT is evidence. But it's evidence of a very specific kind.

We care about what someone like Josephus writes because he stands outside of the tradition. He wasn't a Christian, but he confirms some core details. Unlike the NT authors, his interests and belief system have no bearing—or even a contrary bearing—to the substance of what he relates. We care about that because, together with internal checks (which are more useful here), external checks matter. If all you needed was a body of people telling related stories you could loft at least a dozen ancient philosophers, sages and religious personages into divine realms where, I suspect, neither of us could imagine they should be lofted.

As far as Thallus goes, your characterization of "brushed off" is weird. What are you hanging on Thallus anyway? After a two-stage transmission through sources looking for evidence of a particular sort, it's possible that a possibly 1c. chronicler mentioned an eclipse in AD 32, and possible he connected it—or disputed a connection with—Jesus' death. We can't really tell. Have you read the chronological portent sections of Livy or the tens of thousands of other portents in Ancient literature? This isn't a slim reed, it's no reed at all. If we're going to take this as evidence, the evidence—direct, multiply-attested, non-garbled evidence—for the divinity of Alexander is simply overwhelming!

Incidentally, here's McDowell's retelling:

"Thallus, a Samaritan-born historian mentioned Christ in 52 C.E. However his works are no longer extant, so we have only citations of it by others...Julius Africanus, a Christian writing about 221, says, talking about the darkness that fell when Christ was crucified, 'Thallus, in the third book of his histories, explains away* this darkness as an eclipse of the sun -- unreasonably, as it seems to me.' (It is unreasonable because the crucifixion was at Passover, which is based on the lunar calendar and requires a full moon. When there's a full moon, the moon is at the opposite side of the earth from where it has to be for an eclipse.)".

1. We don't know he was Samaritan. This is a guess from a guess--connecting the Chronographer Thallus to a Thallus emmended, not necessarily correctly, into the text of Josephus and not said anywhere to be a historian.**

2. 52 C.E. is an rounding of an emendation of the extant Armenian text of Eusebius, which describes him as writing from the Trojan War to the 167th Olympiad, or 112-109 BC, is anyway end-point of the three-book history, the terminus post quem, not the date of writing although, if everything holds up, it's probable that he carried it up to roughly his time, since that's a common pattern.

3. "Julius Africanus, a Christian writing about 221, says" Well, no. We have Africanus second-hand, through the Byzantine Monk George Syncellus (9c.). Syncellus didn't rework much, but we're adding seven centuries of processing. Note my quote from McDowell has an elispsis. Does he mention the Syncellus connection? If so, then good.

4. We can't tell whether the "explains away" Africanus' characterization of Thallus reacting to a Christian explanation of the event, Africanus' characterization of Thallus' description of the event without Christian referent, or Syncellus' characterization of Africanus doing either of the two. We do not know he "mentioned Christ" at all. All we really know is that he described an eclipse somewhere around the time—either because he was responding to Christian traditions or because later Christian authors found his dating to be that—and that later Christian authors were interested in this piece of data. On this evidence, however, Christ could have died almost every year in Antiquity.

Anyway, if all the conjectures line up perfectly, as the very book you cited notes, this "does not prove that there really was a darkness—however it is to be explained—during the time of Jesus' cruxifiction. Rather it is evidence for the early tradition of darkness at Jesus' death." This would be good stuff, as after-about-52 would be before any of the Gospel accounts were written and it's nice to have confirmation that the darkness tradition was already out there, although I wouldn't really have doubted that anyway. But it's evidence about a tradition, not direct evidence.

*I need to look more carefully into apokaleo (Vroost: "Calls", McDowell "explains away") here. The question is how deep the sense of "replies" is here. "Explains away" is too strong, for sure; Greek has ways of saying that, and it isn't this. But it should be marked with a sense of reaction.
**Despite Voorst's argument, it matters whether any evidence connects him to the eastern Mediterrean. Without that the eclipse could have been reported anywhere, unless you are sure (point 4) that Thallus mentioned Jesus or you are convinced from the fragments—exclusively Christians, most doing chronographic work to fit together Greek and Jewish/Christian history—that he had an eastern focus. Tertullian, who didn't necessarily know Thallus at first hand, but had him at a better hand than us, lends support to the idea he was some sort of Oriental. A Samaritan, however, would know the timing of Passover. As Syncellus notes, saying that it was an eclipse doesn't give with passover. It's quite possible Syncellus didn't think of this or that his science wasn't as good as Syncellus', but if he did, he'd be as much contradicting the Jewish calendar as denying a supernatural explantion for reported darkness at Jesus' death.

Note: The Chronographic books of Jacoby FGrH aren't online as far as I can tell--although other books are, like Juba, which I checked to see if it was extant when Tertullian wrote. Someone did a translation of it here, though, with Jacoby's notes http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_carrier/jacoby.html . It's an atheist site. I don't know if the translation is by an atheist, but I don't see how it could color this part. Update: The author put scans of the relevant pages at the top. Alas, this is in Jacoby's German-language stage, before the Nazis went after him and he started writing in English.

You're right. My knowledge of Thallus was that of someone who'd read secondary sources saying he wasn't an independent witness to the event. Having now read the fragment in question and some of the scholarly material around it, including the very book you cite—which agrees with me—this seems the only reasonable characterization of the issue.

As a final note about how weak Thallus is, consider if you weren't out to prove Christianity true, but were just examining the truth of falsity of things said in ancient documents—in this case the notice in Sycellus. How many portents can you find in ancient history? Tends of thousands, I'd wager. 99.9% of them a rational person would conclude either didn't happen or are proof of nothing. Collecting portents was a big deal. Take a look at Livy, for example, who concludes every year with a list of all the portents that had taken place. (Or consider Julius Obsequens, who redid Livy, taking out everything BUT the portents and who survived when much of Livy perished!) Whole books are written about their analysis (eg., Lydus). Most ancient states had officials whose job it was to record and analyze them.

Portents are simply everywhere in Greek and Roman literature, and most of all in anything biographically-oriented. Alexander's birth and death involve at least a dozen, often multiply attested. Suetonius and Plutarch use them like mad. Mithidates' birth was foretold by a star, and on and on. There are few literary devises more common than the judicious insertion of confirming portents.

To take from the huge, miscellaneous, deeply bogus corpus a Medieval retelling of a retelling of a fragment of a text—exact contents unknown—plucked from complete loss by Christians intent on polemic and conclude this is actual evidence of divine action in this world isn't bad argument, it's the inability to understand what a good argument would look like, and a deep misunderstanding of what ancient literature is—what you can do with it, and what you can't.

I'm sorry. But I took "And of course when any 'independent' evidence is put forward--Thallus and that eclipse, for example--it is brushed off for one reason or another." to be dismissive of the brushing off, and Thallus to be an example that was better. Is that sentence a fake-out for another piece of independent evidence that, you think, gives you anything more, or are you attacking the brushers-off entirely without justice?

In sum: You gave an example and made your standard "scholars are all biased" insinuation and then immediately retreated from the example. Provide another one or drop the charge.

I did it at great length because, when possible, I like getting as close as possible to the bottom of the barrel—read every relevant ancient source and get a good feel for the scholarly debate. Thallus is a great case because you can do that in a few hours of work. Something like the "historical Jesus" debate—well, it doesn't stand or fall on any smaller piece of information. You'd have to do it all; it would take a lifetime of scholarship to do it and so, as you tend to notice, I tend to avoid bottom-of-the-barrel arguments in favor of what-do-we-know-about-barrels arguments. But occasionally I stumble, and make a bottom-of-the-barrel observation that's wrong, as you are quick to point out.

I think the Thallus example is illustrative of how naive apologists misuse ancient evidence. McDowell, whom I gather you have mixed feelings about, is on the scholarly end of that genre. A quick Google gets you a good sampling of the rest.

I got the McDowell argument from a Christian site. Atheist sites are generally a mirror of naive apologetic ones. That is, they are alike in not knowing how to use ancient evidence, so they make horse-sense denials where the others make horse-sense arguments in the other direction. Pages like http://www.neverthirsty.org/pp/historical-secular-quotes-about-jesus/thallus.htm... drive me insane. Atheist arguments that Jesus didn't exist or that we know nothing at him at all strike me as much the same—naive incredulity in the place of naive credulity.

If you truly want to believe something, there is always "evidence" to be found to support your belief. But what is the quality of the evidence? How does it stand up against evidence that contradicts your belief? Have you honestly and critically assessed the reliability, bias, and value of the evidence at hand?

Suppose, for example, that someone ridicules a scientifically testable theory that attempts to explain an everyday physical phenomenon like gravity. At the same time, this person displays an unshakable faith in the bodily resurrection and divinity of Christ based solely on hearsay literary evidence found in obviously biased religious scriptures. I would suggest that such a person is not rationally weighing evidence and analyzing predjudices to arrive at logical conclusions, but is rather choosing to believe. Such a person, in my view, is either unwilling or unable to evaluate evidence critically, but instead attempts to evaluate the evidence to support their own foregone conclusion. When this fails, the next step is to try to strengthen the case by casting doubt on something heretofore unquestioned, such as the very existence of a contemporary historical figure as well attested as Julius Caesar. The last step, of course, is to put the burden on the non-believer, and actually propose that it is incumbent upon heretics to prove that Jesus was not resurrected, and that finally, in the absence of proof that something does not existence then we must accept that it does exist.

There is a reason it is called faith, and there is a reason why people need to choose to believe or make a leap of faith. I don't begrudge a person their faith, but please don't insult people's intelligence by trying to equate faith with science or belief with critical thinking.

>62 scott.stricker:

The problem I have here is the mixing of anti-supernaturalism with anti-"heresay" evidence. I'll let someone else take the former, but to the latter I would say that "science" isn't a fit tool to evaluate ancient evidence. "Science" does not tell us that Hannibal existed, for example. But it's pretty clear he did. The "toolkit" is fundamentally different, yet the results can be quite certain. At it's peak, of course, science can achieve near absolute certainty, but science is mostly "done" at levels of confidence much below that of our knowledge of Hannibal.

The Germans like to use the word Altertumswissenschaft, the science of antiquity. But it's not a full "science" in any of the half-dozen ways the term is used in either language. The same applies to much else. I have a pretty good idea what Homer, Dante and Nabokov "mean," but "science" wouldn't have gotten me there. Someone, therefore, who thinks "science" is how one decides complex issues of history and meaning is looking at the world all cramped. If they really acted that way, I suspect they'd be unable to hold a job, let alone a relationship. But, I suspect, they save this only-science attitude for situations like this.

I think reason, rational investigation and Altertumswissenschaft can get you to a real Jesus, living at the time he's said to have lived. And I think we can be sure in various degrees of some things he did and said, and many more he was said to have said, done and meant. That doesn't get you to Christian belief, but it can and should overturn the naive anti-Christian arguments—that Jesus didn't exist, etc. People who do this stuff professionally mostly look on these deniers with the sort of polite scorn that scientists look on anti-evolutionists. Not understanding an intellectual method is a problem, not an argument.

The rest of the way involves something other than the examination of ancient evidence, for sure.

So, what does

"And of course when any "independent" evidence is put forward--Thallus and that eclipse, for example--it is brushed off for one reason or another."

means if it doesn't mean at least one of the following:

1. Thallus shouldn't be brushed off.
2. There are other examples that shouldn't be brushed off (I'm sure we agree on Josephus, as do most scholars.)
3. The brushing off is incorrect. I'm guessing you think this is a case of bias. It may rather be that you think the scholars aren't biased, but are ignorant, bad at arguing or unskilled.

You seem quite obsessed with a single post I made that made the point that:

1. You are constantly calling me names and asserting bad motives
2. I do not reply to your constant attacks that I am an "idiot" and don't know anything by pointing out the obvious fact that you speak with great authority on topics, like evolution of which you know very little, and, even when debating finer points of philological method or Greek literature, do not point out who's read what and in what languages. As I said in that message, this would be unfair. The quotes you keep dredging up—"You haven't read this shit" are from a contrafactual condition, and one I explicitly and, as I recall, twice say would be unfair of me to use against you.

From my perspective you are constantly and nastily personal. On one occasion I tried to show you how objectionable this was, and told you how unfair it would be for me to turn it around—giving the specific examples you cite.

This clearly got under your skin. I find that in between sad and amusing, as your own writing is so full of direct, un-couched attacks on me.

That said, we are both probably seeing more animus in the other than there is. Do you know that study where two people are told to hit the other as hard as they were hit? Neither knows the rules the other is working under, and as a result the two end up hitting each other harder and harder. Although I think you have been objectively more nasty, that effect is surely at work too. We are both under each others' skin.

Do you think I am constantly personal and constantly making personal arguments about your education, etc.?

But you’ll defend the importance of faith .. as a personal thing

I didn't do that. Where do you think I did that? 63? My point was that "science" wasn't the method at issue in half the problem. I still think my reply there was a rather good smack-down of the idea that "Science" has anything to contribute to what are basically questions of history, philology and meaning.

The second half of the problem I didn't solve. As a matter of fact, yes, I think there is no way to conclude that, through ancient evidence alone, Christ was indeed whom we both think he was. You need something else. My "something else" would actually combine quite a few other things. For example, I'd consider arguments about the existence of God and about the nature of what God should "look like." (That gets me to something like "There seems to be a God and if he had a religion it has to something like Christianity.") And I'd consider what Christianity says, and how it has worked through people, in theory, in history, in people I have known and indeed in myself.

So, you have mistaken an explicit decision to answer half the question for your own fantasy as to what I think the second half is. Perhaps we could get into that second half.

Again, I think that’s just plain dishonest

I apologize for saying it's your view. In honesty I should have started by saying my intent was to pull apart his view, which I think is a type-specimen of how this sort of thing is wrongly approached. You'll note in the same post I explicitly say that I think your opinion on him is mixed. That should be a sign that I was not making it exactly your view. But, yes, I was erecting a straw man. I should have made it clear my point was method, not ascribing exact views to you from him.

But, yes, I was under the impression that you thought Thallus worth something, and that he and other such evidence was "brushed off" since that was the whole content of your post. I do wish you'd tell me what that sentence meant, if it didn't mean that.

As to the final point, I freely admit that, lacking full access to the sources and the secondary literature, my discussion must be of a certain character. When I can get deeply into an issue—like Thallus, I will. Otherwise, I prefer to discuss the issue without pretending I know the evidence and arguments to ends of my fingernails, and concentrate on higher level methodological issues—which, I think, tend to weigh strongly against many of the arguments you make.

What I dispute is that you know it to the fingernails either. I think I know what it is to get to the bottom of one of these things, and what it isn't. For example, you are justly proud of your library of English-language secondary texts. If you were studying the issue professionally, however, your reading would in fact be mostly articles and original texts, with large amounts in German (a language I never read well and now can't read). You have a great layman's library—far better than mine—with many scholarly books. You have read many of them and understood them. This is not the same as having a scholarly grasp of the issue or of making scholarly arguments. I'm not claiming that I have those, or that I have read them to the level required either.*

What do we do when neither of us can make end-of-the-fingernail scholarly argument? I think we do what we can, making the points we can, and being fair about argument. It would be fair of me to admit that I don't know everything, and I have done so. I think it would be fair of you, in return, to consider the possibility that I am not "tossing off some reference" to larger issues of method, larger literary context, etc., but actually making methodological arguments, and if my ignorance of how many people Corinthians mentions met Jesus is be to used as a club, that your head is pretty exposed on those issues. Knowing a fair amount about historical methodology in antiquity, for example, is something I can justly claim, and which it seems to me you wrongly dismiss.

You are fond of the idea that I'm working off lecture notes. Alas, I'm not even doing that. Rather, graduate school taught me how to think about evidence, particularly ancient evidence and about how scholarship should be done and not done. I think this understanding, together with a certain but by no means encyclopedic grasp of facts and relevant languages, gives me some decent tools with which to debate these points with you. I regret you don't see that.

*Occasionally I can get to that level or close to it. I consider it a great shame that I wasted so much time getting to the bottom of Thallus. Obviously I think this an occasion where some professional training can be useful, and indeed was useful to me, and I was disappointed you didn't want to defend your claim. But, well, we all drop arguments. I dropped the omniscience one because, although your arguments seem wrong to me and I suspect you're misusing arguments, I don't know enough of the theology around the issue and didn't think it very fun to acquire. You may well be right.

Two olive branches:

1. What about if we both agree to follow Paul Graham's "How to disagree."? (http://www.paulgraham.com/disagree.html)

I think it would be very hard for both of us. It's too easy, for example, to say "I can't believe how cavalierly you X." But I think it might be good for both of us—our arguments, our brotherhood and probably our souls. Also, it would be a weird challenge and who doesn't enjoy that?

2. It's certainly weird that I know virtually nothing about your conversion to Catholicism. As I've said before, you were certainly instrumental in my earlier conversion—to Christianity generally, though it later became Catholicism—by convincing me that theism had some good arguments "going for it," so to speak. I suggest—and only suggest—that telling your conversion story, or a general "This I believe" since neither of us have much narrative gift, might be a useful way to bridge our differences. I would be glad to follow suit.

Wow. That is certainly an extraordinary response. I'm simply amazed. Did you read my posts? If you are going to command me this and that way, let me command you—read my two posts again, and see if your tone is really justified. Heck, ask a friend.

Do you deny that we are both incapable of making to-the-fingernails arguments? Do you notice the number of times I say what I don't know and can't do—thereby undermining the contrafactual which you take for an insult. I am trying—trying very hard—to be even-handed, to note where your reading is deeper, for example. Are these attacks? Is it unfair to note that you don't have a scholar's library or a scholars understanding of the fullness of the topic—particularly when I note that I don't have one either? Am I not allowed to note there are areas that I can make arguments in? Do you deny that attempting to avoid ad hominems, tone arguments and so forth would be (1) hard for both of us, (2) good for us as arguers, brothers and Christians?

If you choose to misread the first of them as an attack on you—skipping over much evidence to the contrary—why don't you take up the tone of the latter?

Here's my post with notes under each section explaining it and what I thought I was doing and/or apologizing for how it could or should be read.

You seem quite obsessed with a single post I made that made the point that:

I think you've got your teeth into that post, but "obsessed" is probably a red flag to bulls. I should have been less extreme in my word choice.

1. You are constantly calling me names and asserting bad motives
2. I do not reply to your constant attacks that I am an "idiot" and don't know anything by pointing out the obvious fact that you speak with great authority on topics, like evolution of which you know very little, and, even when debating finer points of philological method or Greek literature, do not point out who's read what and in what languages. As I said in that message, this would be unfair. The quotes you keep dredging up—"You haven't read this shit" are from a contrafactual condition, and one I explicitly and, as I recall, twice say would be unfair of me to use against you.

So, let me restate. It would be wrong of me to argue like that. I am not arguing like that. I am tempted, because of how you sometimes argue, but it is a temptation, and I would be wrong to do it. Your arguments should stand or fall without nasty comments from me about this and that. I am not saying these things and would be wrong to say them. Okay?

From my perspective you are constantly and nastily personal. On one occasion I tried to show you how objectionable this was, and told you how unfair it would be for me to turn it around—giving the specific examples you cite.

A reiteration.

This clearly got under your skin. I find that in between sad and amusing, as your own writing is so full of direct, un-couched attacks on me.

This is simply true. I should, however, go another mile here and admit that my writing is not free of attacks on you. I think my attacks tend to avoid the ad hominem line, but many are below the belt and I apologize—apologize to you—for them.

That said, we are both probably seeing more animus in the other than there is. Do you know that study where two people are told to hit the other as hard as they were hit? Neither knows the rules the other is working under, and as a result the two end up hitting each other harder and harder. Although I think you have been objectively more nasty, that effect is surely at work too. We are both under each others' skin.

I think we are going in a viscious circle of overreaction. That isn't to say we're making it up, but I think we're reacting more than need be. I apologize for that and hope you can accept my apology. I hope you too realize this is the case for you as well.

Do you think I am constantly personal and constantly making personal arguments about your education, etc.?

Honestly. Apart from that message—covered and apologized for above—do you think I am? If so, I apologize. Those arguments would be unfair to you.

But you’ll defend the importance of faith .. as a personal thing

I didn't do that. Where do you think I did that? 63? My point was that "science" wasn't the method at issue in half the problem. I still think my reply there was a rather good smack-down of the idea that "Science" has anything to contribute to what are basically questions of history, philology and meaning.

At a minimum you don't disagree with this, right? This is not in any way, shape of form an attack on you. It's not even an argument against you.

The second half of the problem I didn't solve. As a matter of fact, yes, I think there is no way to conclude that, through ancient evidence alone, Christ was indeed whom we both think he was. You need something else. My "something else" would actually combine quite a few other things. For example, I'd consider arguments about the existence of God and about the nature of what God should "look like." (That gets me to something like "There seems to be a God and if he had a religion it has to something like Christianity.") And I'd consider what Christianity says, and how it has worked through people, in theory, in history, in people I have known and indeed in myself.

I'm saying that you jump the gun to assert I think it's all "personal." In fact, I am avoiding making the "second half" of the argument. Then, to make it clear that I am not avoiding it, I give a taste of what I'd say. This content should not be objectionable to you. Indeed, you can justly take credit for much of the thinking behind it.

So, you have mistaken an explicit decision to answer half the question for your own fantasy as to what I think the second half is. Perhaps we could get into that second half.

A summary of what you did—you dreamed up what I am saying. Surely we both do this. I did it on the charge of bias, for example. Therefore, accept my explanation that I did not do what you think I did. Okay?

Again, I think that’s just plain dishonest

I apologize for saying it's your view. In honesty I should have started by saying my intent was to pull apart his view, which I think is a type-specimen of how this sort of thing is wrongly approached. You'll note in the same post I explicitly say that I think your opinion on him is mixed. That should be a sign that I was not making it exactly your view. But, yes, I was erecting a straw man. I should have made it clear my point was method, not ascribing exact views to you from him.

You call me dishonest and I apologize. Then I say what I should have done. Then I note that I already distanced myself from the ascription-to-you, but I admit that I should have been more clear. Then I say I that again, emphasizing I should have done the argument differently.

But, yes, I was under the impression that you thought Thallus worth something, and that he and other such evidence was "brushed off" since that was the whole content of your post. I do wish you'd tell me what that sentence meant, if it didn't mean that.

I stand by the content of this, but I should have avoided "I do wish" as it's patronizing.

As to the final point, I freely admit that, lacking full access to the sources and the secondary literature, my discussion must be of a certain character. When I can get deeply into an issue—like Thallus, I will. Otherwise, I prefer to discuss the issue without pretending I know the evidence and arguments to ends of my fingernails, and concentrate on higher level methodological issues—which, I think, tend to weigh strongly against many of the arguments you make.

I admit that I can't make a full scholarly argument here. I should have adduced both access and lack of time. If you please, you may add training—I am not untrained, and Michigan is a very good school, but my degree was not finished so my training was not complete. At the end, I say "tend to weigh strongly." This is, I think, about right. I do think the methodological arguments are against you much of the time. But you may justly question whether methodology without all the necessary content isn't somewhat vacant.

What I dispute is that you know it to the fingernails either. I think I know what it is to get to the bottom of one of these things, and what it isn't. For example, you are justly proud of your library of English-language secondary texts. If you were studying the issue professionally, however, your reading would in fact be mostly articles and original texts, with large amounts in German (a language I never read well and now can't read). You have a great layman's library—far better than mine—with many scholarly books. You have read many of them and understood them. This is not the same as having a scholarly grasp of the issue or of making scholarly arguments. I'm not claiming that I have those, or that I have read them to the level required either.*

I think you must have taken offense at this. But I think it's dead on. Neither of us can make a really good scholarly argument on these topics. Your reading is great—I say that above, and I praise it and your collection—but it is not a scholarly thing. To go all the way, you'd need to go a lot deeper. I myself (as I say above) have not done that. I also admit that I don't know German anymore, but that it too would be useful to either of us. I end by emphasizing that I do not claim the "to-the-fingernails" knowledge here.

What do we do when neither of us can make end-of-the-fingernail scholarly argument? I think we do what we can, making the points we can, and being fair about argument. It would be fair of me to admit that I don't know everything, and I have done so. I think it would be fair of you, in return, to consider the possibility that I am not "tossing off some reference" to larger issues of method, larger literary context, etc., but actually making methodological arguments, and if my ignorance of how many people Corinthians mentions met Jesus is be to used as a club, that your head is pretty exposed on those issues. Knowing a fair amount about historical methodology in antiquity, for example, is something I can justly claim, and which it seems to me you wrongly dismiss.

I start with an open-ended question—what do we do? I then say that we should make our points and try to be fair. I then admit that I am not always fair and repeat that I do not know everything. I then ask you to admit that I do know some things. I draw some equivalence between my lack of the Corinthians bit and your lack of knowledge of other things. I think this comparison is fair. I close by saying I do know something, and that you dismiss the field.

You are fond of the idea that I'm working off lecture notes. Alas, I'm not even doing that. Rather, graduate school taught me how to think about evidence, particularly ancient evidence and about how scholarship should be done and not done. I think this understanding, together with a certain but by no means encyclopedic grasp of facts and relevant languages, gives me some decent tools with which to debate these points with you. I regret you don't see that.

I admit I am not even working off notes, but mostly from my fingers. I then explain what I think graduate school taught me. I admit my knowledge of the rest of it (ie., specific facts, languages) is "by no means encyclopedic." I then say that what I do know "gives me some decent tools with which to debate." This seems a pretty pale way of saying it. I close by regreting you don't see this. I don't think you do.

*Occasionally I can get to that level or close to it. I consider it a great shame that I wasted so much time getting to the bottom of Thallus. Obviously I think this an occasion where some professional training can be useful, and indeed was useful to me, and I was disappointed you didn't want to defend your claim. But, well, we all drop arguments. I dropped the omniscience one because, although your arguments seem wrong to me and I suspect you're misusing arguments, I don't know enough of the theology around the issue and didn't think it very fun to acquire. You may well be right.

I disagree with you and am disappointed I didn't get to argue on turf that was more favorable to me. I say that we all drop arguments. (We do.) Then I say "You may well be right"--conceding ground to you.

I hope this makes my point clear, and, where I went overboard, where I apologize. (The post uses the word apologize nine times. Please, take me for my word here.)

After that post I made a post that, I think, an attempt at a fresh start. I put it as an "olive branch" and I meant it. You are right to note that I didn't let your argument go. I should have. (I apologize for not doing so, although I hope—pray?—that you take this message for one.)

1. I note that (I think) you wrote most of your reply before I wrote me "olive branch." As noted, my message was not perfect and for that I have and do apologize. I think your reply was pretty severe even so, but I did give you cause.

2. I really think the Graham rules would be good. Honestly, can you at least reply to the idea? Do you think them bad? Do you think I'm trying to manipulate something? Do you think I'm suggesting them out of bad faith. If so, I must convince you: I am not. I think it would be a good for us to avoid bad forms of argument. I have engaged in them, and I believe you have to. Let's throw that off and start again?

3. I am honestly interested in your conversion story. It certainly rankles me greatly that you think my conversion was "not precisely what I thought." If you want honesty, I can tell you that having you tell me repeatedly I wasn't really, or want's a good Catholic—something you also told another who is close to us, who also converted years before you—before you had even become a Catholic was simply poison to the fond feeling I might have had to your conversion. I think you probably think you are being objective about this, and maybe you are. But you will find it very alienating to people you love if you go about attacking them in this way.

I think, however, that I need to chill and let you think what you want to think about me. And, since much of my feelings are informed merely by our arguments, I am hoping that if we spoke about it in a non-argumentative way, what does unite us will win over what divides us and—what is still greater—the ill feeling that has grown up through bad argument and the natural misunderstandings of two opinionated people.

So, let's imagine you got to the end of this. You have two choices. You will probably be mad at some of the content here. (And let me say, maybe you're right. I too am writing fast and am probably more angry than I should be.) But you can also not fail to see there is an opening here—a way to heal the rift somewhat. Right?

Well, the Spaldings seem to have hijacked this thread to use as a battleground for some issues that started elsewhere.

I'm out. I'm clicking the 'ignore' icon and I recommend you all do the same.

Perhaps someone will start a new thread that has the free and congenial tone this one had until somewhere around posts 54-58.

Os.

rrp,
re: "I don't see how someone can choose to believe; they either believe or they don't.

That has certainly been my experience. I know that I have never been able to consciously CHOOSE any of the beliefs that I have, nor has anyone that I have asked to demonstrate such an ability ever complied with my request.

However, the phrase "choose to believe" is used frequently on discussion web sites. So I wonder if anyone who thinks that they can consciously choose to believe things might explain how they do it. What do they do at the last moment to instantly change their one state of belief to another? What is it that they do that would allow them to say, "OK, at this moment I have a lack of belief that "x" exists or is true, but I CHOOSE to believe that "x" exists or is true and now instantly at this new moment I do believe that "x" exists or is true"?

Maybe they could use something like leprechauns to demonstrate their ability and technique. I'm suggesting them since I'm fairly certain that they probably don't already have a belief in them. According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, a leprechaun is "a fairy peculiar to Ireland, who appeared in the form of an old man of minute stature, wearing a cocked hat and a leather apron" and who hides his gold at the end of the rainbow and if captured has to grant three wishes.

So, assuming that they don't already have a belief in them, I would ask, while they are reading this, to CHOOSE to believe - be convinced without a doubt - that leprechauns exist. And now that they believe in leprechauns, my question would be, how did they do it? How did they make the instantaneous transition from lack of belief to belief?

I'd defend the notion of "choosing to believe" in one sense--the interplay of "belief" and the consequences of belief. That is, when belief has implications for our actual lives, those implications can in fact often drive our beliefs.

Start with rationalization. It's basic human nature to rationalize one's actions by modifying one's beliefs. You start out believing that X is wrong and people who do X are bad, you find yourself drawn to X, you do X, you decide X wasn't wrong at all. Sometimes, of course, you really learned something about X, and your change is defensible. Other times, your psyche has merely resolved a conflict between beliefs and actions, between who you are and who you thought you were.

Similarly, the choice to believe, or not believe, is often entangled with real-world consequences. A religious person increasingly persuaded by atheism may find themselves unable to stop believing, because, say, they're worried about losing friends. Or, for example, someone increasingly convinced that Christianity is true might find ways to avoid that conclusion, because definitively making it would force them to give up, say, a pattern of personal cruelty. In both cases it's easy to say that the person has simply acted against their belief, but I think things are more complicated than that.

>75 rstrats:

Wow! Reviving an old thread after 7 years. A lot of water under the bridge.

As Tim said "things are more complicated than that". Or to put it another way, if you think you understand how complicated this issue is, you are only half way there, even though you now realize you are only half way there.

I have read around and thought about this a bit since 2009. My current state of mind is that there are two separate things, your state of mind and your intention to act. This is all tied up with free will. If you don't believe in free will, those two things are the same. No one chooses to believe or chooses to act. Things just happen. If you do believe in free will, which I do, then they can be separate. I cannot choose my current state of mind; it is what it is. And what I believe is encapsulated by my state of mind. However, I can control, to at least some degree, what my future state of mind will be by freely choosing to act in certain ways. For example, I can choose to read a book or do an experiment and which book and which experiment I choose may change my mind in particular and predictable ways. So while I cannot choose to believe something, I can choose to do things which I know will alter my state of mind in the direction where I might end up believing the thing. In the religious context, that might mean that I choose to read the sacred text, to learn about the religion, to participate in the rituals. By doing so, I am opening the possibility that, even though I currently don't believe, I know that others who have decided to follow that path have ended up believing and so I too may end up believing. By my choice of actions I have chosen an outcome where I believe; in a way, I choose to believe.

I think that Tim maybe getting at a different aspect of the same thing by saying "when belief has implications for our actual lives, those implications can in fact often drive our beliefs".

Well, choosing and believing are two different gifts all creation has. But I think if things are looked at from this point of view whereby "For with the heart one believes and is justified, and with the mouth one confesses and is saved" Romans 10:10. So it is more than just believing. Calvanists will say unless God rejuvenates your heart you are hopeless. But we were given the ability to "choose," "Free Will." I call this: The Mind, Will and Emotions

We might look on each other in this way: each of us is a spirit who has a soul and lives in a body.

The will is how we exercise our freedom of choices. God gave man this freedom when He created Adam. God will not violate our free wills and make us do the right thing, nor will He make choices for us. We can choose His way or not, “the law of the Spirit of life in Christ” (Romans 8:22: “For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death.”), or we can choose the way of self — which really is the devil’s way or “the law of sin and death.”

There are only two ways: God’s or the devil’s (society's way). What man thinks is his own way is really Satan’s way and puts him under the authority of the enemy. If someone is not for God, he automatically is against Him (Matthew 12:30). There is no possible way a person can just do his own thing and think he is not making a choice. That choice is "choosing" cultures way. Even “no choice” on man’s part is a choice, because when we refuse to choose, others will make our choices for us. Satan causes men to follow him by encouraging lust, desires, apathy, laziness, or lack of responsibility.

The mind is the intellect, with reasoning being the “voice” of the mind. If the mind remains unrenewed, not “healed,” it will continue to think carnal thoughts, believe false information, and result in fleshly speaking and living. The emotions were designed by God to express His characteristics, which are placed in our spirits when we become born again. Those are the “fruits” written about in Galatians 5:22, 23 and other places. If we do not yield to the renewal process, we continue to act like our “old father.” I wanted to make those points because the concept of "choosing to believe" started with and created by "Mormons." Specifically a Mormon author by the name of Elder L. Whitney Clayton as they call him who wrote the book titled "Choose to Believe."

Since no one looking in on this topic has demonstrated an ability to consciously choose to believe things, it would appear that the answer to the OP question is most likely "no".

But since it's been awhile, perhaps someone new visiting this topic has the ability.

Or maybe not.

I am new to Library Thing and was just poking around Christian groups. Certainly this debate has been going on for centuries and I have thought about it a lot. In the end I found the conclusion that the Bible sheds the simplest light on the matter when compared to lengthly philosophical arguments. It is all good stuff to think about but I just wanted to share the verses in the Bible that I have found englightening on the subject of "Free Will".

Belief is a response and is secondary to the primary object of belief so there is not much confusion about this in the biblical texts I have seen. However, the free will argument is extremely interesting and not as obvious at first. The primary object to consider is whether we believe in our own ability to make good decisions, or if we admit we are incapable to "choose goodness".

From what I have found the Bible speaks of two wills. God's will and our will (human nature). Our desires, beliefs or choices are either tied to our will (self centered) or connected to God's will (selfless = Christ, giving, etc). I have never seen a mixture of the two wills in the Bible as they are always opposite of each other. The only time "our" will is in alignment with God's will is when we receive it as a gift and believe in the gift (but it wasn't ours to begin with since it was a gift and not self generated).

I could ramble on for hours about this but I think these passages in the Bible speak for themselves. First, we see in the O.T. our human condition with our will, heart, desires, etc. Then I will conclude with quotes about God's will. I "believe" belief is better understand after these passages.

"The Lord saw how great the wickedness of the human race had become on the earth, and that every inclination of the thoughts of the human heart was only evil all the time." Gen 6:5 ESV

“Who can make the clean out of the unclean?” Job 14:4a NASB

“What is man, that he should be pure,
Or he who is born of a woman, that he should be righteous?”
—Job 15:14, NASB

“Behold, I was brought forth in iniquity,
and in sin did my mother conceive me.”
—Psalm 51:5 ESV

“The Lord looks down from heaven on the children of man,
to see if there are any who understand,
who seek after God.
“They have all turned aside; together they have become corrupt;
there is none who does good,
not even one.”
—Psalm 14:2–3 ESV

“And do not enter into judgment with Your servant,
For in Your sight no man living is righteous.”
—Psalm 143:2, NASB

“Who can say, ‘I have made my heart pure;
I am clean from my sin?’”
—Proverbs 20:9 ESV

“This is what the Lord says:
‘Cursed is the one who trusts in man,
who draws strength from mere flesh
and whose heart turns away from the Lord.’”
—Jeremiah 17:5 ESV

The heart is deceitful above all things,
and desperately sick.”
—Jeremiah 17:9a ESV

Now for the N.T.

“It is no longer I that live, but Christ who lives in me” Galatians 2:20 ESV

"But we have the mind of Christ.” 1 Corinthians 2:16 ESV (also, see verses 11-15 for background of 1 Cor 2)

“…among whom we all once lived in the passions of our flesh, carrying out the desires of the body and the mind, and were by nature children of wrath, like the rest of mankind.” Ephesians 2:3 ESV

“For God has consigned all to disobedience, that he may have mercy on all. Oh, the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and how inscrutable his ways!
‘For who has known the mind of the Lord,
or who has been his counselor?’
‘Or who has given a gift to him
that he might be repaid?’
“For from him and through him and to him are all things. To him be glory forever. Amen.” Romans 11:32–36 ESV

“But I say, walk by the Spirit, and you will not gratify the desires of the flesh. For the desires of the flesh are against the Spirit, and the desires of the Spirit are against the flesh, for these are opposed to each other, to keep you from doing the things you want to do. But if you are led by the Spirit, you are not under the law of the flesh.” Galatians 5:16 ESV

“And he said to all, ‘If anyone would come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross daily and follow me. Luke 9:23 ESV

“Not my will, but yours, be done” Luke 22:42b ESV

“For I have come down from heaven, not to do my own will but the will of him who sent me.” John 6:38 ESV

Still no demonstration of an ability to consciously choose/engender a new belief.

>83 rstrats: Not sure what you find perplexing. I can choose to believe anything I want. As a test of that, give me something you'd like for me to believe, and I'll be glad to oblige.

I find that I posted on this thread around 11 years ago, pointing out that I was, at the time, "choosing to believe". But no one took the slightest notice.

>85 MyopicBookworm: So now, 11 years later, are you still in the process of choosing; or have you chosen? I'd be interested in an update. BTW -- happy new year!

>84 jburlinson: See post #75.

>75 rstrats: re: "I would ask, while they are reading this, to CHOOSE to believe - be convinced without a doubt - that leprechauns exist. And now that they believe in leprechauns, my question would be, how did they do it? How did they make the instantaneous transition from lack of belief to belief?"

The issue is not so much whether leprechauns exist, but rather how they exist. It's clear that they do exist in some form or other since we're now discussing them and it appears that as we discuss them we share a general understanding of what we're discussing; a notion that coincides more or less with the encyclopedia entry. Something that didn't exist in any sense would not sustain such a definition or a discussion.

Perhaps we can agree that leprechauns exist as so-called abstract objects, as ideas, perhaps. To quote Bertrand Russell: "I shall use as synonymous with ‘term’ the words unit, individual and entity. The first two emphasize the fact that every term is one, while the third is derived from the fact that every term has being, i.e. is in some sense. A man, a moment, a number, a class, a relation, a chimera, or anything else that can be mentioned, is sure to be a term." So, in this sense, the term "leprechaun", which might be understood as an instance of a chimera, has ontological status.

What does this mean about beliefs? I could say that as an abstract object (an ideation, in this case, corresponding to the word "leprechaun") it exists and that I believe it exists. In fact, I do believe that. I could also say that as a concrete object (a little man I could reach out and pick up if I could find one), a leprechaun does not exist, at least I have never encountered one. In that sense, I could say that I don't believe in leprechauns.

In fact, I could believe one and then the other instantaneously and I could even believe them both simultaneously.

jburlinson,
re: "The issue is not so much whether leprechauns exist..."

But it is. This topic is about whether or not beliefs can be consciously chosen, i.e., engendered.

BTW, you say that you can believe that something exists and at the same time believe that that same something doesn't exist. Just exactly how does that work?

I believe in what is seen and what is unseen....JMJ....

"What is thy bidding my Master" - Darth Vader