A Way of Seeing....

How do people approach life? With a sense of wonder or with doubt? Aristotle said many years ago that philosophy begins in wonder. Kierkegaard later observed and lamented in the 19th century, that there’s been a shift; that philosophy begins with doubt. Is that still the case today? Do we view, (not only philosophy but life in general) with a sense of doubt or of wonder? What impact could this have on our daily lives? How could it impact the way we view religion and faith?

I approach life with a sense of wonder. When I want to establish what I can know to be true, doubt is a good start.

picklesan,

I think it is a mistake to hold wonder and doubt to be in opposition to one another. They make great companions. Check out Broca's Brain by Carl Sagan for a good example of how they may enhance one another.

As an historical aside, philosophy had a good dose of doubt many centuries before 1800s-- think Descartes, or that heretic Spinoza, or that gadfly, Socrates. One of the things that makes philosophy distinct from theology is the need for argument/reason to justify ones beliefs divorced from statements of authority or faith.

Today, if my experience is at all representative, doubt is one of the primary modes of engagement in the discipline. After all, the major preoccupation of philosophers is the presentation of arguments in papers, seminars, meetings, journals and books for the critical scrutiny of their peers.

On an individual level, I think that though doubt may be corrosive to personal relationships, it sure has an important place in the public sphere, where commercial, religious, political and other interests continually vie for influence over people. Wonder is a great feeling, but alone it can be a lever for moving people for both good and ill.

It is true that throughout history philosophy and doubt havn't exactly been strangers (one thinks of the classical Greeks Cynics or Skeptics), although it wasn't until the 18th and 19th centuries that doubt seems to become the absolute basis of philosophy. Perhaps Aristotle & Kierkegaard are probing at something deeper...i.e., that this approach of viewing philosophy and life , might not exactly be so great....

"the major preoccupation of philosophers is the presentation of arguments in papers, seminars, meetings, journals and books for the critical scrutiny of their peers."

That's a very sad and unfortunate thing indeed if it's true... that the major preoccupation of philosophers is merely to put forth arguments to be reviewed and scrutinized by their peers. It has a very 19th century Modernist/Positivistic ring to it. If it's true, something is definately wrong there. I can see all the great thinkers throughout the ages (especially Socrates) rolling over in their graves.

Philosophy is, today, a highly professionalized endeavor, and frankly the insularity of philosophers worries me. I am not sure, however, what worries you about the role of doubt (and perhaps critical attitudes/faculties?) in contemporary philosophy. How would you suggest philosophers proceed?

Also, I am not sure how any this is inconsistent with Socrates' philosophy; he did after all go about asking authorities vexing questions and expose their lack of reason and justification thereby. Perhaps you mean to criticize it as a methodological starting point, such as when Descartes used his hyperbolic skepticism to try to drill down to indubitable bedrock for his worldview. Such a foundational approach is no longer in fashion, for what it is worth. Philosophers use many starting points to motivate their inquiries, including logic, doubt and ethics. Unsurprisingly, these tend to motivate different disciplines within philosophy (epistemology, rather than, say, ethics).

I am trying to see the concern...

Re: 4

What you've written is just the same tedious, hackneyed crap that folks who aren't sufficiently familiar with contemporary philosophy resort to when they realize that they can't *immediately* understand its preoccupations, as though the difficult, often very technical endeavor that is a work of philosophy should always come equipped with a set of training wheels attached to keep the uninitiated wisdom seeker from falling off the bike.

People ALWAYS come up with this shit; they want something from philosophy, they want it to DO something for them (what, I'm never sure, but often they think it should function like literary fiction doubleplus good) but they don't want to put in the time to learn its vocabulary or even its history.

People who are familiar with the history are aware that, with a few notable exceptions, philosophers have always been preoccupied with giving arguments, arguments specifically directed at their intellectual peers (who I imagine would be anyone that can understand the stuff). Look at how the Replies are included along with Descartes' Meditations. There you see a 17th century version of today's system.

Philosophy done with out arguments, if there is such a thing, tends to resemble a bunch of hippies having a circle jerk.

"Whoa man, the world is just so.....big...."

"You said it bro....I mean...could God microwave a Burrito so hot that he himself could not eat it?"

#6: nice invective!

People who want philosophy without arguments should just short-circuit the process and join a cult immediately or take up Postmodern Magic or something.

#6 & #7:

Ah, philosophers speaking!

>6 NoLongerAtEase:.
i find it amusing that you invoke your deeper understanding of history to justify your chest-beating. If you REALLY did understand the history of philosophy you'd be a little more qualified in your claims. I wont deny that argument is an abiding principle in philosophy, but this simple statement casts a wide wide net. You obviously have forgotten all about the CYnics, ever heard of Diogenes of Sinope, who was undoubtedly a philosopher but who ridiculed the tendency (already exerting itself back then) to reduce philosophy to a endless babble of abstract jargon, rather than as a way of life. Diogenes spoke little, he let his actions and practice do the talking, if a point could be demonstrated simply, he would do so. THe story goes that upon listening to some pompous git, who thought he was a philosopher, wax lyrical on the fact that there was no such thing as true motion in the universe, he simply got up and walked away. Point proven.
Also please read Pierre Hadot, a widely acclaimed professor of ancient history and philosopher, who has written at length about how ancient philosophy was initially and primarily a way of life and not solely a set of intellectual arguments. He shows this to be the case with such movements as Stoicism and Epicureanism which extremely influential and popular philosophical movements.

>9 Mr_Wormwood:, But just because someone was a "Stoic" or an "Epicurean" did not necessarily mean that he was a philosopher. To be a Stoic was to subscribe to certain tenets about the way people ought to live. But if all you ever do is follow the tenets, you're not a philosopher; you're just the follower of a school of philosophy.

In other words, even in the case of movements like Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Pythagoreanism, where a particular way of life is clearly contemplated, I don't think that the philosophy is indistinguishable from the way of life. Philosophy is what the founders were doing when they reasoned from premises about the world to conclusions about how we should live.

The original question asks how people approach life: whether with a sense of wonder or doubt. As it stands, it reads like a standard dialectical question meant to spark a conventional debate in which people take up one side and defend it against another, and interesting viewpoints and arguments may or may not crop up; but as noted early on, the either/or opposition is artificial and the question is perhaps not framed very well. The debate takes an interesting turn however, when the claim is made that questions like these have traditionally been, and should remain, in the domain of philosophical inquiry. There were a couple of pompous and irrelevant declamations about the oh-so-important tasks in the daily life of careerists. Followed by a predictable jibe at postmodern philosophers, because their books require a different type of perspective and commitment and are typically not suffered by those looking for logical/analytical/etc. challenges and curiosities. Carping aside, I think this is a slightly different type of question - i.e. what is philosophy - and the replies above try to navigate the (again, artificial) divide between philosophy as a way of life and philosophy as a process. But why does one have to choose? Never mind that the questions of what philosophy is, what it authentically is, what it is not etc. are all fascinating and endlessly refutable. I just find it interesting that we have set up, as if in a mathematical diagram, columns or parallels with a group of co-ordinates on one parallel seeking a match on another. This (x1,y1,z1) is called Philosophy (p1,q1,r1); Philosophy (p1,q1,r1) correlates with Way of Life (l1,m1,n1); if you see Way of Life (l2, m2, n2) it may seem Authentic (function where f(p)=a1) but it is not so because it corresponds to a Philosophy (p2,q2,r2) that is in fact False - if not Flimsy and Superficial, etc. For better or worse things don't work this way in life and they don't make for probing philosophy either.

I never suggested that argument or doubt have no place in philosophical discussion; that was a false assumption. Aristotle said that philosophy should "begin" in wonder...and Kierkegaard later echoed this in light of what was going on in the 17th and 18th centuries. I'm not sure why this evokes such vitorol, childishness, and anger.

I admit I'm not a professional philosopher (you caught me) but I am interested in philosophy, so I don't see why I shouldn't be able to raise a legitimate question (actually it really is Kierkegaard's question). Perhaps he doesn't meet the high standards of the "professionals" in this forum.

>12 picklesan:, Philosophy begins in wonder. Fine, but that doesn't mean that wonder is philosophy, or that people in a state of wonder are engaged in philosophy, or especially that a person's authenticity as a philosopher is predicated on the intensity of his sense of wonder. All it means is that if there were no wonder, there would be no need to philosophize.

Doubt just means being unwilling to accept a conclusion prematurely. You wonder, now you pose a tentative explanation, but you don't stop there. You offer arguments for why your explanation is the right one, and you test your explanation with plausible counterarguments and counterproposals. That's philosophy; it's motivated by wonder, but wonder by itself isn't philosophy.

If Kierkegaard really did set up doubt and wonder as antinomies in as simplistic a way as you suggest, then I think he was wrong. Nobody's philosophy is motivated by doubt. Even Descartes, the most radical doubter around, was motivated by wonder, wondering what it was possible for him to know with certainty, and used doubt as the means for finding out. Doubt is in the toolbox of philosophy, so philosophers talk about it a lot. Wonder isn't in the toolbox; it's something else entirely.

>polutropon
regarding your previous message; you claim that the followers of Epicurus and Zeno are not 'really philosophers' but only the founders themselves were.
It is indisputable that these so called 'true' philosophers set forth an elaborate set of teachings about the correct conduct of life. Just read them. So you seem to be saying that the teachings are to be considered as 'true' philosophy but the following of the teaching is not. strange. To accept this, clearly wrong-headed notion- it would follow that these philosophers did not have an audience in mind, or are to be radically seperated from their audience, and that they did not wish to guide and instruct others, in short to teach them how to live (because this would not be 'properly' philosophical). and yet they clearly did. read them.
It is also indisputable those that followed the teaching of say stoicism, explicitly identified themselves as philosophers. THus Epictetus identifies himself as a follower of Socrates, Diogenes and Zeno and his Discourses are largely (though not entirely) the re-telling of a lagely pre-established set of principles and viewpoints. And while ALL of scholarly opinion considers Epictetus as a philosopher you do not because he doesnt fit your particular definition. again strange.

Re: #9

You'll notice I said "with a few notable exceptions".

But really I want to thank you for opening up my eyes. All this time I've been struggling to read and write philosophy, thinking that's what a philosopher does.

Now that I know better, I intend to go down to the local pub and adjudicate arguments with body language. Perhaps I can get a Fulbright and go do the same thing in some foreign pubs. Would you write me a letter of recommendation?

>14 Mr_Wormwood:, So you're saying that all people who subscribe to a set of philosophical tenets are philosphers by virtue of that fact? Now I think that's strange. It would be like saying that all Christians are theologians because they subscribe to certain religious tenets. If that's how you want to use the word "philosopher," fine by me I guess, but don't be surprised if people use the word to mean something different.

I haven't in any way said that a person isn't a philosopher if he is interested in teaching others how to live. But I don't think that teaching others how to live is either a necessary or a sufficient condition to being a philosopher. I don't think it's "unphilosophical" to teach others how to live; I just think that the act of teaching others how to live does not itself qualify one as a philosopher.

And as for your Epictetus example, I've never claimed that following (read: agreeing with) other philosphers means that you yourself are not a philosopher. I've only said that if all a person does is agree with other philosophers, then he hasn't engaged in any philosophy himself. To the extent that Epictetus expanded upon the teachings of his forbears, he absolutely was a philosopher; to the extent that he parroted them, he wasn't.

Are there any non-straw-man arguments that you'd like to take on?

Edit: having re-read my post in #9, I readily admit that my use of the word "founders" was ill-advised.

I wish our intensely engaged philosophical posters would take a moment to stop tooting their own horns.

The original poster's question above, though interesting, is framed very poorly, not least because it attempts to ask a personal question, misquotes and thus misrepresents Søren Kierkegaard, and then uses this misrepresentation/misunderstanding to legitimize itself. And before posters would put themselves above Kierkegaard or solicit recommendations to Fulbright programs based on their self-assessed brilliance, it may be worthwhile to return to the original context. (Unless, of course, they prefer to keep waving their respective flags.)

Kierkegaard's discussion on doubt is from Johannes Climacus; if you have the last Hong/Hong Princeton edition of Philosophical Fragments, the book starts on pg. 113. It is framed as a 'narrative' i.e. story, in which Climacus, a student, starts to question what it means to speak of philosophy as modern, and the thesis that modern philosophy itself begins with doubt, because this is what he has learnt. In brief, Kierkegaard is not actually concluding or accepting a simplistic tenet like "modern philosophy begins with doubt", he is instead setting it up as a thesis for interrogation. Let me quote from this commentary available online:

The narrative begins with Johannes pondering the three principles of philosophy which he has learned: "(1) philosophy begins with doubt; (2) in order to philosophize, one must have doubted; (3) modern philosophy begins with doubt." Thesis one was held by Descartes and Hans L. Martensen, 1808-1884, a professor of theology at the University of Copenhagen, and later Bishop of Zealand. Martensen was a Hegelian, whom Kierkegaard would later publicly oppose. Thesis two is again supported by Hegelianism, the prevailing philosophy of the time. Thesis three emphasizes modern philosophy, which is often thought to begin with Descartes. Kierkegaard is concerned not only with the presupposition of doubt in philosophy, but he also wished to question whether philosophy before Descartes presupposed doubt, that is, whether doubt is an integral, and therefore necessary, feature of philosophy.

On establishing this as a starting point, Climacus then wonders whether 'modern philosophy began with doubt' as an accident, or out of necessity. From the book:

Lest he be led too far, he tried to explain the following: If modern philosophy by necessity begins with doubt, then its beginning is defined in continuity with an earlier philosophy. Then if we wanted to say something historical about what philosophy begins with, we presumably should rather mention that with which the antecedent philosophy began, inasmuch as the beginning of modern philosophy would be only a consequence within an earlier beginning.... The beginning philosopher could never be justified in saying: With me begins modern philosophy.... In all this deliberating, Johannes Climacus did not advance one step (p. 137f.)... Thus, the individual philosopher must become conscious of himself and in this consciousness of himself also become conscious of his significance as a moment in modern philosophy; in turn modern philosophy must become conscious of itself as an element in a prior philosophy, which in turn must become conscious of itself as an element in the historical unfolding of the eternal philosophy.... He became discouraged... (p. 140f.)

In brief, he is criticizing Hegel's position on the inevitability of historical events, and the possibility of philosophy establishing itself as "modern", i.e beginning at a specific moment and creating something new, and yet being aware of itself as doing so even as it continues with its project - i.e. history as a purposeful transformation that is aware of itself as being such, even as it unfolds. As David Kangas puts it in Kierkegaard's Instant (link to Google books excerpt), Climacus is asking

"whether it is possible to secure the historical and conceptual distinctiveness of the modern beginning in these terms." (p. 73)

This is not idle speculation about whether philosophy, whatever philosophy is, is in fact some definable object that we can pin down as a) process or b) lifestyle or c) sense of wonder, or some combination of the above. It is more a questioning of the foundations of the philosophical moment. If (Kangas continues) as Hegel says, one cannot establish a beginning without understanding what this "beginning" is the beginning of, then we have a paradox, and Kierkegaard hammers away at this logical loophole, and Kangas quotes this passage in particular, on page 135 (link to Kierkegaard)

Modern philosophy must be assumed to be even yet in the process of becoming; otherwise there already would be something more modern, in relation to which it would be older. Is it not conceivable that modern philosophy, as it advanced and spread, became aware of its wrong beginning, which regarding as a beginning would prove not to be a beginning? {Personal aside - hilarious!} This can be correct only if the beginning itself is the essential beginning for modern philosophy, but, historically speaking, this cannot be decided until modern philosophy is concluded in its entirety.

Or, in other words, there is no way to know if the beginning of philosophy is indeed a necessary precursor for modern philosophy, and that the latter is a logical outcome of the former; and, if we are to begin philosophizing now, there is no way of knowing our modern philosophy is in fact the beginning of something momentous until and unless human history is concluded and we can look back at the history of philosophy as tracing some linear trajectory.

Hence, to say "modern philosophy begins with doubt" is more or less the same as saying "philosophy begins with doubt", because the question of what makes something "modern", i.e. definitive of the era, cannot be resolved; all inquiry is of the same fabric. Kierkegaard then continues with the analysis of the other theses, and he is also curious about the relation of the inquiring mind to the theses being made - as mentioned, unlike what Hegel says, the inquiring mind cannot confirm that its inquiries and arguments are a logical inevitability, and

If, for example, a person elevated himself above sense perception in order to philosophize and someone else for the same reason doubted sense perception, both would perhaps arrive at the same place, but the movements would be different, and the movement, of course, was what he was asking about in particular (p. 150)

Kierkegaard then proceeds with an argument about what it means to actually doubt, how doubt arises in consciousness, whether truth exists outside consciousness, etc. For more, you can continue reading the commentary linked earlier, or browse Kierkegaard's book through Google, or find a copy for yourself. Since the Greeks and their relation to modern philosophy turned up earlier, this is how the commentary summarizes the ending:

the work ends abruptly with Johannes considering the Greek skeptics to be far more consistent than modern philosophers. The reader is left not quite sure how Kierkegaard would have explicated himself, or where he would have taken Johannes.

Let me add that Kierkegaard speaks of the Greeks as attaching self-interest to doubt, and claiming that the Greeks were aware that doubt did not exist without self-interest, so to speak of doubt as "objective" is according to Kierkegaard, a "play on words"; systematic knowledge is disinterested, but doubt has a motivation; even if one were presented with a perfected system, doubt would still not be overcome, because doubt "can have everything else as its presupposition" (p. 170). You can read the whole page at this link. There is nothing at all in that passage about wonder or its contrast with doubt.

However, there is a passage excerpted from his papers that is probably relevant to the discussion:

"philosophy begins with doubt
one must doubt in order to philosophize;

in that case philosophy presumably must begin with something else (just as when it began with wonder, it began with explaining the wonderful - here with faith.

modern philosophy began with doubt.

(historically speaking)."

Pap. IV B 5:4, 1842-43

On its own, there is not enough in this excerpt to assume it can be read in the way the above poster/s framed it; it reads more like a note to himself about what he plans to write.

Thanks for posting a citation for the Kierkegaard reference. I'll read Johannes Climacus and see what happens.

I do hope you're not referring to my comments when you talk about "posters (who) would put themselves above Kierkegaard"; all I ever said was that if Kierkegaard said that, then I disagreed with him. I had my doubts all along as to whether the original poster's summary of Kierkegaard's position was accurate. If it had been accurate, then, yes, I would have disagreed with Kierkegaard. But nobody thinks I'm putting myself above Plato if I say that I disagree with his metaphysics.

17> "The original poster's question above, though interesting, is framed very poorly, not least because it attempts to ask a personal question, misquotes and thus misrepresents Søren Kierkegaard, and then uses this misrepresentation/misunderstanding to legitimize itself. "

In regards to the accusation that I misquoted S.K....

"It is a positive starting point for philosophy when Aristotle says that philosophy begins with wonder, not as in our day with doubt. Moreover the world will learn that the thing is not to begin with the negative, and the reason why it has succeeded up to the present is that it has never really give itself over to the negative, and so has never seriously done what it said, Its doubt is mere child's play."

~Soren Kierkegaard, "The Journals" ed. Bretall, 1947, Princeton University Press, 14.

Is the personal or subjective question to be dismissed outright in philosophy?:

"After the individual has given up every effort to find himself outside himself in existence (objectively), in relation to his surroundings, and when after that shipwreck he turns (inward) towards the hightest things, the absolute, coming after such emptiness, not only bursts upon him in all its fullness but also in the responsibility which he feels he has." -Ibid, 13

Also:

"When subjectivity, inwardness is the truth, the truth becomes objectively a paradox; and the fact that truth is objectively a paradox shows in its turn that subjectivity is the truth…. The paradoxical character of the truth is its objective uncertainty. This uncertainty is the expression for passionate inwardness, and this passion is precisely the truth." (Kierkegaard, Postscript).

18>nobody thinks I'm putting myself above Plato if I say that I disagree with his metaphysics.

It's a figure of speech, of course, so let me put it differently. Saying you "disagree with Plato's metaphysics" is like saying you think Shakespeare wrote some terrible plays or Beethoven's music can be really predictable. Your opinions may be relevant to the discussion, but they are not especially meaningful: nobody believes Plato's metaphysics actually describe anything verifiable about our world, just as no one would attempt to criticize Shakespeare based on the observation he may incomprehensible to contemporary readers, nor would they put down Beethoven on account of the perception "no one really listens to that stuff anymore." Everyone, of course, is welcome to an opinion. You can also write multiple theses on what aspects of Plato or Shakespeare or Beethoven are not what they have been claimed to be. However, given the tremendous body of work already out there on such subjects, subjects that have occupied generation after generation, what someone says in passing on such vast and dense fields of study is not helpful without some context and qualification, and it sounds somewhat trivializing when you leave a comment like "I think Rembrandts are too dark." But never mind - this nitpicking isn't important either.

19>In regards to the accusation that I misquoted S.K. ... Is the personal or subjective question to be dismissed outright in philosophy?

If you did not literally misquote him - after all, the fact is you did not quote him at all - I think it is at least fair to say you misrepresent Kierkegaard with your original question, because you oversimplify the concepts he is grappling with and the context he is working in. I have tried to flesh out some of the latter in my last post and I think you will agree with me that there is a quite a difference in perspective and complexity between his actual writings, and your paraphrase that leads one to assume Kierkegaard simplistically opposes doubt and wonder.

19>Is the personal or subjective question to be dismissed outright in philosophy?

I did not imply any such thing. However, I think my characterization of your post is quite fair: you came in with a personal question - and needless to say we all have questions that pop into our minds - that may have been prompted by a reading of Kierkegaard, but - do not take this as ad hominem, it's not meant to be - 1) the question was framed poorly, i.e. it was vague and simplistic and 2) you paraphrased Kierkegaard in a misleading way, and used this paraphrase of a major philosopher to prop up your question. That's not necessarily a wrong thing to do - everyone, in a sense, remains a student of philosophy all their lives; but, in this case, it led to a lot of unnecessary confusion.

>20 Existanai:

Existanai...I appreciate the constructive criticism and input...I agree, the orginal question probably is "poorly framed" as you say; my intent was only to put out a question and try to stimulate a discussion regarding the nature of wonder and doubt and how they influence & form the way we think and live. I'd ask your advice...How would you try and re-frame the question if you were me?

I don't agree that I was paraphrasing S.K. in an entirely misleading way. Of course these are a complex set of questions that whole sets of works could be written about and discussed...in that sense...of course it was simplistic, but I don't believe it was misleading. I think it's a fair represtation (however simplistic) of the issues that S.K. is grappling with.

Also Plato:

Socrates: I see, my dear Theaetetus, that Theodorus had a true insight into your nature when he said that you were a philosopher, for wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder. He was not a bad genealogist who said that Iris (the messenger of heaven) is the child of Thaumas (wonder)." Theaetetus p 25 http://books.google.com/books?id=-l2fbl5-9isC&dq=plato+theaetetus&prints...

*
Hegel: “Only one word more concerning the desire to teach the world what it ought to be. For such a purpose philosophy at least always comes too late. Philosophy, as the thought of the world, does not appear until reality has completed its formative process, and made itself ready. History thus corroborates the teaching of the conception that only in the maturity of reality does the ideal appear as counterpart to the real, apprehends the real world in its substance, and shapes it into an intellectual kingdom. When philosophy paints its grey in grey, one form of life has become old, and by means of grey it cannot be rejuvenated, but only known. The owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering.”Preface, Philosophy of Right

*
Wittgenstein: “In every serious philosophical question uncertainty extends to the very roots of the problem.
We must always be prepared to learn something totally new.” Remarks on Colour (1-15, 4e)

**

A few comments. First I agree with the sentiment (in #2 and #11) that wonder and doubt should not be placed in opposition, whether Kierkegaard does it or not. To follow up on #17 when he writes (of Kierkegaard) “In brief, he is criticizing Hegel's position on the inevitability of historical events, and the possibility of philosophy establishing itself as "modern", i.e beginning at a specific moment and creating something new, and yet being aware of itself as doing so even as it continues with its project - i.e. history as a purposeful transformation that is aware of itself as being such, even as it unfolds”: Here I would say that “wonder” stands in a polemical relation to the view of philosophy articulated by Hegel in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right; the notion that philosophy comes on the scene only after events are cut and dried (which allows an identity between the real and ideal, the real and the rational) and, likewise, the List der Vernunft in The Philosophy of History leaves no room for contingency, no room for anything of which one might be “in wonder.” There are no historical surprises for Hegel, no possibility that things could be otherwise, they simply are. I take it that Kiekegaard’s emphasis on “uncertainty,” understood as “the expression for passionate inwardness, and this passion is precisely the truth,” stands opposed to these Hegelian premises of philosophy.

But if I might bring in Wittgenstein here: uncertainty -- a form of doubt -- also opens a way to wonder (the preparation, or capacity, to learn something totally new); or perhaps we can understand wonder and doubt as different orientations that bring about openness towards what exists, what is thought to exist, and categories of knowledge.

21>How would you try and re-frame the question if you were me?

It depends. I would have started with the excerpt from Kierkegaard's journals, perhaps, and used that to frame my question, but I'm still not completely sure what the question is. If I wanted to discuss Kierkegaard in particular, I might have asked for comments on the passage itself; if I wanted to talk about the relation between wonder and doubt, my question might have been a little different; if I was using this to lead to some question about religion and faith, again, it would be different. Your original post is a cluster of questions.

22>perhaps we can understand wonder and doubt as different orientations that bring about openness towards what exists, what is thought to exist, and categories of knowledge.

Well put. I think citing from the Theaeteus is especially pertinent, because Heidegger famously cites from the same dialogue a few times to enquire about truth and the nature of philosophy. In trying to find some quotes from relevant passages in Heidegger off the 'net, I stumbled on two blog posts that I think are very appropriate to the discussion.

Wonder: Theaetetus 155 d with Aristotelian and Heideggerian Glosses

The divine Plato puts the following words in the mouth of Socrates at Theaeteus 155 d (tr. Benjamin Jowett):

I see, my dear Theaetetus, that Theodorus had a true insight into your nature when he said that you were a philosopher, for wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder.

Aristotle echoes the Theaetetus passage at 982b12 of his Metaphysics:

"It was their wonder, astonishment, that first led men to philosophize and still leads them."

... Martin Heidegger: {"commenting on both passages, writes in Was ist das — die Philosophie?"} philosophy's beginning, the pathos of astonishment, is also its principle. As such, it is not something left behind as philosophy progresses, but something that pervades and guides her at every step. This, I would add, is one of the differences between philosophy and (positive) science. The aim of the sciences is to dispel wonder, perplexity, astonishment and replace them with understanding, an understanding that makes possible the prediction and control of that which is understood. Philosophy, by contrast, not only begins in wonder but is sustained by it and never succeeds in dispelling it. {emphasis mine.}

The above is in turn quoted by another poster, who attempts the question What Good is Philosophy?, within a Heideggerian context. His thoughts touch on all the strands generated in the above discussion, i.e. philosophy as a way of life/ "genuine" philosophy/ the distinction between personal philosophical enquiry and philosophy as a career, etc. Let me quote at length:

Earlier in {Introduction to Metaphysics}, Heidegger claimed that, "according to its essence, philosophy never makes things easier, but only more difficult" (Ibid, 12 {H9}). The essence of philosophy, for Heidegger, is not to create coherent world-views or systems within which we can frame (gestellen) everything (what he termed onto-theo-logy), but to interrogate beings and let them speak for themselves. Within the history of philosophy, probably starting from Plato, there has been the attempt to find the ‘grand unified theory’ of everything. Put in other terms, philosophers have attempted to find a single mode of discourse within which one can discuss ‘the real.’ For Plato this was the realm of the Forms, for Aristotle (at least under one interpretation) it was the form/matter distinction, for the Scholastics it was the Creator/creature distinction, for the positivists it was reductivistic science, and for many Analytic philosophers today it is logic. All of these are attempts to find a way of speaking about objects to show them as they really are, at the exclusions of other modes of discourse that do not share their methods and manner of speaking. It is this monolithic assumption--that there is a single and all-inclusive way of speaking about objects/beings--that so-called postmodernists have been arguing against since their inception.

With this in mind, the ‘making things more difficult’ that Heidegger proposes as the essence of philosophy is not based in classical skepticism or willy-nilly questioning, the kind that is most often attributed to so-called postmodernists. Rather, it is being itself that ‘makes things harder.’ Heidegger was quite explicit that the whole effort of his thought was centered around the question of being, a question that he feels has been ignored within philosophy. Thus, his rejection of philosophy as a maker of worldviews--which certainly makes things easier--is grounded in his interrogation of being, in letting being speak for itself without the fear of being unthinkingly pigeonholed into a pre-established worldview. From this ground we find Heidegger’s notion of ‘thinking’ (as a technical term): it is not something that we do every day and neither is it the logical ordering of propositions or data, but the eruption of truth into the world, a new appropriation of beings.

So, what good is philosophy? It is good because it changes us; it helps us to see the world differently; beings appear in new ways. Every revolution in every discipline has altered how we see the world around us, how we see and interpret beings. Whether you choose Impressionistic art or quantum physics, the world appears in ways that were literally impossible prior to beings presenting themselves in ways that were unheard of before. When developed, philosophy cultivates (bildungen) us as human beings, expanding our appreciation of the world, allowing it to appear in all its mystery and inexhaustible wonder. In this way, philosophy is openness to that which is foreign, which is not accounted for in our current understanding, and the desire to bring it near (i.e. a principle of hermeneutics).

... So, why study philosophy? Because philosophical study cultivates your own vision, your own ability to see and discern. Perhaps you can study philosophy so you can assist others in seeing, as I hope to. To do anything more is to do "scholarship about philosophy" (Ibid, 12 {H9}), not philosophy proper. Not that such scholarship is worthless (far from it), only less primordial, less originary. {emphasis mine.}

He adds this (kind of amusing) footnote:

When I said that "scholarship about philosophy" is not "worthless," I in no way intended to downplay "scholarship about philosophy," nor did I intend to downplay anything that was non-philosophical. Yes, philosophy is good, but it is not the greatest good; I am very anti-Platonic on this matter. I personally wouldn't want to be in a world full of philosophers, even with the good that philosophy does.

>19 picklesan:, You posted another quote from Kierkegaard which you claim to be the origin of your question about wonder vs. doubt as the beginning of philosophy:

"It is a positive starting point for philosophy when Aristotle says that philosophy begins with wonder, not as in our day with doubt. Moreover the world will learn that the thing is not to begin with the negative, and the reason why it has succeeded up to the present is that it has never really give itself over to the negative, and so has never seriously done what it said, Its doubt is mere child's play."

I must read this passage quite differently from the way that you do. I don't think that Kierkegaard says here that doubt and wonder are opposed to one another as possible starting points of philosophy. Rather, I think he's criticizing the rhetoric of a certain school of philosophy, in claiming to have banished wonder and established doubt as the grounds of philosophy. He admits that this school has "succeeded up to the present," but remarks that it has done so only because its affirmation that doubt is the beginning of philosophy is mere lip-service. Effectively, he's saying that doubt is an impossible starting place for philosophy.

I don't think he's lamenting modern philosophy because "doubt," its starting place, is debased in comparison with "wonder," or some other "positive starting point." He's lamenting that the rhetoric of modern philosophy mislocates its own, actual, starting point.

Whether doubt and wonder should be considered oppositional ways of knowing (of philosophy) or as complementary orientations, one can also acknowledge that a hierarchical relationship exists between wonder and doubt. A homology exists in the relationship between the following terms, with primacy accruing to the first term in the paired sets:

Doubt and wonder
Science and art

The hierarchical relations of doubt/wonder, science/art have other associations (or relations) of superior and inferior mapped on to them:

Doubt:Wonder
Masculine:feminine
Adult:Child
Developed:Un(der)developed

*

Following the discussion of Heidegger in #23, we can also consider the question raised by Kierkegaard in another way, with another provisional “opposition” between two orientations: knowing and being. Ricoeur’s summary of the trend in philosophical hermeneutics (represented by Heidegger and Gadamer) is helpful: “I see the recent history of hermeneutics as dominated by two preoccupations. The first tends progressively to enlarge the aim of hermeneutics, in such a way that all regional hermeneutics ((here he means hermeneutics developed for the purpose of the study of the bible and ancient texts (philology)) are incorporated into one general hermeneutics. But this movement of deregionalization cannot be pressed to the end unless at the same time the properly epistemological concerns of hermeneutics – its efforts to achieve a scientific status – are subordinated to ontological preoccupations, whereby understanding ceases to appear as a simple mode of knowing in order to become a way of being and a way of relating to beings and to being” (“The task of hermeneutics” (p. 54) in From Text To Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II). The opposition of epistemology (which is associated with doubt, science, and method in Gadamer's Truth and Method) to ontology (with the shift in favor of the latter) has this implication for philosophy in the work of Gadamer. First, we must ask what types of beings we are: we are historical beings; second, interpretation/hermeneutics involves us in acquiring the historical tradition which always already shapes our way of being; prejudices, the bête noire of Enlightenment thought (and the philosophy of doubt running from Descartes to Durkheim), are not to be rejected, but rather are the starting point for an interpretive process in which a fusion of horizons (our own with those of the past) takes place.

Hence, we wind up (following Heidegger and Gadamer) with a rejection of skepticism, epistemology, and, most significantly, explanation, and an exclusive embrace of interpretation and understanding. Ricoeur attempted to overcome this opposition by turning to linguistics as a “scientific method” that is appropriate to language and our being in language -- as per Heidegger’s claim that language is “the house of Being.” (“The way to language” (p 135) in On the Way to Language).

“We can, as readers, remain in the suspense of the text, treating it as a worldless and authorless object; in this case, we explain the text in terms of its internal relations, its structure. On the other hand, we can lift the suspense and fulfill the text in speech, restoring it to living communication; in this case, we interpret the text. These two possibilities both belong to reading, and reading is the dialectic of these two attitudes” (“What is a text? explanation and understanding” (p 113) in From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics, II)

I reference Ricoeur for the purpose of showing an effort to work through apparent oppositions that pertain to defining what “philosophy” is (as they are raised in Heidegger and, perhaps in Kierkegaard -- I agree with the interpretation of Kierkegaard in #24). It is possible to both raise epistemological questions (in this case, the conditions of meaningfulness) and ontological questions (the meaning of a text in relation to the world of texts and to ourselves) within philosophical hermeneutics. Ricoeur explains this as follows, with the notion of a "hermeneutical arc."

“I shall therefore say: to explain is to being out the structure, that is, the internal relations of dependence that constitute the statics of the text; to interpret is to follow the path of thought opened up by the text, to place oneself en route toward the orient of the text. We are invited by this remark to correct our initial concept of interpretation and to search – beyond a subjective process of interpretation as an act on the text – for an objective process of interpretation that would be the act of the text.”

“The idea of interpretation as appropriation is not, for all that eliminated; it is simply postponed until the termination of the process. It lies at the extremity of what we called about the hermeneutical arc: it is the final brace of the bridge, the anchorage of the arch in the ground of lived experience. but the entire theory of hermeneutics consists in mediating this interpretation-appropriation by the series of interpretants that belong to the work of the text upon itself. Appropriation loses its arbitrariness insofar as it is the recovery of that which is at work, in labor, within the text. What the interpreter says is a resaying that reactivates what is said in the text” (“What is a text? explanation and understanding” (pp 121-122, 124) in From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics, II)

In this case, an openness to the text (towards discovery and appropriation of its meaning), is compatible with the philosophical tradition of doubt (epistemology), which raises questions of the conditions for knowing a text (its internal conditions of meaningfulness). The tradition of doubt does not have to be excised; and the "pathos of wonder" need not be dispelled (pace Heidegger).

I would think that the shift occurred with Descartes. Cartesian dualism introduces doubt as the main concern of philosophy. Ancient philosophy has less of a definitive distinction between subject and object and thinks more in terms of a world that is encountered with less of a definitive distinction between subject and object(sorry if I'm being a little confusing in my language but the idea of Cartesian dualism seems to be firmly embedded in a lot of modern language). This is more in tune with feelings of wonder. I think the approach of wonder is preferable to the approach of doubt. The emphasis on doubt seems to confine philosophy to merely a negative task of finding where we have went wrong and misunderstood things. it is also wrong in that it presumes that the idea of a world as separate and apart from a perceiving subect is the only way to look at things. It is a posture that has certain advantages but that is not the way the world is encountered and it is not the manner in which wonder is experienced.