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Lädt ... The drive on Moscow, 1941 : Operation Taifun and Germany's first crisis of World War II (2011)von Niklas Zetterling, Anders Frankson (Autor)
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At the end of September 1941, more than a million German soldiers lined up along the frontline just 180 miles west of Moscow. They were well trained, confident, and had good reasons to hope that the war in the East would be over with one last offensive. Facing them was an equally large Soviet force, but whose soldiers were neither as well trained nor as confident. When the Germans struck, disaster soon befell the Soviet defenders. German panzer spearheads cut through enemy defenses and thrust deeply to encircle most of the Soviet soldiers on the approaches to Moscow. Within a few weeks, most of them marched into captivity, where a grim fate awaited them. Despite the overwhelming initial German success, however, the Soviet capital did not fall. German combat units as well as supply transport were bogged down in mud caused by autumn rains. General Zhukov was called back to Moscow and given the desperate task to recreate defense lines west of Moscow. The mud allowed him time to accomplish this, and when the Germans again began to attack in November, they met stiffer resistance. Even so, they came perilously close to the capital, and if the vicissitudes of weather had cooperated, would have seized it. Though German units were also fighting desperately by now, the Soviet build-up soon exceeded their own. THE DRIVE ON MOSCOW: Operation Taifun, 1941 is based on numerous archival records, personal diaries, letters, and other sources. It recreates the battle from the perspective of the soldiers as well as the generals. The battle, not fought in isolation, had a crucial role in the overall German strategy in the East, and its outcome reveals why the failure of the German assault on Moscow may well have been the true turning point of World War II. Niklas Zetterling is a researcher at the Swedish Defense College. Along with Anders Frankson he has previously written Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis and The Korsun Pocket: The Encirclement and Breakout of a German Army in the East, 1944. Both authors currently live in Sweden Keine Bibliotheksbeschreibungen gefunden. |
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Google Books — Lädt ... GenresMelvil Decimal System (DDC)940.5421731History and Geography Europe Europe 1918- Military History Of World War II Campaigns and battles by theatre European theatreKlassifikation der Library of Congress [LCC] (USA)BewertungDurchschnitt:
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Unfortunately, there is nothing in this text that separates it from other studies. There is the usual reliance on German general memoirs, sprinkled with a few frontline diaries to give the reader an impression of what the soldiers themselves overcame to reach Moscow. The text contains the same rehashing of the terrible weather the Wehrmacht had to overcome (both mud and then snow), the same logistical difficulties and mediocre Soviet resistance that really did little to nothing until somehow the Germans exhausted themselves with their long distance advances against the rains and snows of the east. Some Cold War era memoirs from the Soviet side make an appearance, with the usual reliance on Konev, Rokossovsky, Zhukov, Shtemenko, and a few others that provide absolutely no new or original information on the battle. The Soviet side, for all intents and purposes, still remains a mystery compared to the German side of things (even though some newer Russian studies are utilized). Minor mistakes are also present, as when the 316th Rifle Division is first said to come from Central Asia (pg. 83) and then from Siberia (pg. 171). If you've read about the German advance on Moscow (Operation Typhoon), then you've read the majority of this book already. If you're new to the topic, you won't want to start here as the amount of information provided is there for those already familiar with the Eastern Front. For those who are acquainted with the Eastern Front, you'll find little analysis, and no new or original research, but the appendices might prove useful if you're eager for detailed orders of battle and information on losses. So in the end, I'm back to where I started this review; I'm simply confused as to why this volume was written and for whom. ( )