Jeff Pearce’s book on the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935-1941 is really more about western diplomatic efforts than the military campaign; most “action” takes place in London, Paris and Geneva rather than Ethiopia. Pearce is a journalist rather than a historian, and takes a typical journalist’s approach, writing about people rather than events.

While reading the accounts of the runup to the war, I kept finding myself making excuses for the democracies – England, France, the United States – explaining why they couldn’t stop Mussolini from conquering Ethiopia. The Great Depression was still going on, the democracies had neglected military preparedness, voters were in an isolationist mood, it was best to leave things to the League of Nations, certainly Signore Mussolini could be persuaded to be reasonable if some of his demands were met, sanctions would hurt domestic exporters more than Italy, Italy was thought to be a much stronger military power than it actually was, and so on. All of these things were true but didn’t change the fact that an aggressor nation brutally conquered an independent country and the international entities that were supposed to prevent that sort of thing stood by and watched.

Mussolini was at least honest in his contempt of the Ethiopians; England and France were polite in public but not behind the scenes. Haile Selassie put his trust in the League of Nations, which turned out to be a major mistake; the League was essentially Britain and France, and their response was to delay by having meetings about having discussions about having talks about considering taking action. Some minor sanctions – scrap metal and military equipment, for example – were put in place but the crucial measures that could have deterred Mussolini – closing the Suez Canal to Italian shipping and cutting off oil supplies – were the subject of endless rounds of talks until it was too late for them to have any effect. Proposals to hand over parts of Ethiopia to Italy were discussed – without inviting any input from Ethiopia. At one point Haile Selassie attempted an “end run” around the League, granting a concession for oil rights to Standard Oil of New Jersey (and thus hoping the United States would get involved in the situation). However, the English protested, claiming that it was “understood” that Ethiopia was in the English, French and Italian “sphere of influence”, and the US State Department voided the deal.

Mussolini wanted a new Roman empire, and Ethiopia was one of the few places where there was territory not under the control of another European power. The excuse was a conflict between Ethiopian and Italian/Somali troops at the oasis of Walwal; the Italians claimed Ethiopian encroachment, and when surveys – by Italians - showing the disputed site was clearly in Ethiopian territory turned up they were dismissed with armwaving. Mussolini gave lip service to negotiations – with England, France, and the League of Nations, not with Ethiopia – but each time he was presented with a proposal he came up with new demands. Eventually the Italians marched.

Ethiopia, despite getting plenty of advance warning, was not prepared for war. Some advisors had suggested the Ethiopians turn to guerilla war rather than trying to confront the Italians in open battle, but the feudal chiefs didn’t agree; the Ethiopians had inflicted a massive defeat on the Italians at the battle of Adwa in 1896 and were confident they could do it again. However in 1896 it was spears against rifles; in 1935 it was rifles against machine guns, artillery, tanks, airplanes and poison gas. The Ethiopians had some minor, local successes when they could ambush Italian columns in rough terrain, but it was mostly just a matter of marching; the Fascists dubbed the advance to Addis Ababa “The March of the Iron Will”. The Emperor fled to England, but gave a speech at the League of Nations pointing out “today it is us; tomorrow it could be you”. Italians in the audience booed and catcalled until they were removed.

In the meantime guerrilla war went on and the Italians answered with atrocities. An assassination attempt against Governor General Rudolfo Graziani resulted in a wholesale massacre; estimates range from “a few hundred” victims (according to the Italians) to 30000 (according to the Ethiopians). Outside historians put the figure at around 19200, which would have been 20% of the population of Addis Ababa. Graziani followed this up with a more systematic purge of Ethiopian aristocracy, including anyone who had been educated abroad. A few months later, Graziani order the execution of Ethiopian monks and clergy, who he suspected had played a role in the assassination attempt; Italian records have 320 people killed in mass executions while Ethiopians estimate the death toll at 1500 -2000.

Graziani was replaced as governor-general by the Duke of Aosta, an Anglophile who adopted a more conciliatory attitude; however things really turned around when Italy declared war on England and France in 1940. The Italians were able to quickly overrun British Somaliland and made a short advance into Anglo-Egyptian Sudan but after that it was all downhill for Italian East Africa. Aosta was a more competent military leader than Graziani and the Italian performed well in some defensive battles, notably the Battle of Keren but Italian supplies were cut off. Haile Selassie returned to Ethiopia to the adulation of his people but over the objections of some of the English politicians and military.

Pearce notes that the English treated Ethiopia as “occupied enemy territory” rather than as a liberated friendly nation, on the technicality that it had been recognized as Italian before the Italian declaration of war on the Allies; they feared that there would be revenge attacks on Italian civilians unless there was a English military presence. It’s also claimed the English engaged in wholesale looting of Italian improvements – factories and equipment the Italians had built in Ethiopian were disassembled and sent to English African colonies; and the English claimed Ethiopian territory in the Ogaden region as part of British Somaliland, a dispute that wasn’t settled (in favor of Ethiopia) until the 1950s.

As mentioned, this is a book about personalities. Pearce has little use for English politicians (with the exception of Anthony Eden); Neville Chamberlain comes in for special criticism, as does Pierre Laval on the French side. In the US, Secretary of State Cordell Hull doesn’t come across favorably. The Soviets are conspicuously absent, although it’s noted black Communists in England and the US were conflicted; should they be supporting Ethiopia, which was a feudal monarchy, over Italy, which was (nominally, at least) a Socialist state? Perhaps surprisingly given the subject there isn’t too much about individual Ethiopians; probably because there isn’t too much information available. Haile Selassie is first a benevolent and cultured despot, but eventually loses touch with his people; other Ethiopian leaders get fairly perfunctory mention. (See Lost Lions of Judah for some information on foreign volunteers in Ethiopian service).

Pearce comments that no Italians were ever tried by an international court for war crimes (Graziani received a prison sentence from an Italian court, but was released after four months). Italy, after all, had come in on the Allied side after Mussolini was deposed and the Allies didn’t want to offend any of their former enemies. A statue of Graziani was recently erected in his home town – over Ethiopian protests.

The situation poses a whole bunch of “what if” alternate history questions. Could the Italians have been stopped before the invasion? Mussolini is claimed to have told Hitler (in 1938) that if his oil supplies – which came mostly from England and the United States – had been cut off he would have had to withdraw from Ethiopia. Then what? The Ethiopian conquest let the dictators know that that the democracies would do nothing substantial to stop them, perhaps leading to Hitler’s remilitarization of the Rhineland, Anschluss with Austria, and annexation of Czechoslovakia. Would a Italian rebuff in Ethiopia have led to Mussolini’s early downfall and a neutral or Allied Italy in World War II?

Adequate endnotes and bibliography; several plate sections, some of which are pretty disturbing photographs of the Graziani massacre. Inadequate maps, and they’re in the front matter rather than in the appropriate text sections. The book could use a glossary for Amharic words like “Dejazmach” and “tej”. There are a couple minor errors of fact; at one point Mozambique is identified as a former German colony and later it’s claimed that the Emperor and his retinue were transported in two Hurricane fighters.

Recommended for it coverage of an interesting place, time, and people. ( )