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In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy

von Aaron L. Friedberg

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War--or the threat of war--usually strengthens states as governments tax, draft soldiers, exert control over industrial production, and dampen internal dissent in order to build military might. The United States, however, was founded on the suspicion of state power, a suspicion that continued to gird its institutional architecture and inform the sentiments of many of its politicians and citizens through the twentieth century. In this comprehensive rethinking of postwar political history, Aaron Friedberg convincingly argues that such anti-statist inclinations prevented Cold War anxieties from transforming the United States into the garrison state it might have become in their absence. Drawing on an array of primary and secondary sources, including newly available archival materials, Friedberg concludes that the "weakness" of the American state served as a profound source of national strength that allowed the United States to outperform and outlast its supremely centralized and statist rival: the Soviet Union. Friedberg's analysis of the U. S. government's approach to taxation, conscription, industrial planning, scientific research and development, and armaments manufacturing reveals that the American state did expand during the early Cold War period. But domestic constraints on its expansion--including those stemming from mean self-interest as well as those guided by a principled belief in the virtues of limiting federal power--protected economic vitality, technological superiority, and public support for Cold War activities. The strategic synthesis that emerged by the early 1960's was functional as well as stable, enabling the United States to deter, contain, and ultimately outlive the Soviet Union precisely because the American state did not limit unduly the political, personal, and economic freedom of its citizens. Political scientists, historians, and general readers interested in Cold War history will value this thoroughly researched volume. Friedberg's insightful scholarship will also inspire future policy by contributing to our understanding of how liberal democracy's inherent qualities nurture its survival and spread.… (mehr)
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Aaron Friedberg seeks to explore whether or not the United States succumbed to statism during the Cold War. The outcome of the Cold War can be seen as something of a paradox: we might expect that the Soviet Union – with its command economy and commensurately greater relative ability to mobilize all national resources – would be likelier to prevail over its opponent, which possessed a much less centralized, but considerably larger, economy and relatively more limited ability to mobilize national resources. In light of the enormous pressures of the Cold War, Friedberg wants to understand how the United States was able to avoid statism and centralization of power in the executive branch. Friedberg thoroughly analyzed how the United States mobilized (and in many cases, failed to mobilize) manpower and resources for the development of industry, weapons, and technology. In every case, policymakers failed to enhance the power and role of the state to the extent that some believed necessary to defeat the Soviet Union. He argued that the divided nature of U.S. governmental and societal institutions, the long-standing influence of anti-interventionist interest groups and issues (e.g., domestic concerns even in the face of seemingly overwhelming international threats), and – especially – the American anti-statist ideological tradition were factors of U.S. success in the Cold War and the reasons why the United States was able to avoid becoming militarist and statist. Friedberg provided an interesting and in some ways cautionary argument that U.S. Cold War strategy was the result of a series of compromises and political bargaining necessitated by competing interest groups rather than a set of rational strategic calculations. While Friedberg's scholarship is good, his writing style is less than engaging. A bit of a snoozer, but if you're reading this book, you're probably sufficiently interested in the topic that it shouldn't matter much.

Review copyright 2009 J. Andrew Byers ( )
  bibliorex | Mar 26, 2009 |
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War--or the threat of war--usually strengthens states as governments tax, draft soldiers, exert control over industrial production, and dampen internal dissent in order to build military might. The United States, however, was founded on the suspicion of state power, a suspicion that continued to gird its institutional architecture and inform the sentiments of many of its politicians and citizens through the twentieth century. In this comprehensive rethinking of postwar political history, Aaron Friedberg convincingly argues that such anti-statist inclinations prevented Cold War anxieties from transforming the United States into the garrison state it might have become in their absence. Drawing on an array of primary and secondary sources, including newly available archival materials, Friedberg concludes that the "weakness" of the American state served as a profound source of national strength that allowed the United States to outperform and outlast its supremely centralized and statist rival: the Soviet Union. Friedberg's analysis of the U. S. government's approach to taxation, conscription, industrial planning, scientific research and development, and armaments manufacturing reveals that the American state did expand during the early Cold War period. But domestic constraints on its expansion--including those stemming from mean self-interest as well as those guided by a principled belief in the virtues of limiting federal power--protected economic vitality, technological superiority, and public support for Cold War activities. The strategic synthesis that emerged by the early 1960's was functional as well as stable, enabling the United States to deter, contain, and ultimately outlive the Soviet Union precisely because the American state did not limit unduly the political, personal, and economic freedom of its citizens. Political scientists, historians, and general readers interested in Cold War history will value this thoroughly researched volume. Friedberg's insightful scholarship will also inspire future policy by contributing to our understanding of how liberal democracy's inherent qualities nurture its survival and spread.

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