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The Generals' War : The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf

von Michael R. Gordon, Bernard E. Trainor

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In a unique combination of journalism and military expertise, Michael R. Gordon, chief defense correspondent for The New York Times, and retired three-star Marine Corps General Bernard E. Trainor provide a definitive, behind-the-scenes account and analysis of the planning and execution of the Persian Gulf War. The inside story of the war is a tale of politics and clashing military cultures: while one war was being waged against Iraq, another was being fought among the generals themselves. Drawing on interviews with senior allied officials in the Persian Gulf, Western Europe, and the United States, The Generals' War offers unvarnished portraits of top military commanders, as well as new disclosures about the conflicts and power struggles within the anti-Iraq coalition and the American high command. The Air Force believed that wars could be decided through strategic bombing. The Army saw the war as an opportunity to apply its doctrine of maneuver warfare. The Marine Corps approached the Gulf with a history of expeditionary warfare and amphibious assault. The Navy remained aloof from Central Command, preferring to act on its own. Although General Colin Powell and General H. Norman Schwarzkopf were tasked with developing a unified plan from these separate, sometimes conflicting agendas, they never fully harmonized the war plans. As a result, half of Iraq's Republican Guard forces got away. Three and a half years after what was considered a decisive victory, some of the same Iraqi Republican Guard forces that the allies had failed to destroy again menaced Kuwait, forcing President Clinton to order American troops back to the Persian Gulf to prevent a second Iraqi invasion. Saddam Hussein was entrenched and unbowed. The Persian Gulf War was an incomplete success.… (mehr)
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Published in 1995, this book still belongs to that initial wave of Desert Storm publications, although this work's four-year separation from the events it describes allows the authors to include commentary on the wave of celebrity autobiographies and events that immediately followed the end of the war in February 1991. The authors are the New York Times Pentagon correspondent Michael Gordon and the Times former military correspondent and retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor. Their professionalism and level of military knowledge easily allows this work to rise above the bulk of their contemporary Desert Storm storytellers and makes for good reading for students of military history.

Gordon and Trainor tell the story of the Persian Gulf War in two parts with 20 chapters total, along with an epilogue, endnotes, acknowledgements and an index. The book is arranged chronologically. The endnotes are particularly well-detailed and usefully augment the information in the text. The book's perspective is from the 30,000 foot level, meaning that the authors concentrated their efforts on the story of senior leadership during the conflict, seldom diving below brigade level. This is in contrast to Rick Atkinson's "Crusade", whose story ranged up and down the entire chain of command.

The authors focus on decision-making, and they spare none of the major players, despite the prior publication of their self-serving autobiographies. General H. Norman Schawarzkopf, Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central Command, falls under a particularly critical eye, as well he should. The nation was not served well when Schwarzkopf was placed at the helm of CENTCOM, the thinking being that the isolated command was the safest place to put a cantankerous four-star in 1989, but the events of 1990 and 1991 proved to be above his skill level and personality. CINCCENT is not the only player given this detailed analysis, but he is the most noticeable. While there was no question on how Desert Storm would end militarily, one could not say the same about the politics, both domestic and international. It is readily apparent that Desert Storm's unsatisfactory conclusion set the stage for Operation Iraqi Freedom a dozen years later.

Overall this book is a great read written by authors with classical views of military history who did great research and interviews. My only complaint is that the maps are not in sync with the description of Iraqi military units given in the text. ( )
  Adakian | Mar 22, 2021 |
I thought I would educate myself on recent American history. So far the going is slow but I'll finish it yet.

Finally finished this behemoth. I learned a lot, but it wasn't exactly riveting. ( )
  Terrencee | May 8, 2019 |
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AutorennameRolleArt des AutorsWerk?Status
Michael R. GordonHauptautoralle Ausgabenberechnet
Trainor, Bernard E.Hauptautoralle Ausgabenbestätigt
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In a unique combination of journalism and military expertise, Michael R. Gordon, chief defense correspondent for The New York Times, and retired three-star Marine Corps General Bernard E. Trainor provide a definitive, behind-the-scenes account and analysis of the planning and execution of the Persian Gulf War. The inside story of the war is a tale of politics and clashing military cultures: while one war was being waged against Iraq, another was being fought among the generals themselves. Drawing on interviews with senior allied officials in the Persian Gulf, Western Europe, and the United States, The Generals' War offers unvarnished portraits of top military commanders, as well as new disclosures about the conflicts and power struggles within the anti-Iraq coalition and the American high command. The Air Force believed that wars could be decided through strategic bombing. The Army saw the war as an opportunity to apply its doctrine of maneuver warfare. The Marine Corps approached the Gulf with a history of expeditionary warfare and amphibious assault. The Navy remained aloof from Central Command, preferring to act on its own. Although General Colin Powell and General H. Norman Schwarzkopf were tasked with developing a unified plan from these separate, sometimes conflicting agendas, they never fully harmonized the war plans. As a result, half of Iraq's Republican Guard forces got away. Three and a half years after what was considered a decisive victory, some of the same Iraqi Republican Guard forces that the allies had failed to destroy again menaced Kuwait, forcing President Clinton to order American troops back to the Persian Gulf to prevent a second Iraqi invasion. Saddam Hussein was entrenched and unbowed. The Persian Gulf War was an incomplete success.

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