An interesting discussion of an interesting time in the Revolutionary War – 1776 to 1778, with the focus on the Continental Army under George Washington. Washington’s military reputation has sunk somewhat in the estimation of modern historians, and author John Buchanan more or less agrees – GW had a penchant for overly complex plans, often incorporating multiple separate columns converging on an objective after a night march, a difficult problem for a professional army, much less a group of amateurs like the early Continentals. It was, perhaps, unfortunate that this strategy actually worked at Washington’s most famous victory – the Battle of Trenton, when two columns managed to arrive at the objective within 5 minutes of each other, despite a river crossing and winter night march. (Buchanan points out the Washington’s plan included two other columns, that were supposed to cross the Delaware downstream and block a road to keep reinforcements from arriving by that route – neither of these even made it across the river). It’s interesting to speculate what might have happened if the attack on Trenton hadn’t come off – in fact, Buchanan notes that the difficulty of crossing the river made several officers push for a cancellation. Although the battle was really no more than a large scale raid, it provided a boost in morale that may have been vital to the continuation of the war.

What Washington did turn out to be good at was extricating the Continental army from difficult positions – after the Battle of Long Island, where Howe had Washington pinned against the East River only to have GW pull off a night river crossing; after the Battle of Trenton, where Cornwallis believed he had him pinned against the Delaware River and Washington neatly sidestepped around him; and during the battle of Brandywine, where Howe crossed the river at an unknown ford and had Washington on the flank. All three of these depended greatly on Washington’s luck, but it’s an axiom of military history that luck is probably the single most important thing a general needs.

Washington’s other great accomplishment, of course, was negotiating the politics of the early republic. A number of his subordinates – Charles Fox, Horatio Gates – were more than ready to replace him and lobbied Congress for the honor. Congress also stuck its fingers in the military pie, with urging to win the war with “one bold stroke” – as Buchanan points out, this required a totally unrealistic idea of what the Continental Army was capable of. Finally, a lesser politician might not have been able to deal with the French landing at Yorktown, which was done without any noticeable coordination with the American. Washington swallowed his pride and immediately marched the army south in time to complete the investment of Cornwallis and end the war. In this respect, Washington reminds me a little of Eisenhower – someone whose major talent was not field commander, but more of military manager, keeping troops supplied and dealing with fractious subordinates.

One of the things that impressed me, used to more recent military history, is how small the Continental Army was. At the low point, Washington commanded about 1200 troops – barely a battalion in modern terms – and even at its largest the army was not much bigger than 20000 – a small modern division. Nevertheless it was organized like an army, with regiments and battalions, most of which were perhaps the size of a modern company. At times it must have seemed like the officers outnumbered the enlisted men.
The book has excellent maps, an extensive bibliography, and a “Suggestions for Further Reading” appendix. It’s interesting to compare it with Robert Harvey’s A Few Bloody Noses, which discusses Washington at length from the British viewpoint. ( )

Very interesting! It's an angle on the Revolutionary War that's generally neglected - how this very inexperienced commander a) survived and b) built up his equally inexperienced army into one that could match the trained and experienced British regulars (not to mention the Hessians and other mercenaries). The book covers, in some detail, events from July 4 1776 (yes, that date), when the British came ashore on Long Island to begin the war, until the spring of 1778, after their winter in Valley Forge. The author clearly has a lot more information than he's put into this book, for which I am grateful - too many history writers insist on putting down every single bit of data they've uncovered. Here, for instance, Buchanan repeatedly references the feud between Washington and one General Charles Lee (of whom I'd never heard - admittedly, this is not a period of history I've studied at all). He lays out the basis, mentions some incidents within his timeline that gave the feud impetus, and finally mentions the bad luck and bad judgement that took Charles Lee out of the fight and permanently stopped his attempts to position himself to replace Washington. There's much, much more to the matter, I'm sure, but I don't need to know it - what Buchanan gave me was quite sufficient to show the flavor of events without drowning me in trivia. Similarly, he regularly quotes from letters to, from, and about Washington, without overwhelming the reader with the whole of every document. This is not a serious, detailed study of the beginning of the Revolutionary War - it's an overview, for readers who don't know much more than "Lexington and Concord! Valley Forge! General Washington, the Father of our Country!" which is about my level. And at that level and for those purposes, it's beautifully done. There are a few missteps - particularly the lack of maps, especially in the sections where this group is maneuvering and that group is going around them and the river or the mountains or the ford is channeling their travel...it would have been helpful. And some of the few maps in the book, near the beginning, were...fuzzy. They were obviously expanded from very small images, and every line was blurred, including the text - I'm really surprised such poor maps were published. Later on in the book is one more map, in the same style, but drawn at a useful size so that the lines and text were clear - that level of illustration throughout would have been much better. But aside from the poor and limited mapping, the book was excellent; I have a much clearer image of the physical and political maneuvering, on both/all sides, over that period. I doubt I'll reread, but it was interesting, useful, and quite quick to read (the last book that size I read took me nearly 6 months, mostly because I couldn't stand to read more than a few pages at a time because of all the trivia the author poured out, illustrating his research). ( )