For all the reading I have done on WWI, it never ceases to amaze me how some of the senior officers, particularly British (only because I am most familiar with the British literature), casually discuss the casualties of the troops under their command.
This book, while somewhat adhering to the theme listed above, is worth a look. Marshall was not on the "fast track" to the senior ranks prior to the war. In fact, he was not a "Staff officer", and therein was most likely not considered to be a player. However, wars have a tendency to change how leaders are chosen. In Marshall's case, starting at the battalion command level, and through a series of transfers that took him through four fronts in WWI, ended up as General Officer Commanding (GOC) for British forces in Mesopotomia.
Marshall discusses his transfer from India to the Western Front, where he briefly served, but was quickly dispatched to the effort in Gallipoli. Here, in a somewhat noteworthy fashion, Marshall questions some of the tactics employed (albeit ex post facto), but yet resigned himself to employing the same tactics in a numbing effort to dislodge the Turks.
Following the evacuation of Gallipoli, Marshall served on the Salonika front. However, Marshall quickly moved up the chain and was transferred to Mesopotamia as a Corps Commander, serving under General Maude. His accounting of his time as corps commander leaves something to be desired. One wonders how closely he was involved in the day-to-day operations, or how much his staff acted on his behalf. From reading this, this question is unresolved.
Marshall was chosen to succeed Maude, after the latter's untimely death in Baghdad. It appears the senior leadership in India did not approve of this, but again, Marshall does not go into any more detail.
Marshall discusses his displeasure with the opening of the NW Persian front, and how he disapproved of the "Dunsterforce" mission to Baku. His reasoning was probably spot on at the time, since his primary argument was that the lines of communication would be hopelessly overextended and exposed. Yet he was overruled on this issue.
His narrative ends somewhat abruptly after hostilities had ended, and the British had occupied Mosul.
The book is an important reference for the British campaign (post-Kut), since many of the senior leaders did not publish after the war. I would have liked to have been given a lot more detail on some of the details of the campaign in Mesopotamia, and moreso, his interaction with both India and London on the political intrigues as the war was drawing to a close in Mesopotamia. ( )