This booik could have been subtitled " How the US Failed." The author goes back to WWII days to show the lack of success in fighting terrorists. Perhaps had the author taken the story back to George Washington himself, that master of the spy business he might have uncovered more positive stories, but then that was when the Americans WERE the terrorists. ( )

Other than Michael Scheuer's excellent three works on terrorism, this is an required, and much needed historical perspective on counter-terrorism. Naftali writes: "After years of studying the intelligence and security world, I have come to believe less in the efficiency of conspiracies than I do in the inefficiency of government (p. xii)." The narrative was written, but not published, as a study for the 9/11 Commission.

Naftali traces the history of American counter-terrorism back to the Eisenhower administration, and provides a required understanding of Kennedy-Bush I policies and directives about terrorism. It is not really secret, but certainly not appreciated that Nixon and Reagan had significant experience already in understanding Middle Eastern Muslim, and world examples of terrorism previous to the more well-known failures of Clinton and Bush. One consistency in counter-terrorism is to appreciate that the second-level rank of analysts consistently outperformed their senior-level, and presidential directors. This factor should be taken into account in the war on terrorism. The senior-level and presidential level policy makers, more sensitive to political and bureaucratic winds and directions, often misled the American people with a false sense of security and did not respond effectively to threats, including the deaths of American service people and civilians. We have in many ways repeated 9/11 previous to that date and continue to inadequately respond. American policy is unduly reactive. Even when appropriate polices are enunciated, policy implementation lacked muscle.

The roots of failure were set early on. After WWII, Otto Skorzeny, a notorious Nazi special-operations expert, planned to lead a terrorist campaign against the new governments of a liberated Europe. In shades of post-invasion Iraq, the attempt seems even more notorious now than recounted in Naftali's work. Skorzeny's plot prompted U.S. intelligence to mobilize a counter-terrorism corps. At that time the FBI was responsible for some foreign intelligence gathering. When the British offered to share wartime signals intelligence, they proposed Percy "Sam" Foxworth, an experienced FBI hand, as a contact. The idea was to transfer him to the new Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of the CIA. But FBI Chief J. Edgar Hoover nixed the idea since he didn't like Foxworth. Had an FBI agent taken the job, there might have been cooperation between the FBI and CIA rather than the rivalry that ensued. Again, in an ominous foreshadowing of one of 9/11's notorious failures, the lack of communication and cooperation between the FBI and CIA, the two agencies began at odds in counter-terrorism.

Naftali also points out that the fear that foreign terrorists might attack the United States dates back at least to the Ford administration. And Reagan, who was determined to compensate for what he regarded as Jimmy Carter's weakness in defending U.S. interests during the Iran hostage crisis, came to office with terrorism at the top of his agenda--the only president ever to do so.

Unfortunately, concerted action did not always follow awareness. Even when top policymakers saw the danger, Naftali suggests, their interest almost never prompted consequential policy changes. Presidents were hard pressed to sustain their focus on the issue; when they did, their initiatives were not always implemented by the relevant bureaucracies. Little came of the 1981 call by then Vice President George H.W. Bush to create an intelligence clearinghouse. In 1984, the Reagan administration issued National Security Decision Directive 138, launching a campaign to "send a strong and vigorous message" that the United States "will not tolerate terrorist activity." But according to Naftali, the routine operations of the CIA and the FBI went largely unchanged. In 1986, the recommendations of a vice presidential task force, which prefigured those of the 9/11 Commission, were also issued as a directive; in the end, few were carried out. In June 1995, President Clinton issued a presidential directive and promoted an expansive legislative package, but it was not until the U.S.A. Patriot Act that many of its recommendations were adopted. Awareness of terrorism and the commitment to combat it have reached unprecedented levels since 9/11, but the resolve has certainly dissipated over time.

A slew of public scandals, some linked to terrorism, others not, also inhibited the government. Various efforts to check abuses of power by the government reduced its leeway to fight terrorism. The 1975-76 Church Committee investigations reined in the intelligence agencies and made them wary of covert operations. In the aftermath of the Iran-contra affair, the role of the National Security Council (NSC) staff was diminished, and the implementation of the counter-terrorism recommendations put forward by the vice president's task force was complicated. The controversy surrounding the FBI's 1988 investigation of the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador restricted domestic intelligence gathering. Even the Monica Lewinsky scandal had an adverse effect on Clinton's anti-terrorism policies. There is no evidence that the retaliatory strikes in Sudan in 1998 were meant to divert public attention from the president's domestic problems. But Clinton and his advisers became particularly sensitive to the charge and to the `wag the dog' media criticism. The result of the scandal was to reinforce a preexisting tendency to avoid risk. Since 9/11, the Bush administration used force preemptively and unilaterally, only to flag in the wake of lower opinion polls and then the Chamberlain-like policies of Hussein Obama.

Despite its limitations, CIA comes off better in Naftali's handling of the material than the more journalistic and sensationalistic accounts of CIA in Joseph Trento's, The Secret History of the CIA and Tim Weiner's Legacy of Ashes. Tensions between the CIA and the FBI, the NSC and the State Department, and the State Department and the Federal Aviation Administration hampered the progress of the inter-agency working groups charged with formulating counter-terrorism policy. The communication failures reported by the 9/11 Commission predated the Clinton and Bush administrations; Naftali's account makes clear from the outset that they were often the unfortunate side effects of petty turf wars. The history of U.S. counter-terrorism efforts is replete with the creation of new bodies and institutional overhauls. But as the number of relevant players grew, so did over-regulation, friction, and poor coordination.

The enemy is patient, lethal, and intelligent. If only Americans had comparable administrators to wage war against the terrorists.