The existentialists did not have a coherent system of ethics as a group, because they were not really a group, nor did they all present a complete system individually. However, some of their thoughts on ethics were quite interesting from a theoretical point, as well as influential beyond the realm of philosophy. This short book gives us a summary on the thoughts of three major existentialists: Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre.
Kierkegaard, arguably the first existentialist, described three phases of ethical development that people can pass through in their lives. This began with the lowest, the Aesthetic, progressing towards the higher Ethical, to the final and highest stage of the Religious. These were not stages that everyone passed through in order from birth to maturity; rather some people would remain at the lower end, while others who sought the truth would progress to the highest. Here, the key point which would influence future existentialists was the emphasis on the need for subjective real life experience in progressing toward goodness, as opposed to it being something that could be acquired purely by intellectual endeavour and unthinking text book learning. In other words, to progress from his second stage, the Ethical stage (in which conduct is guided by learnable objective principles), to his highest stage, the Religious, it was necessary via questioning to gain subjective insight of a religious nature, ie of God. It is important to note here that Kierkegaard classed the majority of “religious” people at the time as not being in the higher, Religious stage of development because they were unquestioning and had not reached a justified belief. This departure of ethics from being solely a universal, codifiable system as Kant or Spinoza would have it, to being a something one must earn through acceptance of principles plus experience and justified belief, is what went on to influence the systems of later existentialists, Heidegger and Sartre.
Heidegger did not class himself as an existentialist, but many others have done, not least for his influence on Sartre. Heidegger took God out of the system, and described the difference between an Authentic and Inauthentic existence. The Inauthentic existence is characterised by an unquestioning adherence to group norms without individual questioning of what is truly right, without listening to personal calls of conscience. In this latter point it has some similarities with Kierkegaard’s first and second phases, though it is a more general and basic existence. On the other hand, the Authentic existence is reached through a personal, subjective conviction of what is right justified by a questioning of one’s role in society and an individual acquisition of experience and knowledge. In this respect it is somewhat akin to Kierkegaard’s final, Religious phase, minus the object of the enlightenment being God, which is replaced by an awareness of one’s context in the universe, and some other differences.
Finally, Sartre ran with Heidegger’s distinction between Authentic and Inauthentic existence, and expanded on it. Sartre again places importance on an awareness of personal freedom and the role of the individual in determining his own path, in choosing his own principles, making his own decisions, and determining his own morality. Personal freedom and consciousness are linked here, with the unthinking, unquestioning participant in society being described as being like an object. Whereas the conscious individual is aware of his own freedom, often causing a vertiginous nausea, a theme he illustrates in his novels. Sartre also brings in the concept of Bad Faith, which is the blaming of one’s actions on external forces, or pretending that we do not have individual responsibility for our choices, using the excuse that we could not help doing what we do for whatever reason. The individual living in bad faith behaves like an object, and is what Sartre calls a Being-In-Itself, and has much in common with Heidegger’s Inauthentic person, implicated in their own deception. In contrast, Sartre’s Being-For-Itself is aware of its own freedom, and is responsible for determining his own behaviour. These are not two mutually exclusive modes of existence, rather they are co-existing modes within an individual which can have greater or lesser relative usage. This system becomes difficult to accept from an ethical point of view, because it can denigrate a right-acting, but unquestioning citizen, but can sometimes exalt a free-choosing, but wickedly-behaving individual. It sets sincerity, self-questioning, and awareness of personal freedom on the one hand against habit, group-adherance, and role-acting on the other. Of course this is a black and white opposition, but it is an interesting way to view the opposing tendencies within an individual.
In summary, this is a very concise and easy to read book on the ethical thoughts of three major existentialists. It would be useful reading for anyone interested in ethics, free will, or existentialism. Because it does not require extensive prior knowledge of their works, it would also be a good introduction to those who have not read their individual works before. However for those familiar with the original works this is also a very clear, concise, and helpful summation of what is often not presented with any brevity by the original authors. ( )