Jason BurkeRezensionen

Very good look at the state of terrorism in the Middle East did helps to see things outside western rhetoric. Spring 2009½

Devoured 100 pages in a day. Should be required reading for all.

If I had one book to give someone interested in understanding ISIS and the threats we now face from Islamic militancy, it would be this one. Published in August 2015, this book includes material through the summer of that year, but also digests and explains some of the earlier reports coming out of Syria, the Middle East, and South Asia. Burke also addresses the threat of home-grown terrorism that is most real to Western communities and governments.

Burke began reporting on events relating to the change in the Islamic character of the Middle East and South Asia as a journalist in the 1990s and he has refined his understanding of the changes in those regions ever since. His grasp is both deep and wide—he wishes he could have included more about the movement in South and Southeast Asia because, in his conclusions at the end, he believes that could be the next area to source individuals committed to jihad.

Burke reiterates over the course of his narrative that terrorism is meant to force leaders to act quickly, make mistakes, and take action they ordinarily would not do, destabilizing their governments. Terror is meant to make individuals disrupt their daily routines, causing follow-on economic repercussions. And terror is meant to cause the populace to polarize: people to question their relationships, fear their neighbors, challenge their government, and consider violence. One might argue terror has already caused irremediable changes in the fabric of world society. Burke replies that we must become resilient, savvy, and knowledgeable. Terrorism in the Middle East may have already run its course, but the seeds are everywhere.

The book is not long, and those of you already well-schooled in the history of ISIS may not feel you need to reread the beginning, though I found Burke’s finesse added a depth to my own understanding of the region, besides being the tightest, clearest history I’ve yet seen. Burke adds to the work done previously by making cogent comment on others’ conclusions. For years I’d been wondering about the families of suicide bombers, their apparent acquiescence causing me to question my own understanding of family ties. Burke addresses this directly:
"Suicide bombing is neither a cheap weapon, as often said, nor the spontaneous, organic expression of the inchoate rage of a people. It is a tactic, adopted for specific strategic reasons by terrorists, and which involves the commitment of significant resources if it is going to be successful. The extremist organizations that pioneered the use of the tactic—such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers—rapidly learned that few communities naturally accept the voluntary death of their teenagers. The individual who becomes a human bomb may cost an organization less than a missile but any militant hoping to reply suicide attackers needs to invest heavily and systematically in propaganda designed to build and then maintain a ‘cult of the martyr’ if they are avoid a backlash from relatives, friends and their wider circle. It is not natural for a mother or a father to celebrate the death of a child, and the idea that young men, or increasingly women, should kill themselves in order to kill others, often civilians, has to be normalized…in practical terms, meanwhile, the families of ‘martyrs’ need to be looked after; funerals organized and paid for, valedictory films produced and broadcast; a dedicated infrastructure to find, isolate and condition ‘martyrs’ set up and run. This effort must be constant and places a considerable strain on a groups’ resources. Many Islamic extremist organizations, including IS, make disproportionate use of foreign volunteers as suicide attackers. One reason may well be to make a powerful statement about the extent of their support around the globe. But another may simply be that foreigners are cheaper."
Burke briefly traces the history and methods of Al-Qaeda and ISIS, their differences and similarities, and their current state of play, including their affiliates around the world. He then discusses the threat to the West, drawing on the most important conclusions of Western analysts regarding what has been called home-grown terror or “lone wolves.” He first focuses on terror incidents in Britain and Europe, which I found particularly enlightening. With regards to America, Burke focuses most intensely on the Marathon Bombers in Boston.

Burke takes issue with the notion of ‘lone wolf,’ arguing that the similarities of the public statements of those with wearing this label use many of the same words and concepts, implying an underlying global community that extends far beyond their individual actions. “These men were formed, conditioned and prepared for their ultimate acts over years, if not decades, by an entire culture of extremist activism.”

An interesting outcome of the Arab Spring, Burke notes, is that several relatively Westernized pro-democracy activists turned to Islamic militancy when they were disillusioned during the fifty months from 2011 to 2015 when regimes collapsed, governments failed, and the international community did little to stave off deprivation for citizens facing war or displacement. He speaks of the gangland ethos among converts to Islamic militancy, the ‘jihadi cool,’ and 'jihad meets The Sweeney meets the gangsta.’ There is exploitable weakness there, for both the converts and for the main terror group.

In the final chapter on the future of terror, Burke discusses several completely fascinating long-term surveys or polls done in huge swathes of Islamic territory. The U.S.-based Pew Center published one in 2013 which revealed that support for suicide bombing remains limited, concerns about extremism are high, and levels of support for Al Qaeda remain low, but that perceptions of Western society are are increasingly negative, including views of Christians and Jews. On the Western side, we don't need to go further than our newspapers and TV reports to know that perceptions of Muslims are tanking.

Burke’s final chapter is one readers will not want to miss. In it Burke describes the outcomes of this history of terror—the divisions we see in our societies, the retrenchments in rights, the fear, the polarity—despite the relative lack of physical impact of terror on Western communities. “The real impact of Islamic militancy…is in the Islamic world where the monthly death toll frequently exceeds the total in the West over the past decade.” But the West has had costs: by focusing on terror we did not focus on climate change, the relationships between the West and Arab or Islamic populations have become poisonous, and our own communities have divisions that are destroying us from within. How we deal with the threats we face will define us long into the future.

This book has been shortlisted for the Orwell Prize 2016.

This is quite an excellent book, one that I would not ordinarily have picked up. However, what I like, is that Jason shows a rare sensitivity when writing this book. He displays no antagonism to the people he meets on the road.
His interpretations of what he sees, is subtle. He also takes the time to try and understand the people, and have real conversations with them. In doing so, he shows us a real glimpse of what is actually happening in the region.
When he says, for instance, that Iraqis just want to put food on the table, we are suddenly reminded that we are all the same under the skin.
We often look at people through the eyes of religion, not through the eyes of humanity. He brings this to the fore.
A very good book, one well worth the read.

Clear, well-informed, sober analysis of just what the threat really is. Perhaps the title is again over-dramatic since his conclusion is that Islamic violence is more a problem for the Islamic world than for the West. Horrors have happened and will almost certainly continue, but the scale is in all reality tiny. Centrally coordinated sophisticated attacks like 9/11 are at the far range of probability given greater vigilance and the constraints on the militants. Islamic State is a new phenomenon in that it controls substantial territory and significant income, but its focus is local: "the Near Enemy". The so-called "lone wolves" are a misnomer in that they are integrated in what Burke calls a "movement": a culture, a belief system and a communication network, but not in an operational executive structure and they have limited resources. 9/11 was also a different thing from most such events in that it was highly organised and expensive but even there the weaponry was absurdly simple - box-cutters.
I shall sleep a bit easier in my bed after reading this.

The 9/11 wars is a journalistic recap from 9/11 to the death of Osama bin Laden with a focus on Afghanistan and Iraq told from a British perspective of a Guardian foreign correspondent. The title, not the text, unfortunately mixes 9/11 with the Iraq War which are only related through the folly of the Bush administration. One of the strengths of the book is that both bin Laden and the American interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq are intruders whose influence is limited and dependent on local allies. The criminal terrorists of Al Qaeda were the main beneficiaries of the ham-fisted, corrupt and ignorant American intervention. The two wars exposed a drastic lack of competence and leadership. When the US commander Ricardo Sanchez labeled the approaching helicopters as a "sound of freedom", he apparently considered Apocalypse Now as a textbook.

Bagram, Fallujah, Abu Ghraib and all the other minor and major crimes and scandals have already escaped down the memory hole. The book doesn't dwell too much on them either. Instead, a big part of the book deals with the often neglected chapter of the terrorist attacks in the Netherlands, Spain and England. These terrorist actions and attempts were not masterminded by Al Qaeda but by local disaffected and alienated copy cats. Local police and social work, not foreign adventures, are the keys to solve and prevent future attacks.

On the foreign policy front, the author correctly puts Pakistan at the front and center of the problems in Afghanistan. He curiously fails to discuss the malignant roles of either Israel or Saudi Arabia (15 out of 19 ...) in the Middle East. The sudden Arab Spring nearly torpedoed the author's book project and is only hastily inserted into the story, It also reveals the author's bias towards his rich Egyptian/Arab buddies. Nevertheless, the book is still a valuable history of a turbulent decade that nicely complements the many often US-centric accounts. When the US hopefully exits Afghanistan in 2014, it will be possible to write a full story of the Bush wars.

Un livre indispensable pour comprendre les guerres d'Afghanistan et la montée en puissance du radicalisme islamiste dans ce pays.

For a really illuminating account of that loose network of networks generically called Al-Qaeda this is considered by many as the most trustworthy and lucid work. Written in an engaging prose, this history of the emergence and evolution of present day islamic radicalism is really unputdownable!

London Observer Chief Reporter Jason Burke was featured in the recent BBC2 documentary "The Power of Nightmares" which compared the rise of Islamic militancy with the corresponding (and equally unnerving) rise of the religious right in US politics. The rather silly cover of his book on the subject belies what is in fact a thorough, erudite, dispassionate and compelling account of the rise of Radical Islam, of which "Al Qaeda" - in its strict sense - is really only a small part.

Burke has spent a number of years in various Islamic hot spots (Saudi, Afghanistan, Kurdish Iraq) and has apparently the spent the most of the last four years doing his homework. The account he sets out (which really ought not to be a surprise to anyone but the Neo-Conservatives) is that Islamic militancy is not centrally controlled; there is no "head of the snake" except the one Western foreign policy has created in Osama bin Laden. For nothing has assisted fundamentalism as a rallying point for (the in reality mostly social and political) discontent in the Islamic word than his vilification by Messrs Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and their friends. Indeed, Burke's case is that before the Western Hawks began targeting it, Islamic militancy was, amongst its own constituents, all but dead in the water.

Burke is convincing in his arguments that Al-Qaeda *the actual organisation* was never more than a hard-core of twenty or thirty militants, was not more than indirectly associated with many of the terrorist acts attributed to them, and was dispersed, incapacitated and in large part eliminated after the war in Afghanistan. But Al Qaeda *the idea* - which is the creation of western conservative political classes - has spread virus-like amongst the Islamic world, and is a much more threatening spectacle. Ideas are a whole lot harder to kill off than individuals.

In laying the groundwork for his thesis Burke is obliged to engage with a lot of minutiae of the history of Islamic dissent (every bit-player in the last twenty years gets a mention), and this part of the book is somewhat heavy going, though it certainly leads gravitas: without it, Burke would be open to criticism for a lack of thoroughness. But otherwise, this is a stimulating and important book.

The definitive book on Islamic militancy. Burke explodes the myths about 'al-Qaeda' and exposes the reality of the threat. Immensely readable, I found it hard to put down. Burke leaves the reader in no doubt about his authority on this particular subject, relating interviews with various militants and officials who have had dealings with Osama Bin Laden's 'hardcore'. Quite frankly, if you want to understand the workings of Bin Laden's network (such that it is), look no further than this.

Fascinating and compelling read. Author has extensive personal experience in the Middle East. Suggests that people with significant grievance will seek out a context in which to express it, so that Islam in many ways is currently fulfilling the anti-Weste

I haven't gotten through this book yet. I think that most of the more interesting bits I already knew about, so it really doesn't hold my attention at all.

When this is required reading for all "coalition of the willing" political leaders and no-one in power can make a public statement or foreign policy decision without having having passed a test on their comprehension of it we will at last begin to see the beginnings of rationality and humanity in our dealings with the Middle East. I bought this after reading a piece by Chomsky in which he said this was probably the best book written on terrorism. Burke knows his subject well and gives a clear grounds eye view of who the terrorists are and how they operate. Burke demonstrates that there is no such thing as a Dr Evil type monster out there, but the real danger is our inability to see how our western leaders have so humiliated and raped and despoiled and oppressed (by proxy or directly) the democratic and human rights aspirations of Arabs and how there are literally as a result thousands of would-be suicide terrorists incognito and freelance the world over. I can just add to Burke's book the comment that it's not a problem with Islam -- otherwise we would have seen this sort of terrorism non-stop ever since the west has encountered islam. The 9/11 plotters and Bin Laden made their aims and motivations very plain (why do so many in the west still remain ignorant -- why do our leaders continue to deny it in public?) and the US conceded on their major demand (withdrawal from Saudi Arabia) after establishing new bases in Iraq. And Australia fully supported and backed the US proxy occupation and oppressoin of Moslem holy lands and peoples -- hence Bali. No prizes for guessing the motivations of the new wave of terrorist activities since then.

(This and other reviews on my blog at http://sweetreason.wordpress.com )

The best book I've read on Al Qaeda and recent Islamist terrorism. I read this book because I saw Jason Burke on the Adam Curtis's BBC TV series The Power of Nightmares; but what Burke understands (and Curtis seemed not to quite grasp) is that the fact what persists of Al Qaeda is not the Bond-villain-style organisation pulling the strings of global terrorism around the world that our Governments have been scaring us with but the ideas they put forward is not less scary but more. Essential.½