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James Phelps (2)
Autor von Australia's Most Murderous Prison: Behind the Walls of Goulburn Jail
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At the start of the First World War the German East Asia Squadron found itself far from home, communications links cut and surrounded by enemies. Admiral Graf von Spee, detached one cruiser as a commerce raider (the SMSEmden) and took the rest of his fleet across the Pacific with the aim of rounding Cape Horn and heading back to Germany. On the way he defeated a British fleet at the Battle of Coronel and in turn was defeated at the Battle of the Falkland Islands. Meanwhile, after sinking a great deal of shipping, the Emden was cornered by HMAS Sydney at Cocos Islands and defeated.
While these events have been recounted before, Phelps takes a perspective based on the Australian naval commanders and Australia’s nascent efforts at signals intelligence. At the start of the war, Royal Australian Navy (RAN) detained German merchant ships in Australian ports and with them captured some code books. With these, RAN College instructor F.W. Wheatley was able to read some of the German messages, and when the Germans later made crude changes to their key, he was able break these and continue to read coded messages. While code books were specifically intended for the German navy to communicate with merchant ships, this was the era where vessels were powered by coal and the movement of colliers revealed where the warships were likely to go.
Phelps picks up the argument that had the Admiralty paid more attention to Australian intelligence they might have intercepted the Germans earlier or avoided the disaster at Coronel. Perhaps. The Pacific Ocean is immense and tactical surveillance at the time was limited to what a man could see from up a mast. A fleet sent to find von Spee might miss him entirely. And Coronel had more to do with British misunderstandings and miscommunication than the weight given to Australian intelligence.
In the epilogue, the editor about to publish Wheatley’s account is quoted as saying “Thanks for being patient, but I had to dot my I’s and cross my T’s. This is one hell of a story and I had to be sure”. And this is where Phelps falls down. As a history book it is not sufficiently reliable.
Phelps does not explain what inspired him to write this book, as a sports journalist who had previously written “true crime books”. He merely thanks his publisher for providing a “non-fiction mandate” and allowing him to “move across genres”. He has not mentioned any interest in the Navy, espionage or military history. Nevertheless, I congratulate him on diving into the archive to find material for this book.
Phelps showed a bad habit of frequently referring to warships as “battleships”. This is not just a matter for naval nerds. The war was proceeded by an arms race which was marked by the construction of more and more powerful ships, at the pinnacle of which was the battleship. But apart from a handful of Japanese battleships, there were no battleships in the Pacific. Now while I could tolerate the odd reference to a battle cruiser as a battleship, calling the tiny French gunboat Zelee a battleship is particularly confusing.
In the authors preface, Phelps states that the dialogue has “often taken directly from letters, texts and reports, has occasionally been adapted to help this adventure flow”. On the contrary, it seems that most of the dialogue is invented. The bibliography lists few primary sources beyond official reports - and none are German or British. We can be pretty sure that the words attributed to von Spee and the crew of the Scharnhorst immediately before it was lost with all hands are sourced solely from Phelps’ imagination.
Factual errors litter the book, and while even the best historian occasionally makes errors, I can’t help feeling these were inserted to “improve”the story. Phelps reports that Admiral Fischer was recalled as First Sea Lord after the Battle of Coronel - it was before. HMAS Australia damaged a rudder transiting Magellan’s Strait - it was a propeller. HMAS Australia found a lifebuoy from the Scharnhorst on 1 January 1915 in “a sea of debris” - it was on 2 January and there was no sea of debris. Wheatley was awarded a CBE after his code breaking revelations in 1934 - actually it was in the 1932 Birthday Honours list
But the item that pushes this down to two stars is a slur directed at the captains and crews of Royal Navy cruisers at the Battle of the Falkland Islands. Phelps says that after the Nuremberg sank “HMS Kent opened fire with machine guns and shells. They slaughtered the survivors. All of them.” On the next page, Phelps accuses HM Ships Glasgow and Cornwall of firing on the helpless crew of the Leipzig. An allegation of a war crime is serious, but when I looked at other sources I found a different story. One where, in difficult conditions, the British ships went to great lengths to rescue the German sailors.
Two stars for Mr Phelps, which he can share with Harper-Collins. And if he publishes a new edition, it should be with corrections and an apology.… (mehr)