Nathan ThrallRezensionen

I would have rated this book even higher if it weren't so chaotic, but I understand that it was chaotic just as the lives of the non-Jews who live in Israel. I also noticed one important, incorrect fact, and that leads me to wonder what else was incorrect. However, the main story in this book is definitely tragic, and the everyday lives of the people presented is exceedingly painful. Israel knows exactly what it is doing by setting up the Palestinians and Christian Arabs to fight amongst each other and therefore become even more weakened. The close family bonds presented (whether family by blood or culture) were extremely impressive.

Thoughtfully exposes the linkages between familial and social relationships, local bureaucracies, and geographic boundaries. It examines an omnipresent system of hard and soft boundaries layered by complex interplays of historic events, ethnic relations, political dynamics, urban networks, topography, personal decision making, and familial and filial relationships. This analysis of a palimpsest provides structure to the narration of one single tragic event that otherwise could be construed as kismet resulting from a confluence of unrelated misjudgments and the weather. A very compassionate work of writing that deftly hides it’s strong academic underpinnings of urban geography and moves the reader quickly through an emotionally wrought story.

Abed Salamas's 5 year old son Milad is excited that his class is going on a school picnic. But because they are West Bank Palestinians, their bus can't use the roads with the most direct route to the picnic site, and the bus itself is old and decrepit. Tragically, while the bus was en route, stalled near a check point, it was struck by a rogue dump truck, overturned and burst into flames. And because the West Bank is divided into Zones A, B, and C, each under different governmental authorities, there were major delays in dispatching fire fighters and ambulances, even though the disaster itself was in view of a check point. Many children died, including some who were initially transported to the hospital in Ramallah that was open to Palestinians, rather than to the better equipped hospital in Jerusalem. Getting to the Jerusalem hospital required special permits and passing through checkpoints which caused a lot of delays and through which many Palestinians could not pass.

This was a tragic book, and I learned a lot from it. I had some vague knowledge about the Oslo Agreements, and believed that the West Bank was to be allocated to the Palestinians. But I have also heard over the years about the illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank, many of which have been encouraged by the Netanyahu government. In fact, the way the West Bank is set up, most Palestinians are crowed into urban "islets" widely separated by wide open spaces where the Israeli settlements are being built. And beyond that, Israel is building a wall to physically isolate the Palestinians from Israel and from the Israeli controlled areas of the West Bank. (Wonder if that's where Trump got his wall idea). This book, while it contains a lot of valuable information (and was written by an Israeli journalist) taught me I need to do a lot more reading on this subject.

Highly recommended.

4 stars

4.5

This collection of Thrall's thoughts on Israel/Palestine from around 2010-2016 treads an established path: Oslo — and the overall American-led peace process — was a facade that enabled Israel to further entrench the occupation. Israelis' experience of the status quo — insulated by American support and carte blanche and veto power at the UN — is not nearly enough pressure for them to approach the negotiation table in good faith, or to even consider a concession that is reasonable enough for the Palestinians to accept. It's not necessarily the most groundbreaking insight but the book proves its point with ample evidence.

I especially enjoyed the historical sections: how Carter pressured Israel to enter negotiations, and how the peace with Sadat was a leftover, secondary to the failure to even get Begin to consider any Israeli-Palestinian arrangement. The takedown of Avi Shavit, also, was sharp and rang true: Shavit seems to express horror at the atrocities at Lydd, a synecdoche for the Nakba, while still claiming that it was necessary for the Zionist project to be realized — without examining if the realization of one's project permits the destruction of another's life.


Will flesh this out later — but the most riveting part was the beginning, the history — especially Carter’s role. The rest less new or insightful but I generally very much agree with the idea that Israel needs force to make concessions. Would have been interested in more discussion of BDS as technique to create change

I was excited to review this text, due in no small part to the premise present in the publisher's blurb — namely, that "[i]t is those who have embraced confrontation—through boycotts, lawsuits, protests, civil disobedience, and even violence—who have made the most progress toward a solution." Unfortunately, The Only Language They Understand is undermined by the author's failure to present a genuine class analysis of the conflict. What remains is a patchy, already dated, and ultimately insubstantial survey.

In a myth-busting analysis of the world's most intractable conflict, a star of Middle East reporting, "one of the most important writers" in the field (The New York Times), argues that only one weapon has yielded progress: force.

Well, that was depressing. A collection of essays on the unending struggle; the title comes from early essays arguing that Israel and Palestinian organizations only make concessions when people, including the US, give up on “peace” and particularly only when they’re suffering setbacks. (Since a setback for Israel is a victory for Palestine and vice versa in most cases, one can see how this would make for difficulty.) The Oslo agreement got the PLO invested in keeping the West Bank in line, turning it “from a protector against an occupying army into an agglomeration of self-interested businessmen securing exclusive contracts for it,” and implicated Palestinians in daily collaboration. The US, of course, won’t even think about using most of the possible leverage on Israel it has because that’s not politically feasible: “Listening to them discuss how to devise an end to occupation is like listening to the operator of a bulldozer ask how he can demolish a building with his hammer.” The US also prevents other third parties from taking part in the process in a meaningful way.

There are also a number of other depressing descriptions of/points about the Palestinian situation, including how Israeli police have given up on areas in the West Bank that the Palestinian Authority is forbidden to police, turning them into law-free zones whose residents must still pay taxes. And, in terms of some agreement that would involve Palestinian acceptance of land trades, or a partial area of control, Thrall argues that the problem is that the parties would be “trading fundamentally unlike assets.” Palestinians would give up their intangible moral claims, “acquiescing in the denial of their right to return and bestowing legitimacy on their dispossessors by recognizing the vast majority of their homeland as a Jewish state.” Israelis would commit to physically withdrawing from some land they control now. But the difference is, that once the parties accepted the trade, the Palestinians’ intangible legitimacy would disappear (he says, though I don’t necessarily follow that), and Israel would still have the land until a final settlement was reached.

This book of essays about the ongoing conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians is very interesting reading. The author attempts to be fair about analyzing the costs and benefits to each party of compromising on various key issues. In doing so, he makes a persuasive case that the costs are too high and the benefits too meager for either side to make a compromise that would bring about a workable solution.

Some of the essays provide a history of the conflict and the diplomacy concerning its resolution (including very recent history.); the others analyze the diplomacy and why each attempt failed. I found both the history and analysis compelling reading, and would recommend this book to a friend with an interest in this topic.

Having lived in Egypt for many years this is a fair and honest book about the conflict. US readers are usually only aware of the Israeli side of the issue. This book follow the history and the efforts to maintain peace. Easy to read, the book is in a series of essays about the conflict under five main topics. Those topics are forcing compromise, collaboration, confrontation and negotiations. Each chapter is dated so the reader has a timeline of history.
Currant and reflective of the role this conflict plays in the region. We forget that the Arabs conquered this area thousand years ago and most natives still claim their heritage before the arabs. I remember clearly Egyptians saying I am Egyptian not Arab.
Excellent read and one that should be read by all who want a fairer picture of the situation than is seen here in the United Sates.
Received as a review book from Library thing.

An objective, unbiased work by journalist Nathan Thrall, "The Only Language They Understand: Forcing Compromise in Israel and Palestine" provides yet another look at the Israel-Palestine conflict. While the first part of the book provides an overview of the conflict, the majority of the book is a compilation of essays/articles that hinders the reader from gaining a wholistic understanding of the author's main thesis. Overall, this is a good start for those interested in a brief overview of the region's history.

Nathan Thrall is a journalist and senior analyst for the International Crisis Group. He lives in Jerusalem and has written extensively about the Arab-Israeli conflict. His first book is not all new material. The first third of the book is new and recaps the history of diplomatic attempts to resolve the conflict. The remainder of the work contains essays written at various times by the author with the date of publication noted at the end of each chapter. This creates a choppiness and certain amount of repetition that detracts from the overall effect of this being a single integrated effort. But with this being said, the author presents a compelling argument that the only diplomatic progress made since the 1967 war has been the result of force applied to the parties involved.
Thrall writes with a clear journalistic voice. He knows and has interviewed many of the individuals involved on both sides of the conflict. His approach is even-handed and he tries to be as objective as he can in such fraught circumstances. On this subject most people have already chosen sides, so much that is written comes with a clear pro-Israeli or pro-Palestinian slant. I did not detect that kind of clear bias and the author is to be commended for that difficult feat. What emerges is some of the best reportage and analysis I have read concerning the conflict, and the attempts made to resolve it.
I highly recommend this book to anyone who is interested in taking a fresh look at this Middle East conflict which seems as if it will go on without end. In fact, I have found that this work has changed some of my own opinions on the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is just about the best compliment I can make. While I still consider myself a supporter of Israel, it is clear that it bears much, maybe even most, of the responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem, their horrible living conditions, and for the lack of progress toward any sort of final resolution to the problems of this beleaguered part of the world. What also seems clear, and is the point of this book, is that there will be no resolution unless the parties are forced to reach one. This holds particularly to Israel which seems to find the current stalemate far preferable to the perceived pain of a comprehensive settlement.

The peace process that has eluded Israel and Palestine is explored in this new book on the apparently unsolvable Arab-Israeli conflict. Author Nathan Thrall who’s a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group, offers, under the cloud of “Forcing Compromise” a detailed history of the worlds failed efforts to reach a fair peace accord in the Middle East. The problem is more than West Bank settlements, recognition of the State of Israel, the eventual status of Jerusalem, or even the number or legal status of refugees. It is an entrenched and well-earned distrust on both sides. Writing mostly of Israeli activities and American governmental reactions Mr.Thrall reviews with the reader the failures of Camp David and the Oslo agreements to name two. Leaaders of Israel from Menachem Begin, thru Benjamin Netanyahu were and are wrong; also negotiators such as Marin Indyk, Dennis Ross, and John Kerry equally to blame. The author shows us in various ways he feels that many American presidents were, too easy on the Israelis. Mr.Thrall states that rather increased American and European pressure on the parties would be or how it would work without elaborating on what that pressure would be. Meanwhile today Arabs and Israelis accept the status quo as their best alternative. The Arab nations in the Middle East and the Arab League’s support of Hamas (which runs Gaza and whose main goal is still the destruction of “the Zionist entity”) are not recognized as threats to peace by Mr.Thrall. Each side here faces real and and basic problems: rockets, suicide bombers, checkpoints, land grabs, and internecine conflicts. However, as earnest as he is in highlighting the problems, Mr.Thrall remains I feel partial and selective in investigating any of the truths in them. At a White House press conference in February, Trump said that while "the United States will encourage a peace and really, a great peace deal," it will be up to the Israelis and the Palestinians themselves to figure out how to make it happen. Mr.Thrall feels that this is the kind of approach least likely to yield results. Mr. Thrall is able to make a strong case that instead of leaving the Israelis and Palestinians alone or mildly warning them both of the dangers facing Israeli democracy if a two-state solution isn't achieved,rather the only weapon in the US arsenal that has ever produced meaningful gains on the issue is force; diplomatic, economic, for over the past 25 years weve seen the opposite, a policy directed toward building "faith" and "trust" and avoiding the use of force at all costs.

This review is based on an advanced reader’s edition.
Thrall presents a detailed political and diplomatic picture of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with heavy emphasis on the Israeli-US and Palestinian-US diplomatic exchanges. It is unbiased—the positions of both factions are treated with an even hand. “They” in the title is meant to refer to both parties.
Other than the first chapter which serves as an overview, topics focus on different aspects of the conflict rather than a chronological unfolding of events. Consequently, material is often repeated. The author has included the dates when the chapters were written underscoring that the book is not intended as a history although historical happenings are discussed if they influenced diplomatic and political moves. (An event omitted but having a lasting effect on US-Israeli relations is the USS Liberty incident during the Six-Day War in 1967.)
An implied conclusion reached by Thrall is that the only resolution to the impasse is a forced compromise. Neither party is likely to accept anything other than a forced compromise. Many offers have been presented in the past but it has become apparent that an impasse is preferable to a solution by both sides. Compromise—either forced or negotiated—would seem to be a logical solution but difficult to envision; culture and heritage cannot be compromised and territorial apportionment ineffective.
The book is not a primer and requires more than superficial understanding of the situation. I was often lost in the mass of detail and parade of characters, political parties and nomenclature. The advanced reader’s edition reviewed had no index which may be included in the released edition. That might be of assistance but a glossary would be of even greater use.

As the world reacts to the latest horror of victims in Syria, should we look or turn away in despair? Do we even have a contributing role?
Nathan Thrall has looked and deeply into the political activity and the economic effects behind terrible human suffering in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.
This book starts with a lengthy essay outlining the conflict and many efforts to bring peace through many years followed by shorter focused articles about particular processes and places such as Gaza. This could not have been an easy book to have written and a more difficult book to have lived. it is not an easy book to read. Is it our duty? If we read novels for insight into human character, this is a non-fiction look into the darkest recesses of human character. It is not novel in today's world.
One thread through the book is the detailed line of American Presidents and diplomatic efforts to influence some construct for peace. These efforts have been earnest but naïve even with years of expertise. Agreements from Camp David to Oslo are examined and American diplomatic views are grouped and examined.
The American defense expenditures with this conflict alone are staggering. What do we have to show for this? Has this advanced much beyond an uneasy status quo? What kind of country is Israel becoming in the eyes of the world? How will demographic changes affect the region? Is a so-called two-state solution viable any longer?
The author argues that only force such as serious sanctions on Israel tied to political mandates will get real progress toward Palestinian independence and eventual peace. Another alternative is more of the same. I just don't know. I don't know.

FTC NOTICE: Free Review Copy from the LibraryThing Early Reviewers Program (in exchange for an honest review)

REVIEW: When undertaking the negotiations of, or simply reading about, the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict, everyone becomes aware of how influences within and beyond the borders of the Middle East become a party to the issue. “The Only Language They Understand: Forcing Compromise in Israel and Palestine by Nathan Thrall, investigates the dynamics of these relationships and how they influence outcomes. His thesis establishes the element of force as core to achieving change, regardless of country and/or organization. “Compromise on each side has been driven less by the promise of peace than the aversion of pain…not limited to bloodshed. Economic sanctions, boycotts, threats, unarmed protests, and other forms of confrontation have been just as important in bringing about ideological concessions and territorial withdrawals. “Force” in this broader sense has, sadly, proved the only language “they” understand” (2).

Mr. Thrall explained the suppressive aspect(s) of the Oslo Accords, despite not being viewed that way by international courts because “the agreements” maintained a status quo. He made the reader think differently about the Camp David Accords, the Oslo Accords, Madrid Conference of 1991 and other related conference outcomes. I had viewed them as a tremendous amount of beneficial progress toward peace in the Middle East--especially after reading “The Path to Geneva: The Quest for a Permanent Solution, 1996-2003,” by Yossi Beilin. At the time of Beilin’s work, great achievements were made; but, in the long-run, it looked like situations eroded. To truly understand the making of each stage of agreements, readers needed more knowledge of the context, language, and time-frame in which the agreements were reached, and Nathan Thrall did an excellent job of covering those details along with some over-arching themes in support of his thesis:

*Intifadas, wars, terrorism, and other aggressions.
*Exporting the Holocaust to the Palestine Mandate.
*Zionism and the diaspora.
*Revisionist history and racism.
*Corruption.
*Frameworks for peace and statehood.
*Foreign powers and positioning.
*Decision making processes: short-term versus long-term reality.
*Periphery Doctrine effectivity.
*Collaborations between Palestinians and Israelis.
*America’s role the in the peace process: mediator or trouble-maker?

The author made it easy to recognize how themes played out repeatedly and ultimately existed as a form of force. He also made the reader ponder intelligent, though likely unpopular and uncomfortable, questions: Would the diaspora have survived without a separate Jewish state? Who truly had the right to promise Palestine to the Jewish people? Did America need to be involved in this peace process? Did the parties squander their opportunities to reach a two-state solution? Did some of the Palestinian leadership carry responsibility for continued nationlessness and some of the harm to their people? Was the author pro-Israel or in favor of the Palestinians? Ultimately, there was no denying that the author did a phenomenal job in supporting his thesis while writing a very interesting, fact-filled, thought-provoking book. Nathan Thrall’s “ The Only Language They Understand: Forcing Compromise in Israel and Palestine ” enveloped a highly-recommendable read that earned a well-deserved five-star rating.

Good book overall. Interesting subject overall and the author presents it in an interesting format.