Another great battle book at the micro level from Scott Patchan. This concise volume (126 pages of basic text) covers only Longstreet’s flank attack on the second day of the battle of Second Manassas. The detail is amazing, the research impeccable, the narrative riveting. I was very surprised to learn how poorly coordinated Longstreet’s assault actually was, and how fiercely the Union troops defended before giving way. I had always pictured a massive wave of Confederates sweeping everything before it. Not so.

One star off for the maps, though, which are nearly illegible and very disappointing. Ironic since Patchan’s maps for his Last Battle of Winchester (done by Hal Jesperson) were so wonderful.

Patchan includes an appendix with the best battle walking tour I have yet seen, not just points of reference but detailed description of exactly what happened where you are looking (“and now turn around and see where Milroy’s men counterattacked...”)

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The battle of Second Manassas suffers from comparable neglect. While Gettysburg and Antietam are covered in numerous books, the battle of Second Manassas had to wait for a long time to receive a worthy battle study. John J. Hennessy's account of that battle remains the best book to date. In the traditional narrative of the battle, most effort is given to Jackson's defense on the northern part of the battlefield. Longstreet's attack on the southern part is treated mostly as a sideshow. No longer!

Scott Patchan has written a good, if short study of Longstreet's attack that shows the classic Civil War echolon attack gone wrong. The generals always failed to take into account the longer distance the men on the outer path have to march. While the outer forces in vain try to catch up, the "hinge" begins to pivot inward, undoing the overall planned movement. As later at Gettysburg, Longstreet displayed poor overall direction of his forces once he had deployed them. The divisional control over the forces was poor too. most officers were unable to think on a brigade or divisional level. Battle thus was decided on the regimental or at most brigade level. Some units, despite being relatively fresh, were left out of the battle because their commander had forgotten them. On the Federal side, this was even more commonplace as numerous officers allowed themselves the privilege in ordering regiments not under their direct command around.

The southern part of Second Manassas thus is a messy encounter battle. Patchan succeeds well in presenting the evolution of the battle. The hand-drawn maps assist in this task. I only wish the draftsman wrote more legibly. Patchan's account corrects the position and movements of many units in the battle. Unfortunately, he does not discuss or assess these changes. This is the big defect of this book. Essentially you have to just believe that Patchan's new interpretation is correct. Given that the book is rather short, I really miss such an explanation and discussion of the attack's presentation in other books. If Patchan differs from Hennessy whom should I trust? Without access to the sources both authors quote, I have no way to assess their claims. Thus, Patchan's study is very valuable but unfortunately still not the ultimate account. ( )