I posted not long ago a review of Dupuy's book on the German General Staff, mentioning the conclusion (which I through was nearly universally accepted) that the Germans fought 1.3 to 1.5 times as well as the Americans during the Second World War. Silly me; nothing is ever nearly universally accepted in the soft studies. Mansoor, who we are informed in the biographical blurb was preparing to take command of a brigade at the time, published this attorney's brief in favor of the U.S. infantry in 1999. (I cannot help wondering how the brigade command worked out for him.)

The book has scads of favorable reviews, and it's easy to see why. The book discusses in quite considerable depth how the U.S. Army managed to raise 90-odd divisions in three years, outfight the Hun, and save the world. (With a little help from the British and French. Russians may have been involved as well. No Marines, though; they and a third of the Army were off running maneuvers or something when they were badly needed in Europe, the slackers.)

Okay, that pretty much nails one problem with the book. A very narrow focus. That can be a strength, but not when it reaches the point of parochialism.

Another is that the case is not made as well as I would like. Mansoor actually scores some serious points against Dupuy early on, noting that the combat superiority of German infantrymen disappears if you assign a lower force multiplier value to artillery and air support and a higher force multiplier to being the defending force. Fair enough. But he goes nowhere with this observation. Do you get a better chi-square fit to the data with the different weighting? Or at least no worse a fit? Not a whisper.

And then, having dismissed artillery as the explanation for how the Americans managed to be on the winning side, Mansoor later goes into great depth on how superior American artillery was to German. I think he convinced me; Americans really did have superb artillery. But it kinda undercuts his earlier point.

Well, okay, now that I have the snark out of my system, I'm going to acknowledge that this is still a very worthwhile book; I'm glad I read it and I don't think I wasted my money purchasing it. It just does better with a dash of seasoning, if you follow me.

The funny thing is that, with one exception, Mansoor inadvertently makes an excellent case for every criticism leveled at the Army by the Dupuy camp. I mentioned the artillery already: Mansoor says Dupuy overestimated its importance, and then says it was a key part of American combat effectiveness. Mansoor says the ninety-division gamble paid off, though he tells us it almost proved disastrous. American divisions were tough and capable, though of course not in their introduction to combat. The replacement system was really pretty remarkable, once the local commanders found ways to subvert it and overcome its gross deficiencies. Etc.

One final snark: The name J.C.H. Lee appears nowhere in the book. No, really. McNair, on the other hand, receives almost a reverent treatment. Okay, the highest ranking American general killed in the war (albeit by his own side by mistake) probably deserves to be cut some slack. Mansoor persuades me that he was actually a pretty important part of winning the war.

The one thing Mansoor changed my mind on is the replacement system. Yes, it was vile, but it appears that local commanders were a lot better at overcoming its deficiencies than I had previously appreciated. Efforts to assimilate replacements effectively were far more widespread than I had realized. The horror stories of replacements going directly into the line and dying like flies are not untrue, but this seems to have been desperation more than accepted policy. War gets desperate sometimes.

I don't know why I'm snarking so hard on this book. It really is very interesting and worth reading. Erm, maybe because it's challenged my preconceptions and got me thinking?

Nah, that's probably not it. It's because the book provides such a good narrative and so much good information that simply doesn't prove what the author is trying to prove. It's like a glowing hagiography of Churchill that devotes an impeccably researched chapter to his alcoholism and two each to his ego and adventurism. Weird.

Something I'm going to have to follow up on is the assertion that German soldiers were much less motivated by unit cohesion, and much more motivated by Nazi ideology and discipline, than van Creveld was willing to acknowledge. Mansoor gives a reference. I've put it on my wish list.

Two wry thumbs up. I guess. ( )