This is a straightforward narrative of the interplay between Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill during the Second World War. Its a gripping story and well told in this book, which provides a good insight into the different motivations of the Big Three, how they changed over time and the compromises (or lack thereof) they made in order to keep the alliance going. It was particularly useful for me since much of the history of the Cold War that I had previously read tended to kick things off from the Yalta conference (or alternately the "percentages agreement" between Churchill and Stalin).

One can see Stalin's deep mistrust of the allies as they continually delay the allied invasion of Europe and Roosevelt's distrust of Churchill's focus on the Mediterranean and Aegean as being a ploy to use American troops to prop up the British Empire rather than defeat Nazi Germany. By 1944 Stalin's armies were steam-rolling the Germans and he felt he no longer had to offer compromise on his aim of establishing a deep cordon sanitaire fending the USSR off from western Europe. This meant that he had the upper hand in the meeting at Yalta where Roosevelt made concessions on Poland and China to the USSR because he needed Stalin's cooperation in participating in the United Nations and in declaring war on Japan.

By Potsdam, Roosevelt, who had counted on establishing a close personal relationship with Stalin as a way to counter some of his excesses, was dead and Truman had the Atomic bomb and a way to end the war with Japan sooner rather than through a land invasion which was projected to take a year and half to complete. Churchill had also been thrown out by the British electorate, bringing a labour government headed by Atlee to power. Paradoxically this meant a worsening of relations with Stalin, whom Churchill often spoke admiringly of even when he bemoaned the rise of Soviet power. One thing that had united Churchill and Stalin was their dislike of the principles of the Atlantic Charter which had promised to uphold democratic principles across the world - in Churchill's case because it would weaken Britain's hold on its Empire, particularly India. Attlee on the other hand was determined to offer India greater independence and sided with Truman who wanted to take a tougher line on ideological principles.

For those who have read widely on the period there are no earth-shaking revelations, but what Fenby does so well is bring the main characters alive, with his eye for detail and the telling quote. In that respect its an engaging and lively account that is well worth reading. ( )