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Lädt ... The Freewill Questionvon W. H. Davis
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This book is the result of a discontent on my part with (r) the super ficial and offhand way many determinists set forth their arguments, without the slightest hint of the difficulties which have been raised against those arguments, and (2) the fact that the chief and best argu ments of the libertarians are scattered allover the literature and are seldom if ever brought together in one package. may be taken as an effort to gather into one place Mostly this work and to express as cogently as possible the arguments for freewill. So far as I know all of the arguments we treat have been made before. Only toward the end of this work do I attempt to elaborate a point not heretofore emphasized. That point is that freedom of the will is a concept intimately entangled with the human power to reason, so that if one of these powers goes, the other must also go. Moreover, both the will and the reason are intimately tied up with our moral sensitivities, so that no one of these phenomena is intelligible without the others. Hints of these ideas abound, of course, in the literature, and the degree of originality claimed is minimal. The interconnections, however, between these three basic concepts of the will, the reason, and the good, are of such great importance and are so usually ignored that I feel our short statement of the situation warrants the reader's sympathetic attention. Keine Bibliotheksbeschreibungen gefunden. |
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Google Books — Lädt ... GenresMelvil Decimal System (DDC)123Philosophy and Psychology Philosophy Of Humanity Chance, Free Will, And NecessityKlassifikation der Library of Congress [LCC] (USA)BewertungDurchschnitt:
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Chapter one sets the problem up. He describes the common, practical acceptance of free will in our day to day lives. He argues that the modern determinists "prove too much," and convert their position from a metaphysical one to a merely semantic one.
Chapter two delves into his intuitionist case for libertarianism. This is not surprising given his strong interest in epistemological pragmatism elsewhere in his work.
Chapter three wrestles with the question of whether the principle of sufficient reason is violated by the libertarian position.
Chapter four looks to Charles Peirce and his discussion of habit for what Davis describes as the most compelling evidence for determinism: the phenomenon of "habit" in animals generally and in humans in particular.
Chapter five examines whether the free will implies some sort of causeless spontaneity. Davis counters with his explanation of what he describes as "self-determinism." He directly addresses the claims of Richard Brandt in this chapter.
Chapter six delves more broadly into the physical and metaphysical implications of hard determinism. He argues, contra other libertarians, that quantum physics does not make determinism any less formidable a position. He recounts a story relating to a discussion between William James and a friend who was sickened by the idea of an irreducibly complex universe whose events could not be entirely described by any physical law.
Chapter seven examines whether determinism means that man can or ought to be able to predict the future. He describes this problem as an "embarrassment" for determinism.
Chapter eight is one of the longest sections of the book. Here, Davis turns to an examination of the implications of the free will position, which he admits are "frightening" and inspiring of awe and humility. He spends some time on the Existentialists here.
Chapter nine describes the free will phenomenon of "self-transcendence" where we human beings "may, if we choose, do the thing which we less want to do." He asserts that free will means that "A man may not only do what he pleases, but he may also please what he pleases" and work to change his own preferences over time. There is a struggle in the individual between "good and evil" or perhaps between "reason and passion."
Chapter ten talks about the problem of self-deception and a sort of "will to believe."
Chapter eleven examines the relationship between moral conscience and free will.
Chapter twelve looks at "the relation between the will, the reason, and the good." Ever the Pragmatist, Davis again relies on James and Peirce heavily here.
In his conclusion, Davis admits that the determinists have "an apparent clarity which seduces us." He professes finally that the human animal endlessly operates under the hope that the truth of this and other issues will come to light by examinations such as these.
This work is a delightful, short read. It surveys the frequent points of contention for the libertarian position, and it handles them respectfully but with enthusiasm. Davis shows his work, and acknowledges the heavy debt he owes to the Pragmatists in shaping his own views. ( )