David Loyn
Autor von In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian and American Occupation
Werke von David Loyn
Zugehörige Werke
Getagged
Wissenswertes
- Geburtstag
- 1954-03-01
- Geschlecht
- male
- Nationalität
- UK
- Kurzbiographie
- David joined the BBC as a TV news reporter in 1987.
In his early years he reported on the first free elections in Poland, the fall of Berlin Wall and the Romanian Revolution.
After a short spell as a political correspondent in 1993 he became South Asia correspondent based in Delhi.
He reported frequently from Kashmir and Sri Lanka, and followed the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. His crew were the only journalists with the Taliban when they took Kabul.
After returning to Britain he was acting defence correspondent in 1997.
The following year he focussed on Kosovo in a series of reports culminating in the discovery of a massacre. That report won the Royal Television Society award for Foreign News, and David was also made RTS Journalist of the Year in the same year, for a portfolio which included Kosovo and a film for the BBC's Newsnight programme from Hurricane Mitch.
David is currently international development correspondent, and has covered several natural disasters, including the Bam earthquake, the Asian tsunami and the Haiti earthquake. He has reported from Afghanistan almost every year since 1995.
In 2007 he secured a rare interview with the Taliban's military commander in Helmand, spending several days behind enemy lines.
David's first book "Frontline - how a group of British mavericks changed the face of war reporting" was shortlisted for the Orwell Prize in 2005. His second book "Butcher and Bolt" tells the story of 200 years of foreign engagement in Afghanistan.
Before joining the BBC in 1985 David was named Sony Radio Reporter of the Year, for a series of reports from India following the death of Indira Gandhi.
Mitglieder
Rezensionen
Auszeichnungen
Dir gefällt vielleicht auch
Nahestehende Autoren
Statistikseite
- Werke
- 5
- Auch von
- 2
- Mitglieder
- 139
- Beliebtheit
- #147,351
- Bewertung
- 4.0
- Rezensionen
- 3
- ISBNs
- 15
It was America’s longest war. Yet I suspect many of us rarely noticed except for the early fight against al-Qaeda and the failed attempt to catch Bin Ladin, the death of Bin Ladin in 2011, and the scenes of the hectic withdrawal in the summer of 2021, eerily reminiscent of the departure of the U.S. from Vietnam in 1975.
David Loyn, a BBC reporter in Afghanistan, and for a year, communications adviser to President Ashraf Ghani, traces this long history. The recurring theme seems to be the lack of a sustained investment in what was needed to decisively defeat the Taliban, protect and invest in the development of the country, and effectively hand over to the indigenous government. It felt like being prescribed an antibiotic and taking it just enough to eliminate symptoms, then backing off, allowing the resurgence and resistance of the infection, complicated by the alternatives to the Taliban–governments reliant on the support of the country’s warlords, powerful and corrupt and resented by the people.
Loyn traces the problems back to decisions made early on. The Bush administration wanted a “light footprint,” reserving forces for the Iraq invasion, which was the military’s primary focus. This led to limited U.S participation in the pursuit of Bin Ladin, allowing his escape. Efforts to eliminate al-Qaeda’s allies, the Taliban, were hampered by the character of the international force and the complicated rules of engagement under which each company operated. Nevertheless, the Taliban was pushed back from Kabul and Kandahar and into the mountainous borders with Pakistan.
This allowed the Taliban a chance to re-group and take an insurgency approach, using IED’s and other disruptive measures against occupiers, gradually regaining ground rather than engaging in open warfare, protected by supposed US allies, the Pakistanis. By 2009, at the beginning of the Obama administration, it became clear a new strategy was needed. Special ops raids to strike key Taliban targets often resulted in civilian casualties and an increased hatred of the foreign presence. And as the US fell into disfavor with the Karzai government, the Taliban succeeded in recruiting disaffected Afghanis. And so the US “surged” troops, engaging in both counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism approaches under a succession of generals (McKiernan, McChrystal, and Petraeus). McChrystal continued to press for more troops, as much to protect the population as to kill terrorists. He got part of what he wanted and timetables for withdrawal, first by 2012 and then 2014, that hamstrung these efforts.
Both the Taliban and the U.S. began to explore talks, often cutting out the Afghan government, further rankling relations. As US and UN commanders sought to train Afghanis, the number of incidents rose of Afghanis turning on and killing their supposed allies. As the pullbacks continued, sometimes temporarily interrupted during the Trump administration, the Taliban continued to regain more of the country.
Loyn’s account ends before the hurried flight of the US from Afghanistan and the victory of the Taliban over the disappearing Afghan military and government. But it is pretty clear what was coming. It was the predictable end result of efforts to fight the war “on the cheap” (even though it ended up quite costly in money and lives). He shows the folly of unclear war aims, inadequate resources to do what needs to be done, ignorance of the nature of the culture, and a labyrinthine command and operational structure.
Loyn’s perspective seems to be that a longer term investment in counter insurgency with sufficient resources to defeat the enemy while winning the people and giving the young government breathing space would have led to a different outcome. We pretended not to be nation building until we were nation building, ambivalent in our investment of resources and troops and ignorant of the warlord structures that siphoned off so much of what we spent there. It seems to me that we were never quite clear why we were there, especially after the initial offensive against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. That itself seems to be problematic.
I suspect all this will be debated for years to come. Loyn’s book is a good starting point, tracing the decisions made, the different parties to the war, and its unfolding over twenty years. Let us hope that after Vietnam and Afghanistan we will learn how to avoid embroiling ourselves in these things.
____________________________
Disclosure of Material Connection: I received a complimentary review copy of this book from the publisher via Netgalley in exchange for an honest review. The opinions I have expressed are my own.… (mehr)