Patrick Porter

Excellent book that shows taking extremes when judging the opposition while running the state [and with it state's foreign policy and external conflicts] results in same - downfall of assumptions albeit at the cost of lives and not just academic pride.

In order to fully achieve insight into unknown parts of the world it is not only necessary to collect data but also to look into without bias and get actual, historical and non-biased information [with context] to create the view of the world one is to enter - as a tourist, economist, entrepreneur or invasion army.

This is especially important when entering parts of the world where society structure is completely different, politics are nowhere close to homeland's and it is very easy to get enamored with exotic locales and way of life. When encountering different societies people get pushed over the brink - in negative way or positive way. Usually there is no middle ground. It is very easy to dismiss these others as barbarians, or dismiss one's own culture as overburdened when compared to advantages (be it simplicity or something else) of life of people in exotic countries. In any case how we approach the situation and foreign societies in instinctive way says more about us then about people we observe. Usually observer compares things with what he knows and fears and more often then not gets to the completely wrong conclusions (at least (or better said - hopefully only) in the beginning). Everything can be learned and minds can change but to achieve that correctly is to exclude one self from the observation.

As author states throughout the book culture is not static but dynamic element - it is directed by relations within certain society and with other societies, conflicts (internal and external) and application of lessons learned through history. Humans are humans no matter where they live - if tool or approach cannot be used to achieve advantage it will be discarded, approaches changed, tools retooled and tested again.

To focus on the culture as a static element (expecting behavior on the basis of archetypes for given area) is to make same error as it is to go to much into questions of culture scientifically and pile out data without context - and therefore lose valuable insights that would explain lots of things. Chapters on B. Liddell Hart and the way he used Mongols to push for ideas on mechanization shows that sometime scientists create proofs for their own theories. Sometimes they prove to be right (or at least point in the right direction) but this is not correct scientific approach.

Although academically written book style is very easy to follow. Everything the author states is given in a very precise and lean way, and backed up with examples, proofs (provided in the retrospective of course) and detailed notes. Chapters on Japan, Mongols and (from modern times) IDF's conflict in summer of 2006 were especially informative.

Author made me see that what one might take for granted (or at least expected) - that governments do their job before entering conflict and check against who and why - seems to be rarely done and depending on the standing on possible opposition could lead to total blunder. It is so easy to stir the masses with the rhetoric when no one ever asks the important question - who and why? Maybe when people start to ask these questions governments will also change. Hope remains.

Highly recommended to military history readers.… (mehr)

Patrick Porter's Military Orientalism provides an excellent analysis of the recent culturally-focused bent within western military thinking. "It is not a question of whether culture matters," writes Porter, "but how it matters, and how to conceptualise [sic:] it." This is expressed through several case studies: British perceptions and accounts of the Russo-Japanese War, interwar military thinking and the "lessons" of Ghengis Khan (particularly as expressed by Basil Liddell Hart), the United States and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and finally Israel's experience in the 2006 Lebanon War.

Almost without exception, Porter does a fantastic job outlining relevancies, misperceptions, and the 'trap' that is overawareness of an enemy's culture. While there are certainly traditions and beliefs that inform the actions of say, al Qaeda, they are equally willing to preserve their own lives at the cost of their perceived traditions. Porter also goes on to demonstrate how a group like al Qaeda might encourage such unchanging assumptions, as then any deviation from those expectations will easily surprise their opponents.

However, it is the last of the case studies that might be a stretch. While Israel is certainly to be considered a part and an ally of the west, the circumstances and nature of their war in Lebanon is a bit tricky to use as an example of military orientalism. More than some sort of cultural bias, what the Lebanese experience shows is perhaps an overreliance on Israeli military history - a case of generals preparing to fight the previous war.

Nevertheless, Porter's book is an excellent counterpart to those professing to understand the "Arab mind" and other such monolithic nonsense, and recommended reading for anyone engaged in study on the middle east and eastern military history in general.… (mehr)

From the Ancient Greeks’ obsession with the armies of the Persians, Westerners have been irresistibly drawn to the exotic nature of ‘Oriental’ warfare and have sought either to emulate their enemies’ imagined ways of fighting or to incorporate Eastern warriors and ‘martial races’, such as the Sikhs and Gurkhas, in their own forces. The alluring yet terrifying prospect of Samurai warriors, obedient to an ancient code of chivalry, or of the Mongol cavalry thundering across the steppes, continue to grip our imagination, while the courage and fighting prowess of today’s ‘Eastern’ warriors, the Taliban and Hezbollah, have been grudgingly acknowledged by the high tech armies of NATO in Afghanistan and the IDF in Lebanon. Such romantic notions are based on a highly questionable premise, namely that race, culture and tradition are separate and primordial, and that they determine how societies fight. But how far does culture shape war? Do non-Westerners approach strategy, combat, or death in ways intrinsically different from their Eastern neighbours? This debate can be tracked through time, from Herodotus onwards, and features in innumerable histories and literary works as well as in poetry, art and oral epics. Yet there are few histories of the idea itself. Military Orientalism argues that viewing culture as a script that dictates warfare is wrong, and that our obsession with the exotic can make it harder, not easier, to know the enemy. Culture is powerful, but it is an ambiguous repertoire of ideas rather than a clear code for action. To divide the world into western, Asiatic or Islamic ways of war is a delusion, one whose profound impact affects contemporary war and above all the War on Terror. Porter’s fascinating book explains why the ‘Oriental’ warrior inspires fear, envy and wonder and how this has shaped the way Western armies fight.… (mehr)