John Sides

I liked this book in many ways, though my feeling is it's a 3.5 star read, not really a 4 star. Reasons: turns out, people who voted for Trump had reservoirs of animus (or at least distrust, doubts, etc.) toward black people, Muslims, and immigrants, especially Latino immigrants. Surprise, surprise. But, in addition, it turns out they were *not* (primarily) motivated by economic concerns. There were two (large) contending theories about Trump's victory, and this book seems to shoot down the "it was *really* economic worries/trouble/despair/etc." contender.

But given that, it does seem like there are a few shaky points. One is that the book, several times, kind of reverses itself (at least in part, and possibly not at all if/once I reread it.) Case in point, 80% of the book builds up the conclusion that "Its race, stupid," but then the last chapter (and some content elsewhere) points that the partisan loyalty and the entirely predictable party-flip-after-two-terms mechanics also predict Trump's victory (or that, at least, his victory slots right into that, much the same statement.)

Perhaps this is due to there being three authors, with different chapters being written by different people (and hence different "voices", different phrasings and points being stressed, etc.) Or, the authors themselves don't quite buy the simple summary they themselves made on at least one podcast where I heard (all of them) interviewed.

Another shaky point is assumptions. At an early point in the book, the authors cite a paper that "plausibly" concludes (in their paraphrasing) that since voters didn't vote for more progressive economic policies, that they were not worried about economics. Fine, as far as it goes (and this makes sense with their findings that many Trump voters where economically liberal, conservative voters.) But how many conservatives do you know who, when asked by political scientists, call for more socialist/progressive economic policies? At least in the US, we just got off years of Tea Party activists calling for the opposite (because they believe e.g. less regulation and "free markets" will solve economic problems.)

And finally, I worry because of how much some of this all rests on just making calls. (What doesn't, at base, and especially in something as complex as political/social science, right? I know.) Example: a plot is shown with, if I remember correctly, different quartiles (or maybe it was quintiles) and when they recovered from the 2007-2009 economic crash. It shows income (or wealth, I should really find this plot again) the curve of each... quintile. Anyway, the point was that the second highest earning group had recovered something like 12 to 18 months before the election and, because people vote on their recent economic history and not their long-term history, economics was not a part of the election. But that seems crazy to me... and maybe I'm just wrong. But if I'm struggling for say 2007-2008 to 2015, and at 2015 I finally break even and then by 2016 I'm up 0.25% or something... I'm still thinking about it.

As weird as it might seem, I'd like to see more data and explanation here. But more sociological and/or anthropological data about this kind of stuff. I feel like political science is working at the edge of its expertise here.

Anyway, in some ways, these points are picking around the edges (see 3.5-star comment above, and a 4-star rating, thanks to Goodreads.) But as someone who thinks, "Of course it's about race and ethnicity and culture and religion; the US is an expanding experiment in heterogeneity and everyone seems to keep forgetting that that is WEIRD," and, "Uhh, duh, racists," I didn't come away as convinced as I feel I should have.… (mehr)

I really appreciate the way John Sides & his co-authors approach these books. Some may find them dry, but they are about as non-political as it gets, and they are stuffed full of important information, all back by data and statistics.

This book was especially interesting to me given the chaotic nature of it. I was one of the many people shocked by what happened in 2016, and it seems everyone under the sun has their own opinion of how it all transpired.

Through the data presented in this book though, it's clear what drove Trump supporters to the polls in November 2016 (hint: it wasn't economic anxiety as many like to claim), what motivated them (hint: often xenophobia and racism), and what actually was going on with the discrepancy between public polling and the final results.

All in all, if you're a political junkie like me, you'll find this interesting. I'm very interested in reading Sides's account of the 2020 election, which comes out next month.… (mehr)

Most political non-fiction, particularly when dealing with US elections, tends to be skewed by the author's biases. Mark Halperin and John Heilemann's books, Game Change and Game Change: 2012, which I read back in 2020, prove this. Even the best books that dissect elections and their implications, like Jared Yates Sexton The People Are Going To Rise Like the Waters Upon Your Shore, succumb to this.

It was a breath of fresh air, then, to find The Gamble. Decidedly non-partisan, this book dedicates itself to dissecting the statistical data available during and in the wake of the 2012 election. It offers insights into what aided Obama, what hurt Romney, and what actually led to Obama's win.

While some may find it dry for that reason, I adored it. Not only did I learn a lot about election statistics and fundamentals, but the information had facts and figures to back it up (seriously; the appendix is 100 pages long, or thereabouts).

Despite the 2012 election being a decade ago, this was still a valuable read and one I recommend to those who are interested in political science.… (mehr)