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Lädt ... Clashes: Air Combat over North Vietnam 1965-1972von Michel L. Marshall, III
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Melde dich bei LibraryThing an um herauszufinden, ob du dieses Buch mögen würdest. Keine aktuelle Diskussion zu diesem Buch. This is an exceptional work of history. In this well-written and organized treatment, Michel covers the air war over North Vietnam during the two major air campaigns of the war: Operation Rolling Thunder and Linebacker I/II. Michel provides the most cogent overview I have read of the challenges that the U.S. faced (from missile reliability issues to misguided tactics) as well as the competitive nature of adaption during the war. Full of relevant data on air-to-air losses and the differences between the Air Force and Navy's approaches to air combat, this is a must read for military analysts, air power enthusiasts and historians interested in the Vietnam conflict. Zeige 2 von 2 keine Rezensionen | Rezension hinzufügen
Literaturhinweise zu diesem Werk aus externen Quellen. Wikipedia auf Englisch (18)A retired U.S. Air Force fighter pilot and Vietnam veteran makes full use of recently declassified U.S. documents in this first comprehensive study of fighter combat over North Vietnam. His balanced, exhaustive coverage describes and analyzes both Air Force and Navy engagements with North Vietnamese MiGs while simultaneously discussing the SAM threat and U.S. countermeasures, laser-guided bombs, and U.S. attempts to counter the MiG threat with a variety of technologies. Accessible yet professional, Clashes is filled with valuable lessons that are as valid today as they were in the 1960s and 1970s. Some sixty-five photographs, tables, pie charts, maps, and diagrams of American and North Vietnamese formations and tactics are included. Beginning with the first air-to-air engagements of Operation Rolling Thunder in 1965, Marshall Michel describes the initial American successes against the MiGs and the stunning turn of events in late 1967 when the North Vietnamese began shooting down more U.S. aircraft than they,lost. He explains how in 1968, at the end of Rolling Thunder, the U.S. Air Force ignored problems with their tactics, formations, and missiles, while the U.S. Navy undertook a complete reassessment of its air-to-air operations and formed its famous Topgun course. The second part of the book, covering Operation Linebacker in 1972, examines the results of these two approaches and how the Navy scored heavily against the MiGs while the Air Force continued to suffer losses to MiG-21s. Michel offers extraordinary insights into events that led to this situation and the Air Force's efforts to reverse the trend. This combination of descriptions of actual dogfights with authoritative analysis of the tactics, pilot skills, high-level decision making, and shortcomings - more than 57 percent of U.S. air-to-air missiles malfunctioned and less than 13 percent scored a kill - will prove indispensable to everyone with Keine Bibliotheksbeschreibungen gefunden. |
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Google Books — Lädt ... GenresMelvil Decimal System (DDC)959.7043History and Geography Asia Southeast Asia Vietnam 1949- 1961–1975 Vietnamese WarKlassifikation der Library of Congress [LCC] (USA)BewertungDurchschnitt:
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As Michel notes, given the tactics and technology employed, the air war in North Vietnam "was the one area of the Vietnam War that has military significance in the global balance of power." There both sides deployed planes and weapons designed for a potential war in Europe between the Soviet Union and NATO. For the United States Air Force, this meant using F-105 fighter-bombers built to strike their enemies quickly, relying upon speed for protection. Armed with heart-seeking and radar-guided missiles, they were designed without cannons in the belief that, in the new age of missiles, dogfighting was obsolete. This was soon proved mistaken, as the smaller and more agile MiG-17s posed a challenge for which the F-105s were poorly equipped. Armed with cannons as well as missiles the Navy's F-8s proved much more capable of meeting the threat, though their pilots were also frustrated by technical problems with the missiles and rules requiring visual confirmation before attacking, which often inhibited the ability to launch their weapons.
As the war went on, all sides adapted in response to what they learned. For the North Vietnamese, this involved developing an elaborate ground control interception (GCI) system that employed both North Vietnamese fighters and growing numbers of anti-air cannons and missiles. While both the Air Force and the Navy sought improved weapons and supporting technology, the Air Force's exclusive reliance on technical fixes contrasted with the Navy, which in 1968 established the Topgun School in an effort to improve dogfighting abilities. New aircraft were also introduced — the F-4 for the U.S., the MiG-21 for the North Vietnamese — which also represented an escalation in ability prior to the termination of the North Vietnamese bombing campaign by President Lyndon Johnson in March 1968.
When Johnson's successor Richard Nixon resumed the bombing in North Vietnam in 1972, the new lessons were employed in full. The Air Force found themselves launching ever-larger missions to bomb tough North Vietnamese targets, while North Vietnamese pilots adopted new tactics to contest control of the air. By now the superiority of the Navy's approach was becoming more indisputable, reflected as it was in the superior kill ratios of North Vietnamese places to their Air Force counterparts. As a result, once the war ended in 1973 the Air Force moved to establish their own Weapons School to teach the hard-won lessons of the now-concluded conflict and employ them to secure American air superiority in future wars.
As a former F-4 pilot who flew in Vietnam, Michel brings a firsthand familiarity to his subject. This he uses to interpret the mass of staff reports, expert assessments, and personal narratives that he draws upon to detail the various airborne engagements that defined the war. He does this dispassionately, favoring analysis over dramatic narrative, yet his book engages the reader with its clearheaded insights and perceptive conclusions. While it suffers from the lopsided nature of his coverage favoring the Americans (understandable, given the relative inaccessibility of North Vietnamese records), this is nonetheless the best history of its subject, one that explains the hows and whys of the air war in North Vietnam better than every other book out there. ( )