Even hardened students of the Vietnam War may glance over this monograph and groan that, whatever else this book is, it is a return to the great numbers war and the question of what MACV believed the state of play was, and why, in regards to the nature of enemy the United States was fighting. However, since there are true believers who are still insisting that Tet (and the rolling series of offensives that followed in its wake) represented a victory denied, there is a great pay-off in examining the numbers. The reality is that how ever much damage was done to the Communist forces they always sprang back and, in the end, broke the American replacement system (by early 1969) before MACV could break theirs.

One point that Moise emphasizes is that he doesn't believe that there was actually a system of lies, unless you count self-deceit. The question with General Westmoreland and his subordinates always remains the difference between incomprehension and incompetence, besides the difference between maintaining confidence and believing your own propaganda. ( )