W. H. DavisRezensionen

What a pleasure it is to crack open this book and read the words of my old professor! He explains in the preface his frustrations with determinists and his view that they fail to directly address the claims of metaphysical libertarians like Davis.

Chapter one sets the problem up. He describes the common, practical acceptance of free will in our day to day lives. He argues that the modern determinists "prove too much," and convert their position from a metaphysical one to a merely semantic one.

Chapter two delves into his intuitionist case for libertarianism. This is not surprising given his strong interest in epistemological pragmatism elsewhere in his work.

Chapter three wrestles with the question of whether the principle of sufficient reason is violated by the libertarian position.

Chapter four looks to Charles Peirce and his discussion of habit for what Davis describes as the most compelling evidence for determinism: the phenomenon of "habit" in animals generally and in humans in particular.

Chapter five examines whether the free will implies some sort of causeless spontaneity. Davis counters with his explanation of what he describes as "self-determinism." He directly addresses the claims of Richard Brandt in this chapter.

Chapter six delves more broadly into the physical and metaphysical implications of hard determinism. He argues, contra other libertarians, that quantum physics does not make determinism any less formidable a position. He recounts a story relating to a discussion between William James and a friend who was sickened by the idea of an irreducibly complex universe whose events could not be entirely described by any physical law.

Chapter seven examines whether determinism means that man can or ought to be able to predict the future. He describes this problem as an "embarrassment" for determinism.

Chapter eight is one of the longest sections of the book. Here, Davis turns to an examination of the implications of the free will position, which he admits are "frightening" and inspiring of awe and humility. He spends some time on the Existentialists here.

Chapter nine describes the free will phenomenon of "self-transcendence" where we human beings "may, if we choose, do the thing which we less want to do." He asserts that free will means that "A man may not only do what he pleases, but he may also please what he pleases" and work to change his own preferences over time. There is a struggle in the individual between "good and evil" or perhaps between "reason and passion."

Chapter ten talks about the problem of self-deception and a sort of "will to believe."

Chapter eleven examines the relationship between moral conscience and free will.

Chapter twelve looks at "the relation between the will, the reason, and the good." Ever the Pragmatist, Davis again relies on James and Peirce heavily here.

In his conclusion, Davis admits that the determinists have "an apparent clarity which seduces us." He professes finally that the human animal endlessly operates under the hope that the truth of this and other issues will come to light by examinations such as these.

This work is a delightful, short read. It surveys the frequent points of contention for the libertarian position, and it handles them respectfully but with enthusiasm. Davis shows his work, and acknowledges the heavy debt he owes to the Pragmatists in shaping his own views.