Albert O. Hirschman (1915–2012)
Autor von Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States
Über den Autor
Werke von Albert O. Hirschman
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (1970) 438 Exemplare
Leidenschaften und Interessen : politische Begründungen des Kapitalismus vor seinem Sieg (1977) 406 Exemplare
Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action (Eliot Janeway Lectures on Historical Economics) (1982) 75 Exemplare
Latin American issues; essays and comments 10 Exemplare
The Postwar Economic Order: National Reconstruction and International Cooperation (2022) 5 Exemplare
National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (The Politics of the international economy) (1980) 5 Exemplare
Salida, voz y lealtad 1 Exemplar
De Consumidor a Cidadão 1 Exemplar
Le passioni e gli interessi. Argomenti politici in favore delmcapitalismo prima del suo trionfo 1 Exemplar
, : , 1 Exemplar
Política Econômica na América Latina 1 Exemplar
Tre continenti: economia politica e sviluppo della democrazia in Europa, Stati Uniti e America Latina (1990) 1 Exemplar
Interés privado y acción pública 1 Exemplar
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Wissenswertes
- Rechtmäßiger Name
- Hirschmann, Otto Albert
- Geburtstag
- 1915-04-07
- Todestag
- 2012-12-10
- Geschlecht
- male
- Nationalität
- Deutschland (Geburt)
USA - Geburtsort
- Berlin, Deutschland
- Sterbeort
- Ewing Township, New Jersey, USA
- Wohnorte
- Deutschland
Frankreich
USA
Kolumbien - Ausbildung
- Sorbonne
London School of Economics
University of Trieste (PhD) - Berufe
- Ökonom
- Beziehungen
- Colorni, Eugenio (brother-in-law)
Fry, Varian (colleague)
Hirschmann, Ursula (sister)
Gold, Mary Jayne (colleague)
Fittko, Lisa (colleague) - Organisationen
- Yale University
Columbia University
Harvard University
Institute for Advanced Study - Kurzbiographie
- Otto Albert Hirschman was born to a prosperous German Jewish family in Berlin. His parents were Hedwig and Carl Hirschmann, a surgeon, and he had two sisters, Eva and Ursula Hirschmann. He later changed the order of his given names and dropped the final "n" from his surname. He studied at the Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, the Sorbonne, the London School of Economics, and the University of Trieste, where he received his doctorate in economics in 1938. At age 21, he volunteered to fight for the anti-fascist Republic in the Spanish Civil War. When France was occupied by Nazi Germany at the start of World War II, he joined the Emergency Rescue Committee mission in Marseille led by Varian Fry that helped more than 2,000 Jews and other refugees escape, among them Marc Chagall, Marcel Duchamp, and Hannah Arendt. He also fought with the French Resistance. He went to the USA in 1941 as a Rockefeller Fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, where he met and married his wife, Sarah Chapiro, another émigré. He enlisted in the U.S. Army, which sent him back to Europe to work with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Among his tasks was serving as an interpreter at war crimes trials. After the war, he worked with the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, DC, focusing on European reconstruction under the Marshall Plan. He became a private financial advisor to the nation of Colombia in 1954-1956. On his return to the USA, he began a 30-year career as an academic, holding a series of appointments that blended economics, politics, and culture at Yale, Columbia, Harvard, and the Institute for Advanced Study. Prof. Hirschman was highly influential in many fields. His writings ranged from geographically specific studies on economic development, such as Journeys Toward Progress: Studies of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America (1963) to broader works such as Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States (1970).
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The Postwar Economic Order: National Reconstruction… von Albert O. Hirschman
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Hirschman majd 50 éves kötete arra vállalkozik, hogy nekimegy a klasszikus közgazdaságtan alaptételének (ami azóta már, gyanítom, nem annyira alaptétel), a „láthatatlan kéz” elméletének. Eszerint ugyanis a szabadversenyes kapitalizmus egyik tartópillére az, hogy ha egy vállalat termelékenysége csökken, akkor a vásárlók elpártolnak a cégtől (a szerző ezt nevezi kivonulásnak), ami a céget arra inspirálja, hogy javítson saját hatásfokán – és csiribú-csiribá, a szabadversenyes kapitalizmus máris regenerálta önmagát. Hirschman szerint azonban ez nincs így, mert 1.) ha a gyenge teljesítés általános (akár összejátszás folytán), akkor a kivonulók legfeljebb egy másik, ugyanolyan rosszul teljesítő céghez tudnak kivonulni, az meg halottnak a csók 2.) manapság szinte minden vállalatnak van kihasználatlan kapacitása („slack”), amiből esetleg el tudnak karistolni egy darabig még akkor is, ha jelentős számú vásárló hagyja faképnél őket 3.) itt vannak az úgynevezett „lusta monopóliumok” is, akik megelégednek azokkal a vásárlókkal, akik túl enerváltak, vagy egyenesen hülyék ahhoz, hogy alternatív szolgáltatásokkal váltsák le őket – mert Állam bácsi dotálja őket, úgyhogy igazából nem is szorulnak vásárlókra (igen, rád nézek, Magyar Posta, MÁV, meg a többi posztszoci szörnyszülött). Ebből következik, hogy a szimpla kivonulás nem elegendő visszacsatolás ahhoz, hogy üdvös változást idézzen elő – ám ahhoz, hogy kerek legyen a történet, Hirschmannak nem csak cáfolnia kell az elméletet, hanem új modellt is kénytelen alkotni*. Ennek érdekében bevezeti egyfelől a tiltakozás fogalmát, amelynek során a vásárlók nem otthagyják az adott vállalatot, hanem megmaradva vásárlónak, tiltakoznak a minőségromlás ellen. A szerző szerint ez az elem a kivonulással kiegészülve (lehetne) az igazi biztosítéka a szabadverseny öngyógyulásának – más kérdés, hogy a vásárlótól jóval több energiabefektetést igényel, mint a kivonulás. A harmadik fogalom pedig a hűség, ami akár racionális, akár irracionális (gondoljunk csak a magyar válogatott szurkolóira, nyehehe), Hirschman rendszerében meglehetősen pejoratív fogalom, mert lehetővé teszi, hogy a vállalatok megmaradjanak rossz beidegződéseiknél. Ezeknek a fogalmaknak a kombinációjával pedig már nagyon szép új modellt lehet alkotni.
Persze szép, vagy nem szép, el nem olvastam volna, ha csupán a közgazdaságra vonatkozna. De Hirschman rendszerében az a nagyszerű, hogy kábé mindenre rá lehet húzni – a pártpolitikai változásokra, az oktatásra, sőt: az Egyesült Államok egész történelmére is**. A kivonulás és a tiltakozás ezeknek a rendszereknek az öngyógyításában is elengedhetetlen, elég a totalitárius rezsimekre gondolni, amelyek lehetetlenné teszik őket, és ezzel rendesen el is veszítik sanszukat a megújulásra. Ez a sokszólamúság, és Hirschman széleskörű közgazdasági, pszichológiai és politológiai tudása az, amitől ez a rövid kötet olyan fontossá válik – annyira fontossá, hogy 1984-ben még a magyar Művelődési Minisztérium is kénytelen volt lefordítani. Azzal együtt, hogy a közgazdaságtan azóta már bizonyára számos változáson ment keresztül, kifejezetten inspiráló, nehéz, de velős szövegnek éreztem.
Update 2019: És arra kellett rájönnöm, hogy a közösségi oldalak esetében is tökéletesen megállja a helyét mindaz, amit Hirschman állít. Ha ugyanis egy oldal a tiltakozás lehetőségét szimplán technikai eszközökkel a felületen kívülre szorítja, akkor a kivonulás és hűség kettőse önmagában sosem lesz képes feloldani a működési anomáliákat. Mert egyedül a tiltakozás, a pozitív értelemben vett tiltakozás az, ami visszacsatolást jelent a működtető részére a problémákról - persze ha a működtetőt nem érdeklik a problémák, látni sem akarja őket, az már az ő baja. Mert a problémák attól még ott lesznek.
* "…egy modellt sohasem a tények – bármekkora cáfolóerejük van ezeknek egyébként –, hanem mindig csak egy másik modell hatására vetnek el a tudósok.” (a Streeten-Kuhn maxima)
** Hisz az USA születése is egy gigantikus kivonulás eredménye: az európai „szolgáltatásokkal” elégedetlen kivonulók alapították, és az egész Vadnyugat-mítosz is a kivonulás mítosza – hogy a pionír, ha nem találja a helyét keleten, elmehet a messzi nyugatra, a szűzföldekre, hogy a két kezével teremtsen magának szerencsét.… (mehr)
Persze szép, vagy nem szép, el nem olvastam volna, ha csupán a közgazdaságra vonatkozna. De Hirschman rendszerében az a nagyszerű, hogy kábé mindenre rá lehet húzni – a pártpolitikai változásokra, az oktatásra, sőt: az Egyesült Államok egész történelmére is**. A kivonulás és a tiltakozás ezeknek a rendszereknek az öngyógyításában is elengedhetetlen, elég a totalitárius rezsimekre gondolni, amelyek lehetetlenné teszik őket, és ezzel rendesen el is veszítik sanszukat a megújulásra. Ez a sokszólamúság, és Hirschman széleskörű közgazdasági, pszichológiai és politológiai tudása az, amitől ez a rövid kötet olyan fontossá válik – annyira fontossá, hogy 1984-ben még a magyar Művelődési Minisztérium is kénytelen volt lefordítani. Azzal együtt, hogy a közgazdaságtan azóta már bizonyára számos változáson ment keresztül, kifejezetten inspiráló, nehéz, de velős szövegnek éreztem.
Update 2019: És arra kellett rájönnöm, hogy a közösségi oldalak esetében is tökéletesen megállja a helyét mindaz, amit Hirschman állít. Ha ugyanis egy oldal a tiltakozás lehetőségét szimplán technikai eszközökkel a felületen kívülre szorítja, akkor a kivonulás és hűség kettőse önmagában sosem lesz képes feloldani a működési anomáliákat. Mert egyedül a tiltakozás, a pozitív értelemben vett tiltakozás az, ami visszacsatolást jelent a működtető részére a problémákról - persze ha a működtetőt nem érdeklik a problémák, látni sem akarja őket, az már az ő baja. Mert a problémák attól még ott lesznek.
* "…egy modellt sohasem a tények – bármekkora cáfolóerejük van ezeknek egyébként –, hanem mindig csak egy másik modell hatására vetnek el a tudósok.” (a Streeten-Kuhn maxima)
** Hisz az USA születése is egy gigantikus kivonulás eredménye: az európai „szolgáltatásokkal” elégedetlen kivonulók alapították, és az egész Vadnyugat-mítosz is a kivonulás mítosza – hogy a pionír, ha nem találja a helyét keleten, elmehet a messzi nyugatra, a szűzföldekre, hogy a két kezével teremtsen magának szerencsét.… (mehr)
In the foreword of my edition Amartya Sen maintains that the passions / interests contrast analyzed here is more extraordinary than the "alleged conundrum" of unintended effects in market theory. That is a biased and preposterous statement. This book is just a review of selected 18th and 19th century classics in economic theory and political economy. The author has plowed through many books and duly recorded how the words "interest" and "passion" are used in each. He puts together a reasonable narrative for how this word usage developed and what it meant, but it still amounts to little more than a very partial history of economic thought.
Towards the end of the book the author draws his comparison to von Mises' and Hayek's market theory which seems to have inspired Sen's musings in the foreword. The author writes "Curiously, the intended but unrealized effects of social decisions stand in need of being discovered even more than those effects that were unintended but turn out to be all too real". Lo and behold, this actually smells like social theory. But the curious thing is that the author's preceding literature review does not in any way touch upon any "intended but unrealized effects"; what they are or how they might be discovered. Certainly the author can't be thinking that, by reading the works of 18th century philosophers, he has discovered what 18th century people intended with their actions?
In any case, this book is a brief but well-written piece of 18th and 19th century intellectual history. If the author intended it to be something else, the effects of that intention were not realized in my reading of the book.… (mehr)
Towards the end of the book the author draws his comparison to von Mises' and Hayek's market theory which seems to have inspired Sen's musings in the foreword. The author writes "Curiously, the intended but unrealized effects of social decisions stand in need of being discovered even more than those effects that were unintended but turn out to be all too real". Lo and behold, this actually smells like social theory. But the curious thing is that the author's preceding literature review does not in any way touch upon any "intended but unrealized effects"; what they are or how they might be discovered. Certainly the author can't be thinking that, by reading the works of 18th century philosophers, he has discovered what 18th century people intended with their actions?
In any case, this book is a brief but well-written piece of 18th and 19th century intellectual history. If the author intended it to be something else, the effects of that intention were not realized in my reading of the book.… (mehr)
A rare book that is both insightful and less than two hundred pages. I miss the days when "serious" books got by their content and not by their length. Originally recommended to me by a freshman year professor, Exit, Voice and Loyalty is a classic for a good reason. I was recently reminded of it when in Con Law. Exit, voice and loyalty made a surprise appearance in Bruce Ackerman's article about the role of exit and Carolene Products footnote 4 (if "exit" from unpopular minorities is too easy, it makes it difficult organize activism. While it seems like it would be a disadvantage to be clearly identifiable as a minority, the ability to "cover" comes with its own problems). Some of the examples and politics are a bit outdated, and Hirshman clearly has his political sympathies (Ralph Nader gets a few honorable mentions, as does Eugene McCarthy), but this book is worth reading for the timeless principles Hirshman articulates as well as the breadth and creativity that he brings to economics.
The basic idea of the book is that there are two major responses to declines in firms or organizations. The first is exit, "vote with your feet" to stop buying the product or to quit the organization. The second is voice, to raise a ruckus by protest. Hirshman notes that economists tend to think of exit as the exclusive response, while political scientists tend to focus on the voice mechanism.
In Hirshman's model, firms face random quality deterioration that is correctable if management responds to either exit or voice. Hirshman makes the interesting note that for management to respond and correct, exit cannot be too fast or too slow, since aggressive exit would lead to the collapse of the firm before response. Exit also fails to correct firm decline, if the consumer just aimlessly cycles through what are substantially the same firms (some radicals argue that political parties allow the status quo through exactly this mechanism. Voters unhappy with one party exit it and switch to another, only to be disappointed and so-on, when in fact the problem is the system itself).
Voice can be a residual to exit, in some situations (such as monopoly or in autocracies) it may be possible that exit is impossible, and voice is the only response. Voice can also be a substitute to exit, consumers may protest before they stop buying a product. Voice is also more complicated in that members of an organization and consumers must consider the chance that their voice will be effective, and the worthwhileness of a correction compared to the certainty of another existing product. For that reason, organizational memberships and major purchases are likely to be places where voice is used as a substitute to exit.
The most interesting parts of the book come from the interactions between exit and voice. A special difficulty is that the consumers that are most quality conscious (consumers probably face different utilities from different quality levels, making it impossible to translate quality to effective price decreases) and thus in the best position to exercise voice to alert management to failure are also the most likely to exit in response to a decline in quality, leaving the firm to continue to decline. The examples that Hirshman uses are interesting, from Nigerian railroads (they were bad at the time because being publicly funded, management was not sensitive to exit, and the alternatives of cars allow quality sensitive consumers to exit the railroad), to shareholders who quickly sell instead of protesting to management (no longer strictly true, with the rise of activist shareholders. In a sense Hirshman anticipates this, as he mentions that there may be ways to make the voice mechanism more successful/less costly). Hirshman even argues that in some cases, monopolies want to create an exit option to rid itself of troublesome protestors, thereby making even competition a tool of monopolies. A fascinating chapter is Hirshman's answer to the failure of the medium voter theorem. The medium voter theorem predicts that all political parties move towards the center in order to maximize the number of voters. Hirshman notes the failure of this model when political parties consistently produce extreme candidates. Hirshman's answer is that the party may not be responsive to edge voters who exit the party if the party moves on the idealogical spectrum, but more responsive to the "captive" members of the party who voice. These captive members tend to be ideologues who want "purer" candidates.
There is a lengthy chapter on loyalty that explores some interesting ideas as well. Hirshman mentions that loyalty may be useful because it slows the exit of members and consumers, giving firms a chance to correct their decline. Loyalty many case consumers/members to be less sensitive to initial decline but more willing to use voice than others past a certain threshold. A loyalist's threat to exit is a combination of voice and exit, and organizations that make it impossible to threaten exit (that penalize threats of exit with death for example) collapse quickly. Finally, Hirshman discusses situations where loyalists cannot truly exit the organization, therefore turning their decision to exit into balance of the shame of staying in an organization and the chance of reforming "from the inside".
The chapter on applying the concepts to American politics is a little dated but still thoughtful. Hirshman notes that the US is a country formed out of those who "exited" other societies. One of the most thought provoking arguments in this chapter was that high achieving minorities tended to exit their cultural group, depriving that group of those most able to use voice to protest the injustices towards that minority. Hirshman notes in the book, that was the reason that political movements had been focusing on group upward mobility rather than individual upward mobility.
Hirshman ends the book with the note that organizations may have varying responses to exit and voice. That leads to the simple conclusion that to fix much decline, steps should be taken to either make the organization more sensitive to existing voice or exit or make it easier for voice/exit to come out. However, there might not be a stable optimal mix of voice/exit because those mechanisms are also subject to decline (Hirshman gives the example of LBJ administration institutionalizing dissent, keeping major players from resigning and affecting policy by allowing them to "air their conscience").
In short, highly recommended reading.
… (mehr)
The basic idea of the book is that there are two major responses to declines in firms or organizations. The first is exit, "vote with your feet" to stop buying the product or to quit the organization. The second is voice, to raise a ruckus by protest. Hirshman notes that economists tend to think of exit as the exclusive response, while political scientists tend to focus on the voice mechanism.
In Hirshman's model, firms face random quality deterioration that is correctable if management responds to either exit or voice. Hirshman makes the interesting note that for management to respond and correct, exit cannot be too fast or too slow, since aggressive exit would lead to the collapse of the firm before response. Exit also fails to correct firm decline, if the consumer just aimlessly cycles through what are substantially the same firms (some radicals argue that political parties allow the status quo through exactly this mechanism. Voters unhappy with one party exit it and switch to another, only to be disappointed and so-on, when in fact the problem is the system itself).
Voice can be a residual to exit, in some situations (such as monopoly or in autocracies) it may be possible that exit is impossible, and voice is the only response. Voice can also be a substitute to exit, consumers may protest before they stop buying a product. Voice is also more complicated in that members of an organization and consumers must consider the chance that their voice will be effective, and the worthwhileness of a correction compared to the certainty of another existing product. For that reason, organizational memberships and major purchases are likely to be places where voice is used as a substitute to exit.
The most interesting parts of the book come from the interactions between exit and voice. A special difficulty is that the consumers that are most quality conscious (consumers probably face different utilities from different quality levels, making it impossible to translate quality to effective price decreases) and thus in the best position to exercise voice to alert management to failure are also the most likely to exit in response to a decline in quality, leaving the firm to continue to decline. The examples that Hirshman uses are interesting, from Nigerian railroads (they were bad at the time because being publicly funded, management was not sensitive to exit, and the alternatives of cars allow quality sensitive consumers to exit the railroad), to shareholders who quickly sell instead of protesting to management (no longer strictly true, with the rise of activist shareholders. In a sense Hirshman anticipates this, as he mentions that there may be ways to make the voice mechanism more successful/less costly). Hirshman even argues that in some cases, monopolies want to create an exit option to rid itself of troublesome protestors, thereby making even competition a tool of monopolies. A fascinating chapter is Hirshman's answer to the failure of the medium voter theorem. The medium voter theorem predicts that all political parties move towards the center in order to maximize the number of voters. Hirshman notes the failure of this model when political parties consistently produce extreme candidates. Hirshman's answer is that the party may not be responsive to edge voters who exit the party if the party moves on the idealogical spectrum, but more responsive to the "captive" members of the party who voice. These captive members tend to be ideologues who want "purer" candidates.
There is a lengthy chapter on loyalty that explores some interesting ideas as well. Hirshman mentions that loyalty may be useful because it slows the exit of members and consumers, giving firms a chance to correct their decline. Loyalty many case consumers/members to be less sensitive to initial decline but more willing to use voice than others past a certain threshold. A loyalist's threat to exit is a combination of voice and exit, and organizations that make it impossible to threaten exit (that penalize threats of exit with death for example) collapse quickly. Finally, Hirshman discusses situations where loyalists cannot truly exit the organization, therefore turning their decision to exit into balance of the shame of staying in an organization and the chance of reforming "from the inside".
The chapter on applying the concepts to American politics is a little dated but still thoughtful. Hirshman notes that the US is a country formed out of those who "exited" other societies. One of the most thought provoking arguments in this chapter was that high achieving minorities tended to exit their cultural group, depriving that group of those most able to use voice to protest the injustices towards that minority. Hirshman notes in the book, that was the reason that political movements had been focusing on group upward mobility rather than individual upward mobility.
Hirshman ends the book with the note that organizations may have varying responses to exit and voice. That leads to the simple conclusion that to fix much decline, steps should be taken to either make the organization more sensitive to existing voice or exit or make it easier for voice/exit to come out. However, there might not be a stable optimal mix of voice/exit because those mechanisms are also subject to decline (Hirshman gives the example of LBJ administration institutionalizing dissent, keeping major players from resigning and affecting policy by allowing them to "air their conscience").
In short, highly recommended reading.
… (mehr)
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